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ABSTRACT
This article provides a genealogy of extractivismo discourse. In South America, the critical discourse of extractivismo has shifted political horizons and fomented a protracted intraleft dispute. Decades of neoliberalism unified popular movements to resist austerity and recuperate national sovereignty, but the ascendency of leftist administrations across the continent fragmented the field of radical politics. Ecuador exemplifies this internecine conflict: environmental and indigenous activists and allied intellectuals crafted the discourse of extractivismo to resist President Rafael Correa’s ‘21st century socialism’. State actors assert that oil and mining revenues will trigger economic development. But anti-extractive activists contend that ‘the extractive model’ pollutes the environment, violates collective rights, reinforces dependency on foreign capital, and undermines democracy. Drawing on 14 months of archival and ethnographic research, I recover the source discourses of extractivismo and outline the conditions of their coalescence into a novel problematic. I trace extractivismo to the neoliberal period (1981–2006). In that period, I identify the co-existence of two distinct critiques of resource extraction, which I call resource radicalisms: resource nationalism and proto-anti-extractivism. But alongside it, in their struggle for territorial sovereignty and collective rights, Amazonian indigenous groups articulated the discursive elements that would later be unified by the term extractivismo. I argue that a particular conjuncture – the election of a leftist President, the rewriting of the Constitution, and the government’s avid promotion of extractive projects – enabled the crystallization of extractivismo discourse. Anti-extractive resistance in turn triggered a tectonic political realignment: activists that once fought for the nationalization of natural resources now oppose all resource extraction, a leftist President finds himself in conflict with the social movements who initially supported his election, and the left-in-power has become synonymous with the aggressive expansion of extraction. Finally, I consider the tension between extractivismo-as-critique and its capacity to generate collective action.
Acknowledgements
This article would not have been possible without the guidance of Tulia Falleti, Anne Norton, Erica Simmons, and Robert Vitalis; countless conversations with (and comments on multiple drafts from) Adam Leeds and Kathryn Hardy; institutional support from the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at Notre Dame; and, above all, the time and generosity of activists, archivists, bureaucrats, and colleagues in Ecuador.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Thea Riofrancos is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Providence College, US. Previously, she was a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and held a one-year appointment as a visiting scholar at the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Quito. She received her Ph.D. in political science at the University of Pennsylvania in 2014.
Notes
1. The concept of buen vivir, a central concept in the 2008 Constitution and the government’s development plan (discussed below), recurs frequently in both the critical discourse of extractivismo and the justification of development policy on the part of state actors. A full discussion of this concept is beyond the scope of this article; for further reading, see Escobar (Citation2010), Svampa (Citation2015), Caria and Dominguez (Citation2016).
2. NB: Ecuador still relies on banana exports.
3. OPIP, founded in 1978, comprises Kichwa, Achuar, and Shuar indigenous groups from the oil-producing Amazonian province of Pastaza (Sawyer Citation2004, pp. 27–46; 81–105; Yashar Citation2005, pp. 110–114).
4. CONAIE as a whole has been dominated by the highlands federation, ECUARUNARI.
5. The Borja administration partially met OPIP’s demands: it recognized 55 percent of the land they claimed, but this land was not divided up according to traditional use, and the state retained its claim over oil (Sawyer Citation2004, pp. 50–52; Yashar Citation2005, pp. 126–128).
6. The administration lacked the congressional support for financial sector liberalization and major privatizations (Silva Citation2009, pp. 161–163; Hey and Klak Citation1999, p. 80).
7. This platform reappeared in the CONAIE’s (Citation1997) Constitutional Proposal, which stipulated that ‘nonrenewable resources’ would be exclusively owned and managed by the state (Art. 129–130).
8. Hoy 10 January 2005, ‘Poder y crudo dividen a Confeniae’.
9. Hoy 10 January 2005, ‘El petróleo ‘rompe’ a la Confeniae,’ emphasis added.
10. Hoy 10 January 2005, ‘El petróleo ‘rompe’ a la Confeniae.’
11. El Comercio 21 April 2005, ‘Los shuar se declaran en emergencia antipetrolera’
12. El comité de paro, 16 August 2005, ‘Boletin de prensa: Contra las empresas petroleras paro bi-provincial Sucumbíos y Orellana’ at http://ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2005/08/10810.shtml.
13. The strike resulted in $570 million in economic losses, $300 million of which would have been state revenues. President Palacios declared a state of siege on 17 August; confrontations with the military resulted in one death and at least 11 injuries. ‘570 milliones de pérdidas por paro Amazónico’ http://ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=19156&umt=570_millones_perdidas_por_paro_amazonico; ‘Ecuador: An Oil Strike’s Present and Future Consequences, 23 August 2005, at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ecuador-oil-strikes-present-and-future-consequences.
14. ‘ICSID’s Largest Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum Corporation v the Republic of Ecuador’ http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-in-history-an-overview-of-occidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador/.
15. As discussed below, the Occidental contract was terminated in May 2006.
16. El Comercio 13 October 2005, ‘Un 12 de Octubre contra las petroleras y el TLC,’ ‘Movilizaciones en america latina en el 12 de octubre’ at http://www.ecuador.indymedia.org/es/2005/10/11470.shtml and http://cuasran.blogspot.com/2007/10/12-de-octubre-2005-un-repudio-atraves.html 10 March 2007 ‘12 DE OCTUBRE 2005: UN REPUDIO ATRAVESÓ AMÉRICA’
17. ‘Fuera Oxy y No al TLC Ecuador: Marchas por la Constituyente y Nacionalización de Petróleo’ 10 October 2005 at http://movimientos.org/node/5496?key=5496.
18. ‘Fuera Oxy y No al TLC Ecuador: Marchas por la Constituyente y Nacionalización de Petróleo’ 10 October 2005 at http://movimientos.org/node/5496?key=5496.
19. Frente Patriótico por la Soberanía Petrolera at http://soberaniapetrolera.blogspot.com/
20. El Universo ‘Movilización amazónica en Quito contra Oxy y el TLC’ 05/08/2006; El Universo ‘Pachakutik se une a las marchas contra la Oxy’ 9 May 2006.
21. Occidental pursued legal action against Ecuador via the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. In 2012, the ICSID ruled that Ecuador pay Occidental $1.77 billion in damages; Ecuador negotiated the amount down to $1 billion. See http://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-occidental-idUSL2N14X0U420160113.
22. And new oil projects in the untapped reserves of the southern Amazon.
23. The Mandate was a legislative act; the Constituent Assembly had ‘full powers’.
24. Art. 1–5.
25. Art. 6; 8; 11.
26. Asamblea Constituyente, Acta, 37 18 April 2008, p. 13; 40.
27. pp. 23–25; See also the intervention of Diana Acosta, pp. 29–34.
28. Acción Ecológica, 2 April 2008, ‘Sobre el mandato minero’ at http://alainet.org/active/23237&lang=pt.
29. Ironically redeploying Correa’s pronouncement that he would transcend ‘the long night of neoliberalism (Correa Citation2007, p. 3).
30. Acta 37, p. 50. Assembly President Alberto Acosta (AP) had a history of critically analyzing resource extraction. He co-edited the volume Ecuador Post-Petrolero (2000) with Esperanza Martínez (a founder of Acción Ecológia), critiquing oil-dependency and envisioning of a ‘post-oil’ future. A month before the Assembly concluded, he resigned from the administration, and became a key ally of anti-extractive activists.
31. Acta 37, p. 56.
32. Asamblea Constituyente, Acta 40, 29 April 2008, p. 11.
33. Asamblea Constituyente, Acta 40, 29 April 2008, p. 12; 16.
34. Informe de Actividades, 25 March 2008, Memo No. 14-MCH-ANC-2008; Caprio to Chuji (Correspondance) 20 March 2008. For an example of Gudynas’ work, see Gudynas (Citation2010).
35. Enlace Ciudadano 103, 10 January 2009.
36. ‘Congresillo aprobó la nueva Ley Minera’ 13 January 2009 at http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/congresillo-aprobo-la-nueva-ley-minera-328402.html.
37. ‘Protesta contra ley minera deja 6 policías heridos en Ecuador,’ 20 January 2009 at http://eleconomista.com.mx/internacional/2009/01/20/protesta-contra-ley-minera-deja-6-policias-heridos-ecuador; ‘Ecuador: Gran movilización nacional contra la ley minera. Represión y al menos 11 detenidos’, 20 January 2009 at http://www.lahaine.org/index.php?p=189; ‘Movilización Antiminera, Ecuador, 20 de Enero 2009,’ 01/20/09 at http://www.abyayalacolectivo.com/web/compartir/noticia/movilizacion-antiminera--ecuador--20-de-enero-2009; and Moore, Jennifer. ‘Ecuador: Mining Protests Marginalized, But Growing,’ 21 January 2009 at http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1673/1/
38. ECUARUNARI, ‘Movilización por defensa de la Vida y la Pachamama’ Boletín de Prensa, 20 Janaury 2009 at http://www.llacta.org/organiz/coms/2009/com0011.htm
39. For example, CONAIE, ‘El Consejo de Gobierno de CONAIE evaluó como positiva la Jornada de Movilizaciones en el país’ Boletín de Prensa 21 January 2009 at http://www.llacta.org/organiz/coms/2009/com0017.htm.
40. UNAGUA and Acción Ecológica were both parties to the case, further cementing the anti-extractive coalition.
41. Thea Riofrancos. ‘Ecuador: Indigenous Confederation Inaugurates New President and Announces National Mobilization’ 6 February 2008 at http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/1120-ecuador-indigenous-confederation-inaugurates-new-president-and-announces-national-mobilization.
42. Hoy, ‘Dirección bajo 4 Amazonicos’ 14 November 2004.
43. The oil concession was originally granted in 1996. The Sarayaku first brought their case before the Court in 2003, alleging the failure of the Ecuadorian state to consult them prior to oil company CGC’s exploration of their territory. In July of 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of the Sarayaku.
44. Also key was Water Law in May of 2010, in which the CONAIE claimed victory when the legislature was forced to shelve the bill as a direct result of their mobilization.‘Indígenas de Ecuador proclaman “victoria” ante no aprobación de Ley de Recursos Hidrícos’ 13 May 2010 at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-7708489.
45. Interview 28 November 2011; emphasis added.
46. Stated at the Second Social Forum on Mining in Cuenca, 1 March 2012.
47. Minería Muerte 2012, p. 3. Pamphlet received via personal communication, 3 February 2012.
48. Minería Muerte 2012, pp. 95–97.
49. Interviews on 1 December 2011 and 4 April 2012, respectively.
50. Most likely referring to García Linera (Citation2012).
51. Correa, Enlace 294, 20 October 2012.
52. See http://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/codigo-penal-tipifica-nuevos-delitos.html and the 2012 Amnesty International report on 24 social movement leaders accused of crimes http://www.refworld.org/docid/50055db82.html.
54. YASunidos collected 756,291 signatures to present a national referendum on whether to extract oil in the park. The National Electoral Commission controversially rejected the petition (http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/30/yasuni-campaigners-oil-drilling-petition-results-referendum).
55. On the effect of falling oil prices on extraction, see http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/06/commodities-latin-america-amazon-deforestation.