Abstract
Farmers are often critically important to the success of common-pool resource governance reforms. Nevertheless, their participation in these off-farm reform processes has received limited research attention. This paper investigates farmer participation in state-mandated common-pool resource governance. Using groundwater governance in California as a case study, we show that existing social networks, in combination with asymmetries in resource access within the farming community, and a collective identity framed against central government intervention, explain participation and representation in groundwater governance processes. An important governance paradox has emerged, in which groundwater-dependent users are unequally represented in the very groundwater management agencies that have been developed to protect them. This case sheds light on documented shortcomings of common-pool resource governance reforms and aims to inform the design of future reform processes.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the interviewed farmers who granted their time and openness to talk with us. We would also like to thank professors Mark Lubell, Samuel Sandoval, and Graham Fogg for discussions that enriched the manuscript. Finally, we would like to thank Carole Hom for her support with this project and Sean Maxson for leading one interview that was used in this manuscript.