Regionalism's challenge to the pollution haven hypothesis: a study of Northeast Asia and China

^*Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2012 Western Political Science Association annual conference (Portland, OR) and the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association annual conference (Chicago, IL). The author is grateful for comments and suggestions from Stephen Haggard, Ronald Mitchell, and three anonymous reviewers. Matthew A. Shapiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Illinois Institute of Technology, where he focuses on information transfer problems in the context of environmental and science policies. His research looks particularly at the connections between publicly funded R&D and environmentally-related outcomes, how the public responds to the relevant science, and how the government incentivizes change in the public and private sectors.

Abstract

This paper explores the phenomena of environmental coordination within Northeast Asia. I initially frame the discussion around claims that China is a pollution haven for its neighboring countries, and I look for evidence in the domestic and regional environmental institutions which challenge China's pollution haven status. I find that that there is a science and technology-based epistemic community in Northeast Asia which provides an important theoretical response to counter the pollution haven hypothesis. As well, given its strong science and technological output, Japan is poised to assume leadership of the Northeast Asian environmental regime for at least the short- to medium-term.

Keywords:

• epistemic community
• regionalism
• green R&D; environmental policy
• pollution haven hypothesis

Notes

^* Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2012 Western Political Science Association annual conference (Portland, OR) and the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association annual conference (Chicago, IL). The author is grateful for comments and suggestions from Stephen Haggard, Ronald Mitchell, and three anonymous reviewers. Matthew A. Shapiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Illinois Institute of Technology, where he focuses on information transfer problems in the context of environmental and science policies. His research looks particularly at the connections between publicly funded R&D and environmentally-related outcomes, how the public responds to the relevant science, and how the government incentivizes change in the public and private sectors.

¹The establishment of the regime for protection of the ozone layer was the initial force generating interest in the study of international environmental regimes, such as the 1985 Vienna Convention, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, and the 1990 amendments to the Montreal Protocol. Young (1990) points out that, although environmental regime formation is predominantly established in the framework of conventions and protocols, there are also cases in which environmental regimes are constituted in initial agreements, such as the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, and the 1973 and 1978 MARPOL Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. More recently, Breitmeirer et al. (2006) created a database based on the responses of experts on 23 environmental regimes to examine the process of regime creation and efficacy. These mirror our concerns here, yet Breitmeirer et al. (2006) conflate case selection and limit coverage of greenhouse gas emissions from 1992 to 1998. To some extent, these are addressed qualitatively by Biermann and Siebenhuner's (2009) treatment of international bureaucracies, such as the OECD, World Bank, and UNEP. Excluded, however, is the role of international technology transfer as a component of international environmental regimes.

²We can model participation in regimes with a utility function which embodies a sense of general obligation, consistent with Jervis's (1982) claim that short-term interests are sacrificed given expectations of reciprocation sometime in the future. Behavior, thus, is infused with principles and norms, which is the distinguishing characteristic of regime-governed activity vis-à-vis narrow calculations of interest (Krasner 1982). When nations choose to forgo independent decision making, dilemmas of common interests and common aversions arise (Stein 1982). In order to reach a Pareto-optimal outcome in the face of these dilemmas, all players must ignore their dominant strategies.

³The backdrop to the 1987 Montreal Protocol provides an excellent example of how an epistemic community of ecologists may affect international cooperation. In the few years prior to 1987, there were several studies which indicated that international controls on chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were necessary to protect the ozone layer. Loaded with this information, a transnational epistemic community of atmospheric scientists took steps to influence the positions of the UNEP and the United States. This information, however, was not necessarily certain, calling for anticipatory action (Haas 1990). In this case, the common belief and desire of environmental protection superseded the scientific method.

⁴For example, in Japan, policies are categorized as follows: global environment; waste and recycling; air and transportation; waste, soil, and ground environment; health and chemicals; and nature and parks. The following categories are used in Korea: green growth; environment, economy, and society; water quality and water ecosystem; water supply, sewerage, soil and groundwater; air and climate change; wastes and recycling; health/chemicals; nature and parks; and international cooperation. In Taiwan, the policies are divided into the following categories: basic and organic; soil and groundwater pollution; water and marine; waste; atmospheric pollution; EIS; toxics management; environmental disputes; and other laws and regulations. Finally, in China, policies were divided as follows: framework provisions; prevention and control of water pollution; prevention and control of air pollution; solid wastes management; noise and vibration management; hazardous chemicals management; EIS; pollution discharge and levying. For certain categories, this is a relatively simple process: Japan's ‘waste and recycling’ policies, Korea's ‘wastes and recycling’ policies, Taiwan's ‘waste’ policies, and China's ‘solid wastes management’ policies can be initially grouped together. Other groupings across all four countries are also possible, such as, Japan's ‘air and transportation’ policies, Korea's ‘air and climate change’ policies, Taiwan's ‘atmospheric pollution’ policies, and China's ‘prevention and control of air pollution’ policies. However, for other categories, close matches are possible initially for only a couple of countries: Japan's ‘global environment’ policies with Korea's ‘international cooperation’, for example, or Taiwan's ‘EIS’ policies with China's ‘EIS’ policies. There are also a number of categories which are unique to particular countries, such as Japan's ‘health and chemicals’ policies, Korea's ‘green growth’ policies, Taiwan's ‘environmental disputes’ policies, and China's ‘noise and vibration management’ policies.

⁵There are exceptions, such as ECO ASIA and TEMM. This is likely due to ECO ASIA's former's close coordination with USAID and TEMM's focus on conveying news and updates to intra-regional talks.