Setting the rules for survival: why the Burmese military regime survives in an age of democratization

Abstract

Regardless of its growing unpopularity, the ruling military junta in Burma remains far stronger than any of its foes in the country. This article probes how the junta managed to remain in power for such a long time. The answer lies in the informal procedures that governed the way leading members of the junta dealt with their differences and disagreements with their colleagues. Deriving from the rules of engagement within the military established by former military dictator Ne Win, two features came to epitomize the organizational culture of the Tatmadaw (armed forces). The first of these is the maintenance of incriminating evidence against senior members of the military in the event that they fall out of favour or need to be disciplined. The second feature of this culture that has now taken root is the observance of discrete domains of operation. This latter feature allows for the dissipation of tension between officers who are unable to get along well with each other. Importantly, it also prevents a senior officer from acquiring sufficient power to challenge more senior officers within the Tatmadaw hierarchy. Once certain rules became established norms of the Tatmadaw, they came to influence the actions and strategies taken by military officers. The rules that governed the ways military officers interacted with the colleagues they did not get along with and the incentives the Tatmadaw as an organization has created for its members have kept it together. Therefore, regardless of external and internal pressures, the army remains the most organized institution in Burma and appears to be more unified now than ever before.

Keywords:

• Historical institutionalism
• military regime
• Burma
• Tatmadaw
• rules for survival
• political struggles

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Li Li Tey, Dr N. Ganesan and Professor Robert Taylor for their research and editorial assistance.

Kyaw Yin Hlaing is Assistant Professor of Asian and International Studies at the City University of Hong Kong.

Notes

1 At a meeting held in early 1962, Ne Win issued an order that any senior government official who made mistakes should resign from the party voluntarily – they should not wait until the party dismissed him or her. In line with his own order, whenever Ne Win wanted to dismiss a high-ranking official, he merely asked the person to submit a letter of resignation.

2 Party members were not allowed to campaign for themselves or for other party members, as this could jeopardize the results senior party officials anticipated. This, in a way, demonstrated that the party wanted its members as well as the populace to approve the candidates it proposed. Any action that would impede the results that the party had anticipated were deemed improper political acts and those who committed such acts ran the risk of being dismissed from the party-state.

3 For details on factional struggles in the junta, see Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2008).

4 Military officers needed intelligence clearance before they could be promoted.

5 Maung Aung Myoe shared this information with me.