Norm subsidiarity and institutional cooperation: explaining the straits of Malacca anti-piracy regime

Abstract

Given competing interests among the three littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, what explains the nature and timing of their cooperative arrangement in combating maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca in the post-2004 period? This observation is especially puzzling because the material and strategic interests of these actors generally did not change during the time period that witnessed increased cooperation. We argue that key developments of the anti-piracy regime in the Straits of Malacca cannot be fully explained by rationalist approaches, which traditionally stresses material and national interests of states. By critically engaging constructivist approaches, this paper posits that Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia engaged in a process of norm subsidiarity. Through norm subsidiarity, relatively weak states get together to develop their own rules to prevent their exclusion or marginalization from institutions of global governance by more powerful actors. The littoral states engaged norm subsidiarity to resist extra-regional attempts to manage piracy in the Straits of Malacca. These extra-regional security proposals triggered a powerful regional cognitive prior, providing the impetus for an indigenous response, leading consequently to a collective cooperative effort to deal with the threat of piracy.

Keywords:

• Piracy
• straits of Malacca
• norm subsidiarity
• cognitive prior
• institutional cooperation
• regimes

Acknowledgements

We thank G. John Ikenberry, Terry Nardin, Janice Bially Mattern, Chong Ja Ian and other participants of “Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific: A Workshop,” which was held 27 January 2012 at the National University of Singapore, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. As of March 2012, 17 states are parties to ReCAAP, including Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Korea, Laos, Burma/Myanmar, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. See http://www.recaap.org.

2. Some of the plots that have been reportedly discovered include the al-Qaeda linked radical network Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) planning suicide attacks using high-speed boats packed with explosives against visiting US naval vessels. Other reports also indicated that terrorist groups in Malaysia and Indonesia had planned to hijack a ship and use it as a ‘floating bomb’. See Storey (2008: 99–100).

3. The ReCAAP ISC was officially established in Singapore in November 2006 and later recognized as an international organization in January 2007. See http://www.recaap.org.

4. In addition, some scholars have highlighted the various ways in which the Asian financial crisis facilitated new forms of regional cooperation constrained by certain factors, including historical concerns and traditional regional beliefs. See for example MacIntyre et al. (2008).

5. At the time of the RMSI initiative, Admiral Fargo had in fact told members of the US Congress that he was Singapore's would be onboard with the proposal: ‘I just came back from Singapore and had a very solid conversation with the Singaporeans and they're going to help us with this’ (Donald 2004a).