The Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research in South Korea: Contesting National Sociotechnical Imaginaries

Abstract

To many commentators outside South Korea, the Hwang Woo Suk scandal involving human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research was just another spectacular case of misconduct in the life sciences. As such, it is generally assumed to have revealed the drawbacks of research in scientifically and ethically less-developed societies. Such thinking ignores the history, sophistication, and distinctive features of the public debate over hESC research in South Korea. Disputes over the social and ethical implications of hESC research had taken place for some time before the scandal erupted. Moreover, unlike in some other countries, where resistance to hESC research was prompted by religious conservatives, the most serious critique of the country's rapid move into the field came from progressive social movement activists—including feminists and environmentalists. These activists were, in fact, part of the non-governmental organization coalition to impose stricter social controls on biotechnology. This campaign was motivated by broader political and social concerns beyond specific biosafety or bioethical issues. The activists involved in the coalition feared that the capitalist–developmentalist drive toward biotechnology would threaten the public interest and democracy, and ultimately block South Korea's road to becoming a democratic nation founded on the values of social justice, equality, participation, and sustainability. In contesting South Korea's prevailing approaches to hESC research, they challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, the dominant ‘national sociotechnical imaginary’ that articulates the role of science and technology in relation to the future survival and well-being of the nation primarily in terms of its industrial competitiveness.

Keywords:

• sociotechnical imaginary
• human embryonic stem cells
• biotechnology
• bioethics
• biosafety
• South Korea

Acknowledgments

This article is based on the research funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF Award No. SES-0724133) and subsequently supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2008-361-A00005). I thank Sheila Jasanoff for her encouraging support and insightful advice, and Young-Gyung Paik and Kyu Hyun Kim for their suggestions on earlier versions of the article. I am also grateful to the editors, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their very helpful comments.

Notes

1 Non-trivial portions of the South Korean population are Christians. A series of opinion polls in the early to mid-2000s showed, however, that there was little meaningful difference between lay Christians and the non-religious in their views on the beginning of life or on the use of human embryos for medical research (Lee and Kim, 2004).

2 In South Korea, the term ‘progressive’ has historically been associated with various traditions of radicalism including Marxism, and has been distinguished from ‘liberal’. For the last two decades, its meaning has been broadened to include more heterogeneous positions of new social movements. Still, the term usually refers to a left-wing ideological stance that not only embraces the values of equality and social justice, but is also critical of capitalism and liberalism.

3 For more discussion on the topic, see Levidow and Papaioannou (2013) and Jasanoff and Kim (forthcoming).

4 The historical roots of such assemblage can be traced back to the colonial period under Japan (1910–1945), or further back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when Korea made the first serious attempt to modernize (Kim, forthcoming). This is, however, beyond the purview of the present study.

5 ‘Developmentalism’—an ideology that defines ‘advanced/developed’ and ‘backward/underdeveloped’ in terms of economic growth and industrialization and views continued development as the prime purpose and obligation of society—could be found elsewhere (Grosfoguel, 2000). But it took a more collectivist and statist form in East Asia (Woo-Cumings, 1999).

6 Few national constitutions include such contents in such explicit terms. For a comparison, the US constitution does refer to technology but only in the context of the rights to be bestowed to innovators through patents.

7 Mizuno (2009) defined ‘scientific nationalism’ as an ideology that ‘believes that science and technology are the most urgent and important assets for the integrity, survival, and progress of the nation’. She pointed out that the compound term ‘science-technology’ (kagaku gijutsu in Japanese) was actively promoted by Japanese nationalist technocrats during wartime as an expression of this ideology.

8 ‘New biotechnology’ refers to the use of recombinant DNA, cell diffusion, and other novel bioprocessing techniques. Hereinafter, unless otherwise specified, ‘biotechnology’ denotes ‘new’ biotechnology as opposed to ‘traditional’ biotechnology such as fermentation technologies.

9 Under Biotech 2000, launched by the Kim Young Sam government, $20 billion would be invested in developing biotech capabilities equivalent to those of the G7 nations by 2007 (MOST, 1994). The 21st Century Frontier R&D Program, initiated by the Kim Dae Jung government, aimed at enhancing indigenous capability for ‘future core’ technologies such as bio- and nanotechnologies (KISTEP, 2000). Later, the Roh Moo-Hyun government pronounced ‘the second nation-building through science and technology’, and set the development of the 10 ‘next-generation growth engines’—including bio-medicine and bio-organs—as its key policy priority (MOCIE, 2003).

10 In fact, left-wing nationalist groups who had a strong voice in South Korean social movements largely shared the logic of developmental nationalism. For them, the major problem surrounding science and technology was that the policies of the military regimes were not genuinely nationalist and would aggravate South Korea's technological dependency on the USA.

11 Chapter 9, Article 127, Clause 1 of the 1987 constitution stated that ‘the state shall strive to develop the national economy by promoting science and technology innovation and by cultivating information and human resources’.

12 Members of this group were inspired by various discussions on the politics of science and technology in Europe and the USA—New Left critiques of science and technology, STS, the Scandinavian experiments such as consensus conferences, and others (Kim, 1999).

13 As mentioned above, the introduction of certain bio-regulations was required for South Korea to gain membership in the OECD. The preparation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety similarly compelled the government to take regulatory measures to avoid future trade barriers on South Korean products.

14 The participating NGOs were: the Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice, the Consumers Korea, the Green Consumers’ Network Korea, the Green Family Movement Association, the Green Korea United, the Korea Christian Environmental Movement Solidarity, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, and the Korean Womenlink.

15 The 12 other NGOs were: the Citizens’ Movement for Environmental Justice, the Green Korea United, the Green Politics Alliance, the Group for Flower World, the Indramang Life Community, the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, the Korea Federation of Medical Groups of Health Rights, the Korean Women's Association United, the Korean Women's Environmental Network, the National Council of YMCAs of Korea, the National Council of YWCAs of Korea, and the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy.

16 The Democratic Labor Party grew out of a coalition of trade unionists with socialist leanings and other radical social movements. Left-wing nationalists—who, as already noted, shared the logic of science and technology for national development—constituted the largest faction, and were sympathetic to the public support for Hwang Woo Suk and his research. However, the party's policy committee was run by different factions. More importantly, a policy analyst in charge of the issue of science and technology policy was a former activist and founding member of the CDST.