The Scope of Foreign Assistance to North Korea’s Missile Program

Abstract

There is evidence that North Korea’s ballistic missile program benefited from support from the Soviet Union until its collapse and from Russia thereafter. Along with transfers of missile systems and rocket components, it appears that Russian engineers directly supported the program in North Korea. Analysis of missile launches, imagery, design solutions, and technology suggest that Pyongyang’s recent missile program may have continued to have external support despite a pause in the 2000s. This assistance may have enabled the progress in North Korea’s missile program leading to tests of an intercontinental range ballistic missile in 2017.

Notes and References

Acknowledgements

This article owes a great debt to Robert H. Schmucker, who first proposed the idea of foreign assistance to North Korea’s ballistic missile program. He also suggested major parts of the analysis presented here. The author is grateful for his encouragement to work in the field of rocket and missile program analysis and for his ideas and suggestions.

Notes

1 See, for example, David C. Wright, “North Korea’s Longest Missile Test Yet,” All Things Nuclear Blog, Union of Concerned Scientists, 28 November 2017, available at https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet.

2 Exact numbers may vary due to sources and interpretation, but North Korea is attributed with having more than a dozen unique guided ballistic missiles deployed and/or in production. This contrasts with China (12), Russia (∼10), India (∼9), the United States (3), and France (2). If true, North Korea’s missile program is as large as China’s, Russia’s, and India’s.

3 Narrative provided by Wikipedia at “North Korea and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Delivery Systems,” October 2018, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Delivery_systems.

4 Robert H. Schmucker, “3rd World Missile Development–A New Assessment Based on UNSCOM Field Experience and Data Evaluation.” 12th Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense: Responding to an Escalating Threat, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1–4 June 1999, available at http://www.st-analytics.de/app/download/5802794709/Schmucker_3rd_World_Missile.pdf.

5 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0 (Hamburg/Bonn: Mittler Verlag, 2015), ch. 3.4.

6 Ten days after the first successful launch, Rocket Lab logged its 500th static rocket engine test. See Rocket Lab Website, News update, 31 January 2018, available at http://rocketlabusa.com/news/updates/rocket-lab-reaches-500-rutherford-engine-test-fires/.

7 The United States did not produce the RD-180 engine despite years of support from the Russian producer/designer. India might have succeeded in designing and building a modified version of the S-75 Volga engine for the Prithvi after years of failed efforts at reverse engineering. Pakistan never produced Ghauri/Nodong engines. Although there is no consensus among experts, Iran may have successfully produced Scud and Nodong engines with foreign support.

8 The Russian RSM-56 Bulava SLBM logged 19 flight tests before it was commissioned in 2013, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSM-56_Bulava#2010_tests.

9 In 2011, the known North Korean–guided ballistic missiles were the Scud B, the Scud C, the Scud D, the Nodong, the Musudan, and the KN-02/Toksa. Of these six programs, there were only three failed Scud launches in 1984 and maybe one failed Nodong launch attempt in 1990, an unusually low number of failures for a missile program. The Taepodong I satellite launch in 1998 almost succeeded. Only the Unha satellite launcher program experienced significant failures.

10 For details on rocket development programs, see Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0, ch. 6.5.

11 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0, ch. 7.

12 The author has access to reliable data on various programs. Among them are A1, A2, A3, A5, A4 (Germany), R-1, R-1, R-5M, R-7, R-11, R-11M, R-12, R-17, R-27K, Temp-2S, Topol, Iskander, Bulava (Soviet Union/Russia), Atlas, Titan, Titan II, Trident C4, Trident 2 D5 (USA), M112, M45, M51 (France), Al-Hussein, Al-Samoud 2 (Iraq), DF-2, DF-3, and DF-4 (China). Data were collected over the past 50 years by Robert Schmucker and independently over the past 15 years by the author, with sources including original documents, personal communications, books, countless papers, and publicly available launch databases.

13 Between 1984 and 2014, the Scud B, Scud C, and the Nodong were launched at an average rate of roughly one every three years.

14 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0.

15 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, November 1999, 9.

16 Wikipedia, North Korea and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Delivery systems, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Korea_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Delivery_systems; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” 9.

17 Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” Technical Report TR-1268, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, September 2012, 101f, available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1268.html.

18 There are a few other countries where operational ballistic missiles also appeared without encountering any problems, for example, Pakistan. However, it can be shown that all these countries received massive support for their programs including transfers of complete missile systems.

19 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” 12.

20 IBID

21 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and W. Seth Carus, “The North Korean ‘Scud-B’ Programme,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, 1 (1989): 177–181.

22 Personal communication with former East German Scud brigade officers, January 2014–April 2016.

23 United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, 26–27, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/337.

24 Analysis conducted at Schmucker Technologie, Munich; results can be found in Raketenbedrohung 2.0.

25 Imagery can be found at the Wikimedia Commons site, available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Navy_021209-O-0000X-011_Scud_missile_parts_and_equipment_found_in_the_cargo_hold_aboard_the_North_Korean_vessel,_So_San,_discovered_after_being_boarded_by_Spanish_Special_Forces.jpg.

26 Karpenko, A.V., «СКАД»: от вертолетов до «Рекорда» и «Аэрофона», http://bastion-karpenko.narod.ru/R-17_2.pdf.

27 Barton Wright, World Weapon Database, Volume I–Soviet Missiles (Brookline, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1986), 381.

28 Guy Perrimond (ed.), “The Threat of Theatre Ballistic Missiles 1944–2001,” TTU Special Issue (2002): 8.

29 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korean Missile Chronology,” 2012 update, 252, available at https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/north_korea_missile_2.pdf?_=1327534760?_=1327534760.

30 Christoph Bluth, Korea (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 161.

31 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 407.

32 “Missiles Are Pivotal to North Korea’s Military Strategy Says Shorenstein APARC’s Daniel Sneider,” San Jose Mercury News, 25 July 2006, available at https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/news/missiles_are_pivotal_to_north_koreas_military_strategy_says_shorenstein_aparcs_daniel_sneider_20060725.

33 See, for example, David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshev, “An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile” Science & Global Security 4 (1994): 129–160.

34 Iran soon started working on an advanced version that is often referred to as the Ghadr-1. This missile has a proven range greater than 1,300 km with a smaller warhead.

35 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0.

36 Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 29.

37 Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 28.

38 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0, ch. 7.2.1–7.2.2.

39 Iran later addressed this flaw. Later versions of a modified Shahab 3, known as the Ghadr, are clearly capable of horizontal tanking.

40 Robert H. Schmucker, “3rd World Missile Development.

41 South Korean Ministry of Defense, ”North Korean Long-Range Missile Debris Survey.” 18 January 2013. English translation by David C. Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/SK-report-on-NK-rocket-debris-analysis-translation-1-18-13.pdf.

42 United Nations, “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009).”

43 See Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “Flashback to the Past: North Korea’s “New” Extended-Range Scud.” 38 North, 8 November 2016, available at http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scud-ER-110816_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf.

44 At that time, this missile was also referred to as the SS-12, but later, the designation shifted to SS-22. The Soviet system name was Temp-S.

45 Defense Intelligence Agency, SCUD B Study, August 1974, The National Security Archive, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document1.pdf.

46 Missile Threat and Proliferation, Musudan, Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 20 December 2018, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/musudan/; Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 88.

47 Some analysts proposed that a slightly different mixed oxides of nitrogen would solve this problem, but that would only have moved the small window of liquidity down to lower temperatures.

48 Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “Explaining the Musudan,” May 2012, available at http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2012/05/Explaining_the_Musudan_Schiller_Schmucker_v1.2.pdf

49 See, for example, David C. Wright, “A North Korean Mobile ICBM?” 38 North, 12 February 2012, available at http://www.38north.org/2012/02/dwright021212/.

50 See Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “A Dog and Pony Show,” April 2012, available at http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2012/04/KN-08_Analysis_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf.

51 See Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “Getting Better,” ST Analytics, October 2015, available at http://www.st-analytics.de/app/download/5799168213/Getting_Better_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf.

52 The SS-N-6 engine uses unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4 or NTO) as propellants. NTO freezes at approximately −15 °C and boils at just over 20 °C. It is therefore unsuitable to be deployed in the winter or the summer without thermal protection. Thermal protection is not provided to road-mobile missiles on a TEL that hides until the launch command is issued. In addition, the propellants are hypergolic. A breach in a pipe, valve, or propellant tank poses a threat of immediate explosion. Therefore, no country ever fielded a road-mobile missile with this propellant combination.

53 Yonhap News Agency, “日언론 "北, 화성-13형 개발 중단…연료 주입시간·출력 문제", 2 December 2017 (Daily Press, North, Hwasong-type 13 development stopped … fuel injection time, output problem). Available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2017/12/02/0200000000AKR20171202040300073.HTML?input=1195m.

54 Stated, for example, at KN-11 (Pukkuksong-1), Missile Threat–CSIS Missile Defense Project, available at https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-11/.

55 Rockets are designed as solid- or liquid-fueled. Each has unique airframes, stage size ratios, length to diameter ratios, tanks, and engines. Switching from liquid fuel to solid, or vice versa, is not possible.

56 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0.

57 North Korea is believed to have copied the Soviet SS-21 Tochka solid-fueled missile in the 2000s. The result, the North Korean KN-02 missile, looks like an exact replica of the Soviet original, which was readily available in several countries besides Russia, among them Syria, Belarus, Ukraine, and Yemen. The Tochka has a 0.65 m diameter solid rocket motor with a cartridged grain. The propellant is cast into a container inserted into the airframe. The added weight limits missile performance and reduces range. Modern high-performance rockets use case-bonded propellant grains, where the propellant adheres to the missile’s airframe skin and serves as the combustion chamber wall. This reduces weight, but the casting and production process is more complicated.

58 According to analyses at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. Jeffrey Lewis, personal communication, February 2017.

59 Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “Not Much Below the Surface?” Federation of American Scientists, Public Interest Report Summer/Fall 2015, available at https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/SchillerSchmuckerKim_Notmuchbelowthesurface.pdf.

60 See KCNAwatch.org for the original Rodong Sinmun newspaper from 20 September 2016, or the English website of Rodong Sinmun for the official English translation, available at https://kcnawatch.org/periodical/rodong-sinmun-257/ and http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-09-20-0002.

61 The SS-N-6 main engine uses a staged combustion cycle, which yields more performance but is harder to develop. The new engine used a gas generator cycle, like the Scud engine, but with more advanced technologies and higher pressure.

62 Norbert Brügge’s website on rockets and space launchers can be found at http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets_1/index.htm.

63 See Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).

64 KCNA and KCTV; Space Launch Vehicles, N. Brügge; M. Schiller.

65 Between 1962 and 1964, early development at OKB-456 (Moscow) required 145 static tests. In parallel, production at OKB-586 (Dnepropetrovsk) logged 174 static tests. Eighteen test launches of the R-36 added 72 engine firings at flight for a total of 391 firings. Vibration problems discovered in 1964 required redesigns and upgrades. Certification and additional modifications required more tests. In 1967, the RD-250 logged 392 tests, including 33 firings in 11 flights. In March 1968, after Phase 2 certification, the RD-250 series accumulated 1,860 static test firings and 310 flight firings at nearly 80 test flights. See Anatoly Zak, “The RD-250 Engine at the Center of an International Storm,” RussianSpaceWeb, 10 September 2017, available at http://www.russianspaceweb.com/rd250.html.

66 Rocket Lab, “Rocket Lab Reaches 500 Rutherford Engine Test Fires,” 1 January 2018, available at http://rocketlabusa.com/news/updates/rocket-lab-reaches-500-rutherford-engine-test-fires/.

67 See, for example, “Testing Times for SpaceX’s New Falcon 9 v.1.1” at NasaSpaceflight.com, available at https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2013/06/testing-times-spacexs-new-falcon-9-v-1-1/.

68 The satellites reached orbit at roughly 500 km. The only successful Musudan launch in June 2016 reportedly reached around 1,000 km peak altitude.

69 See, for example, Scott LaFoy, “TELS AND MELS AND TES! OH MY!,” ArmsControlWonk, 1 June 2017, available at https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203304/tels-and-mels-and-tes-oh-my/.

70 NTI, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” 4 May 2018. See the Excel database for details and further references, available at https://www.nti.org/documents/2137/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx.

71 Ankit Panda, “Exclusive: North Korea Tested Its New Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 3 Times in April 2017,” The Diplomat, 3 June 2017, available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/exclusive-north-korea-tested-its-new-intermediate-range-ballistic-missile-3-times-in-april-2017/.

72 Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “A Dog and Pony Show.”

73 See Markus Schiller and Nick Hansen, “Retro Rocket–North Korean ICBM Shows External Influence.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 30, March 2018, available at http://www.janes.com/images/assets/014/78014/2_North_Korean_ICBM_design_shows_external_influence.pdf.

74 KCNA, 29 November 2017. See https://kcnawatch.co/newstream/1511929851-215959348/dprk-govt-st/.

75 On both occasions, only the Unha satellite launcher was launched. The first launch, at Kim Il Sung’s 100th birthday, likely was already scheduled by Kim Jong Il. The second launch was likely in honor of Kim Jong Il, taking place about one year after his death.

76 Photos: KCNA/KCTV; Space Launch Vehicles, N. Brügge; M. Schiller.

77 Robert H. Schmucker and Markus Schiller, Raketenbedrohung 2.0.

78 Launch vehicle flight test history and plans for U.S manned spaceflight programs, Declassified Briefing Slide From 1965, Wikimedia Commons, available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USAF_ICBM_and_NASA_Launch_Vehicle_Flight_Test_Successes_and_Failures_(highlighted).png.

79 Launch vehicle flight test history, Wikimedia Commons.

80 Peter Hall, “Boden-Boden-Raketen–Militärische, historische und technische Aspekte,“2007, available at http://www.peterhall.de/srbm/nva/5rbr/5rbr48.html.

81 Photo RAND TR1268-5.2, Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 25.

82 Photo RAND TR1268-5.10, Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 30.

83 Photo RAND TR1268-5.1, Markus Schiller, “Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat,” 24.

84 Courtesy of German Customs Investigation (Zollfahndung).

85 Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “Getting Better – The New KN-08 Design”, Report, ST Analytics GmbH, Munich, 28 October 2015, available at http://www.st-analytics.de/app/download/5799168213/Getting_Better_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf.

86 KCNA and KCTV.

87 KCNA and KCTV.