Abstract
The confluence of new understandings of dryland ecology and common property resource management has arguably led to a “new pastoral development paradigm”—a paradigm that incorporates a widespread acceptance of the importance of livestock mobility within the context of devolving greater rangeland management authority to local groups. Despite over a decade of interest and attention generated by this new paradigm, little progress has been achieved on the ground. A major premise of this article is that this impasse results from persistent conceptual difficulties surrounding the relationship between livestock mobility, nonequilibrium ecology, and common property institutions. These difficulties are best resolved through work grounded in the social and ecological realities of particular regions. The promise of such engagements is illustrated through case material from the annual grasslands of Sahelian region of West Africa. The policy implications resulting from a reconceptualization of the relationship between property and dryland ecology are presented.
Notes
New understandings of dryland ecology and development have contributed to this new appreciation. Widespread development failure in the region has revealed the real biophysical constraints to alternative livelihoods (Ellis and Galvin Citation1994). Range ecologists working in the region recognize the importance of livestock mobility for ecology and production (Vetter Citation2005; Oba et al. Citation2000; Behnke et al. Citation1993). Social scientists have argued that rangelands are best seen as common property resources that can be managed effectively by local peoples (Swallow Citation1994; Niamir-Fuller Citation1999; Simpson and Sullivan Citation1984).
This new sensibility to the importance of mobility, flexibility, and opportunism is variously referenced as the “mobility paradigm,” “new rangeland paradigm,” “opportunistic livestock management,” or “nonequilibrium range management” (Andriansen Citation2003; Niamir-Fuller 1999; Behnke et al. Citation1993; Scoones Citation1994).
An example is Mali's passage into law of a pastoral charter (number 01004 of February 27, 2001)—a commitment on paper to support wider patterns of livestock mobility that is new in Sub-Saharan Africa.
A transhumance herd represents a considerable store of wealth managed by one to three young men or boys. As such, it is vulnerable to theft and loss especially where social connections are few.
The introductory chapter for one of the more influential recent texts dealing with property rights and livestock development in Africa adopts as one of its chief institutional design principles that membership and boundaries need to be clearly defined (Swallow and McCarthy Citation2000, 10).
This is not to say that the ownership externality works at a broader spatial scale than that of the individual rangeland (controlled by a particular social group). Livestock owners do make investment decisions ignoring the environmental costs of an increased regional livestock herd. However, increased restrictions on access to individual pastures will not address this problem (better addressed through taxation and subsidies to alternative investments).