Liberalism, Illiberalism, and the Environment

Environmental social science faces daunting theoretical and empirical challenges today, as the modern political ideas of liberalism that shaped its historical development encounter the growing influence of illiberal ideas and politics. “Liberalism”, in this sense, refers to the philosophical stance in which the rights and perspectives of individuals and minorities of various types and persuasions are protected or at least tolerated, and given due personal, political, and institutional space by states and civil society majorities (Zakaria 1997: 26).

Along with mainstream environmentalism and environmental policy, contemporary social theory of the environment emerged during the 20th century in close engagement with, and frequently in critique of, classical Western liberal values that include the rights of individuals, citizenship, pluralism, representative democracy, etc. Many nation states around the world are predicated at least nominally on the rule of law and the establishment of responsive/representative institutions, including those related to natural resources and the environment. Global institutions, including environmental institutions, are founded to a large degree on liberalism as well, including the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Rio Declaration, the recently endorsed global Sustainable Development Goals, and others.

Western liberal democracies hardly are universal today, however. Illiberalism seems increasingly prevalent, including within historically liberal states. Illiberalism appears in institutional arrangements ranging from centralized states to illiberal democracies, theocracies, monarchies, and nonstate diverse “rights” movements promoting millenarian societal transformation. In much of the world, liberal states and institutions coexist with, and are at times overshadowed by, illiberal counterparts, rivals, and critics. Yet at the same time, strained by a seemingly endless series of actual and perceived social and environmental crises, all states face increased calls for environmental intervention, often even over the rights of individuals, communities, and dependent territories.

This special issue seeks to advance social scientific understanding of society–environment relations in illiberal political and institutional contexts through evidence-informed analysis of a series of cases around the world. Its central question is: What are the implications of today’s wide variety of sociopolitical forms and ideologies for a social science of the environment that seeks to study the full range of nature–society interactions and to support the attainment of a more sustainable future across the globe? Before delving into the six research-based articles at the core of this collection, it may be useful to define key terms and articulate the outlines of an overarching analytical framework.

Liberalism

In its most basic forms, “classical” liberalism protects the autonomy and self-determination of individuals, groups, and local communities to have, maintain, and develop their own distinct sets of beliefs, practices, and directions, even when not necessarily supported or agreed upon by central authorities or popular majorities. In classically liberal states, protections for individuals, groups, and communities are institutionalized through formal constitutional and legal frameworks and practices, including codification of the rights of individuals and minorities, of due process, habeas corpus (transparency and disclosure), and representation (Zakaria 1997: 25–27). Constitutional liberalism does not prevent the oppression of individuals or minority groups, but does establish a foundation within the rule of law for the rights, respect, and consideration of minority interests, positions, and viewpoints; and for procedural justice in relation to those rights.

Related to the classic liberal model is an implicit or explicit social contract in which the state promises benefits to members in exchange for their consent and granting of legitimacy; accountability of the state for its policies, actions, and performance; and formal mechanisms for input from various constituents. Though advanced in times when states’ promises were mainly about development and the distribution of economic benefits, such tenets arguably underlie many assumptions of environmentalism, public participation, and environmental justice in the West today as well as approaches such as community-based natural resources management (Wissenburg 1998; Dobson 2003).

Illiberalism

By contrast, “illiberalism” references those settings, regimes, and movements that do not prioritize or protect the rights, perspectives, and interests of individuals and minorities. Illiberalism may predominate in a wide array of regimes and conditions, ranging from absolute monarchies to military dictatorships, on the one hand, to democratically elected, but repressive majoritarian regimes and populist movements, on the other (Zakaria 1997: 22–24). In political, philosophical, and legal terms, illiberalism makes few provisions, formal or otherwise, for the salience or protection of individuals, as such, or minority groups or communities distinct from the dominant majority or central state. Illiberalism, in a wide variety of forms, has important implications for the implicit or explicit social contract, accountability and legitimacy, and public participation in environmental and natural resources management mentioned above.

Liberalism does not require democracy. Notably in history, the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the late 19th century was arguably, at least in some of its functioning, a liberal monarchy (Zakaria 1997: 29); and the Ottoman Empire’s multiethnic system of participation institutionalized representation of civil society interests without the democratic form (Tilly 1995: 10; McCarthy 2001). Likewise, illiberalism appears in both democratic and nondemocratic regimes, states, and societies. Contemporary Turkey and, for a brief recent moment, Egypt are two widely cited examples in recent history of illiberal democratic regimes, where popular majorities elect illiberal or authoritarian leaders. Recent popular movements and elections in the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and elsewhere will be analyzed by political scientists and others for years to come with respect to political parties, movements, and elected governments advanced on platforms of privilege and exclusion, rather than inclusion and respect for the rights of individuals and minority communities and organizations.

Social Theory of the Environment

Contemporary social theory of the environment, much of it developed in the context of popular social movements of the mid- to late 20th century, is deeply rooted in liberal ideas, philosophy, and visions. Through the lens of classical liberalism, environmental issues, and problems are both universal and particular: through education, active engagement, and institutional reform, the rights of individuals to a clean and healthy environment are fundamental both as individual rights and as collective rights of households, communities, and groups, even when and where the demographic majority (“society”) may benefit in the short term by averting its gaze from environmentally destructive extraction, pollution, and waste.

Through protecting the substantive and procedural rights of individuals, local communities, and organizations to act “on behalf of” the natural environment and their own self-interest, liberal social theory of the environment posits that as a result, “all” ultimately benefit, regardless of the immediate will and belief of the popular majority, or of the state or others advocating on behalf of that majority. Liberal visions of eco-democracy entail formalization and protection of the rights of individuals, local communities, and organizations (civic stakeholders) through participation, engagement, and decision-making. Such a vision would be realized through elaborate sets of laws, regulations, and formal procedures as well as provision of transparent environmental information and reporting (often referred to collectively as “bureaucratic red tape”)—the anathema of antienvironmentalist actors and movements. In such liberal visions, the state’s performance is evaluated collectively, and societal needs and wishes are made known in democratic fashion. Competition among varying interests is regulated. And disputes are settled systematically through the rule of law, with the environmental state making decisions and being accountable for them.

The Paradox

Paradoxically, environmentalism, like liberalism, does not require democracy. Nor does environmentalism require liberalism. Two decades into the third millennium of the Common Era, environmentalism exists in both liberal and illiberal forms, in democratic and authoritarian settings. As it supersedes its liberal roots, today’s environmentalism—in all of its complex, nuanced, and differentiated forms—challenges contemporary social theory of the environment, exposing huge gaps of understanding, scholarship, and policy analysis. (For some exemplary efforts, Doyle and Simpson 2006; Buitenzorgy and Mol 2011; Somers 2013; Böhmelt 2014.)

Collective knowledge of the biophysical environment and its relevance to the survival and sustainability of human and all life have matured to the point where even (and perhaps especially) military regimes and organizations recognize the critical importance of that environment, and of protecting humans from its abuse. Such knowledge is at least a century old, dating to the first understanding the impacts of chemical and biological warfare in the First and Second World Wars. Today all but the most ill-informed and self-interested recognize the broad threats to human survival of the widespread negligence and abuse of the biophysical environment and natural resources.

How, then, are environmental concerns and considerations addressed in nonliberal (illiberal) contexts, states, and regimes? Can authoritarian regimes actually hold certain advantages, as some suggest, for effectively addressing contemporary environmental challenges? Or are environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources doomed to failure in nonliberal contexts, as suggested by much contemporary social theory of the environment? How are we to understand the workings, possible strengths, and limitations of “actually existing environmentalism” in almost every type of political regime imaginable across the globe? Such are the foci of this special issue on “society and natural resources in an illiberal world.”

Aims of this Issue

This special issue has been developed based on four relatively simple but straightforward ideas:

• In the last half-century, much social theory of the environment and natural resources have been deeply rooted in theoretical and political premises and ideals of liberal democracy.

• With the collapse of the Soviet Union and “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989), it seemed for a decade or so that Western liberal democracy was ascendant; that globalization of trade, markets, and culture was inevitable; and that sustainability, in its three pillars of ecology, society, and economy was attainable, albeit not without effort and institutional transformation.

• Today progress has been made worldwide with respect to establishment of environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources, yet only a fraction of the world we live in is constituted by states and institutions that actualize and embrace liberal democracy.

• In short, the world we live in is significantly more politically and institutionally heterodox than the theoretical world of much of the contemporary environmental social sciences. Today all kinds of states and political systems engage in environmental policymaking and practice: not only Western liberal democracies but also military dictatorships and everything between.

The aims of this issue, then, are to examine and provide insights into interactions between societies and natural resources in a broader array of political and institutional contexts than has been common until now. In so doing, we hope to stimulate additional scholarship along such lines and contribute to the further development and maturation of social theory of the environment

Contributions

This collection features six original, field-based empirical studies of “society and natural resources in an illiberal world.” Three articles address society–environment relations in two of the world’s largest and most powerful countries: China and Russia, respectively. The other three articles address environmentality in six of the globe’s smaller states: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; Myanmar and Thailand; and Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively. The countries analyzed are highly diverse, in multiple ways: geographically, demographically, politically, and socially, just to name a few. What unites all eight countries are their “illiberal” political characters. Even here, they are quite diverse, ranging from absolute monarchies to semidemocracies, from military dictatorships to authoritarian states. Despite their many differences, each state’s environmental relations involve environmental organizations, institutions, laws, and regulations, at multiple levels. Together, these “instrumental cases” (Eberhard et al. 2017) are a highly interesting “sample” of illiberal states engaged in environmental policymaking around the world today; there is much that we can learn from them about illiberalism and the environment, even under some of the most marginal of conditions (Figure 1).¹

Figure 1. Countries analyzed in this special issue. (Source: Authors).

Gulf Arab Monarchies

In the lead article in this collection, “Green laboratories: university campuses as sustainability “exemplars” in the Arabian Peninsula,” geographer Natalie Koch examines rhetorical and material practices with respect to the built environment at the “green” campuses of three leading university centers on the Arabian Peninsula, in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), respectively. Though varying in size and form, all three Gulf states are highly centralized monarchic autocracies and petrostates, facing societal transitions toward what some suggest is—or should be—the “end” of the “fossil-fuel era” (Princen, Manno, and Martin 2015). Interestingly, as Koch recounts, all three states have “enshrined sustainability in [their] long-term development agendas” (Koch, this issue; see also Koch 2014).

The three Gulf Arab states are highly centralized autocracies. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest, is undergoing a degree of autocratic liberalization, at least with respect to the rights of Saudi women; even while, under the guise of fighting corruption, the reigning crown prince is cracking down on rivals within the extended royal family. Qatar, the smallest and arguably most liberal of the three is considered, variously, a constitutional or absolute monarchy. The UAE, a federation of seven emirates on the Persian Gulf, is considered an absolute monarchy.

In her article, Koch examines the role and respective images of three of the region’s sparkling new, internationally oriented university campuses as “exemplars” of sustainability, and in some real and symbolic way, visions for a postpetroleum future in the region based on a shift from resource extraction to becoming centers of scientific, technical, and financial expertise and excellence. The environmentally friendly design and construction of the new, “green” campuses, Koch argues, serve as “an effective “demo” of how green technology and renewables might be incorporated into future development” in the region (Koch, this issue). There is little open debate over such megaprojects, however, as “the very act of questioning large-scale development is politically risky. Due to the absence of press freedom, it is systematically excluded from public debate—whether in the form of student group activities or reporting in the media” (Koch, this issue; italics in the original).

China

The People’s Republic of China is one of the largest and most influential states in today’s world system. With the largest human population, second largest economy, and as the world’s greatest emitter of greenhouse gases, yet on a per capita basis still a developing country, China’s environmental policies and practices are of critical importance. Liberal social theory of the environment offers little to explain the institutionalization or effectiveness of China’s one-party, highly centralized, authoritarian state in efforts to address that country’s rapidly mounting environmental challenges—and its role in global environmental governance. Following on important work by Beeson (2010), Gilley (2012), Zhu et al. (2015), and others, this collection features two articles on environmental policy and governance in China.

In the collection’s second article, “Climate-change journalism and “edgeball” politics in contemporary China,” anthropologist Sam Geall (this issue) focuses on the state-controlled news media and environmental journalists efforts to “play” the system. Interestingly, journalism on the issue of climate change takes place “in such a way that a political space is created where a multiplicity of perspectives is supported, some of which may run counter to authoritarian and technocratic approaches” (Geall, this issue). “Chinese journalists have opened up one such space by playing the ‘edgeball’ … [in] situations where an outcome is not known in advance: a necessary condition for an effective politics anywhere, including in illiberal contexts” (Geall, this issue). The polity described is one that includes environmental NGOs, issue entrepreneurs, even environmental movements. The main emphasis, however, is on individual environmental journalists who, he argues, play an important role in engaging in “a form of critical pluralism” (Geall, this issue), however illiberal the political context may be.

The final article in this collection takes a historical look at environmental policy and governance in China, with an in-depth case study focused on water conservation, economic development, desertification, social displacement, and state policymaking in Gansu Province. “Dilemmas of state-led environmental conservation in China: Environmental target enforcement and public participation in Minquin County,” by sociologists KuoRay Mao and Qian Zhang (this issue) focuses on multiple levels of governance and the strong, central state’s attempt to impose strong ecological goals (targets), while simultaneously emphasizing local stakeholder (farmer) engagement. In the case examined by Mao and Zhang, the central state embarked on a conservation program that explicitly aimed to balance achievement of positive ecological outcomes with local consultation and collaboration. Ultimately, the official characterization of the Minquin environmental crisis as a national security issue led to strict enforcement of quantitative ecological objectives by cadres at lower governance levels, at the cost of local participation, dislocation, and other social impacts.

Russia

The Russian Federation is the world’s largest country and has, since the Stalin era, maintained its role as one of the world’s military, political, economic, and resource superpowers. The third piece in this collection, “Oil extraction and benefit sharing in an illiberal context: a comparative analysis of the Nenets and Komi-Izhemtsi indigenous peoples in the Russian Arctic,” by sociologist Maria Tsiachniouk and colleagues, recounts that the country is “described variously as a managed democracy, a hybrid regime, and fully authoritarian regime” (Tsiachniouk et al., this issue). It may also be characterized as a competitive authoritarian state (Levitsky and Way 2002), with representative bodies and elections at multiple levels, and strong central leadership. In the article, the country’s federal character & constitutional recognition, however limited, of indigenous peoples and territories is important. The state described is one that accommodates NGOs, at least to a certain degree, and private firms sufficiently engaged in global markets to be concerned with corporate social responsibility. Regional variation within and between the federated states is important. Tsiachniouk et al. (this issue) focus on the relative strategies and fortunes of two groups of indigenous communities in the Russian Arctic, in their efforts to obtain social and economic benefits from resource extraction in their respective areas. The surprising results belie impressions of the Russian state as monolithic and all-powerful.

Southeast Asia

In their contribution to this collection, “Transitions to energy and climate security in Southeast Asia? Civil society encounters with illiberalism in Thailand and Myanmar,” political scientists Adam Simpson and Mattijs Smits (this issue) examine energy and climate security policy in two neighboring Southeast Asian developing states, both dominated, at times, by strong militaries. The Kingdom of Thailand is formally a constitutional monarchy under the leadership of King Vajiralongkorn. Since May 2014, it has been a military-dominated state and society; as of this writing, the country may be moving slowly once again toward reconstituting the country’s legislative body, under close control by the military. For several relatively brief, recent periods (1992–2001, 2001–06, 2007–14), the country has taken on certain weak democratic/competitive authoritarian forms. Civil society organizations and environmental institutions and concerns remain strong in the country, however, even within the military-dominated state.

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (formerly Burma)—currently a form of constitutional semidemocracy or competitive authoritarianism, is under the supervision of the country’s military, under direct military rule for half a century (1962–2011). The two neighboring countries have been transitioning back and forth between direct military rule, competitive/electoral authoritarianism, “defective democracy” (Merkel 2004, as cited in Simpson and Smith, this issue), for much of the last century. Liberal ideas and ideals are present in both countries, but militaries prevail—within limits. In both countries, environmental concerns persist. Through the lens of the experience of environmental nongovernmental organizations and leaders in both countries engaged in energy and climate security issues, respectively, Simpson and Smith (this issue) trace the successes, challenges, and limitations of civic environmental engagement in the two countries, over multiple regime changes. Environmental concerns and actors develop and emerge even under in the most challenging circumstances.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The newest and arguably most complicated state examined in this collection is the historically troubled Balkan state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), analyzed in “Ironies of consociation: forestry and natural resources governance in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by political philosopher and natural resources scholar, Aaron Vlasak (this issue). Today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina is an internationally brokered consociational state consisting of two “Entities”: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). The article examines the nominal multilevel governance of the Una National Park (forest reserve) in FBiH. On the ground, the national and even subnational governments have little to no presence in the Park. In practice, multiple local governmental and parastatal entities do have a presence. This is a fascinating analysis of an externally brokered weak state and confusing array of overlapping, contradicting, and at times conflictual efforts at nature protection and resource-based economic development. It is the frustrating story of a poor state, rich in natural resources but weak in its capacity to devise and perform effective resource conservation practices. Not for lack of trying by actors at multiple levels, the country’s history of war, and social and cultural division hangs heavy over its path toward sustainability and development.

Conclusion

Among the catalysts for this special issue project is a lively, continuing debate on the relative possibilities and risks of various forms of environmental authoritarianism: ranging from the accomplishments as well as failures of state-led environmentalism in China (Beeson 2010; Blühdorn 2013; Wurster 2013; Shahar 2015; Bernauer et al. 2013); to growing calls for binding, top-down, environmental mandates to mitigate urgent threats of global warming (Shearman and Smith 2007; Hobson 2012), species extinction, the global migration of new disease risks, and a plethora of other perceived and actual environmental emergencies.²

The collection is relevant today in ways hardly imaginable at the onset of this scholarly undertaking. Longstanding norms and values in support of liberal democracy are challenged across the West; in the USA this has been accompanied by a strong movement to roll-back and reduce the role of national environmental agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Interior, Department of Energy, and others. As the President of the United States has formally stated his administration’s intent to withdraw from the voluntary Paris Climate Agreement, negotiated in part by his predecessor, China has stepped forward as a leading advocate for global climate action. And the historic leadership of the European Union in supranational environmental regulation is challenged by resurgent nationalism across the continent.

Environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources remain a central concern and priority in much of today’s world. But social theory of the environment is challenged to understand how and explain why there remain salient environmental issues even in illiberal states as well as in liberal democracies threatened from within and without by rival states and authoritarian movements.

When and where are environment and natural resources such ideologically and politically overridingly salient issues that all states must address them or risk failure, delegitimation, or catastrophe? How can competing interests and priorities on economic development/extraction/enrichment, on the one hand; and environmental and social sustainability, on the other hand, be balanced in all kinds of states and polities? Relatedly, how do we know successful environmental outcomes when we see them, and who in the state and civil society is empowered to define environmental priorities? How, when, and under what conditions can proenvironmental actors in all kinds of states, organizations, and local communities come together in support of proenvironmental practices? These are just a few of the urgent questions of the present era to which we hope that this special issue makes a modest contribution.

Notes

In Figure 1, the eight countries examined in this issue are displayed in relative terms on a scatter diagram. The X-axis (“Brown–Green”) represents the development, capacity, and effectiveness of environmental institutions (Widener & Jänicke 2002). The Y-axis (“Weak–Strong”) estimates the overall strength, capacity, and effectiveness of governmental institutions with respect to social and economic development, more broadly (Migdal 1988; Evans 1995).

The debate is not new – see also the contemporary classic by Ophuls (1977).