Can Russian strategic submarines survive at sea? The fundamental limits of passive acoustics

Abstract

Deep reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenal of Russia raise very important questions about the survivability of its strategic forces. The Start I and II treaties will increase the role of Russian sea‐based strategic missiles in providing assured deterrence relative to its land‐ and air‐based forces. In this article, estimates are made, based on information available in the open technical literature, of the upper limits of the ranges at which Russian SSBNs can be detected by U.S. attack submarines. In particular, it is shown that it is implausible that U.S. attack submarines would be able to trail covertly Russian SSBNs on a day‐to‐day basis in their patrol areas in the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Marginal Ice Zones of the Arctic, provided that Russia applies advanced submarine silencing technologies and that the strategic submarines are properly maintained and operated.