Development of gray-zone deterrence: concept building and lessons from Japan’s experience

Abstract

In contemporary international security, some powers try to challenge the status quo through gradual, sub-threshold expansion without resorting to the explicit use of force. Examples of such sub-threshold challenges can be seen in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and Eastern Europe. They are now referred to as ‘gray zone’ or ‘hybrid threat’. For a long time deterrence theory, a core component of strategic studies, has largely neglected such sub-threshold challenges. The exceptional part of that is empirical school’s findings, including fait accompli, limited probe, and controlled pressure. They perfectly match with the current threats and help developing conceptual framework to deter these kind of threats. Based on these findings, this paper attempted to illustrate three principles for gray zone deterrence: combination of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, mobilization of the whole government assets, and keeping open the window to escalation and analyze, Japan’s efforts to develop conceptual framework for gray zone deterrence. Since Japan’s efforts to develop conceptual framework of gray zone deterrence dates further back than other part of the world, as the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010, a case study on Japan would provide useful insights for gray zone deterrence.

Keywords:

• Deterrence
• gray zone
• hybrid threat
• Japan's defense policy
• East China Sea

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 In Asia-Pacific, the Government of Japan started to use the word of ‘gray zone’ in its capstone strategic document (the National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011 and thereafter) in December 2010. In Europe, NATO Allied Command Transformation started use the word of ‘hybrid threat’ since at least 2011. See NATO Allied Command Transformation (May 2011).

2 About details of China’s maritime creeping expansion, see Green et al. (2017), p. 51–263.

3 Japan-China Joint Press Statement: Cooperation between Japan and China in the East China Sea, (2008); Understanding on Japan-China Joint Development in the East China Sea, (2008); Understanding on the development of Shirakaba (Chinese name: Chunxiao) oil and gas field (2008).

4 About the concept of ‘dynamic deterrence’ and NDPG2010, see National Institute for Defense Studies (2011), p. 255–257; Takahashi (2012).

5 About the process about this process, see Nagashima (2013)

6 About operation of Japan Coast Guard for the Senkaku Island situation, see Japan Coast Guard (2016).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sugio Takahashi

Sugio Takahashi is a Chief of Policy Simulation Office, NIDS in Tokyo, Japan. He was a Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic Planning of Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2016. In that capacity, he was in a drafting team of the National Defense Program Guidelines of 2010 and 2013 and Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation. He received MA and BA from the Waseda University and MA from George Washington University. Mr. Takahashi has published extensively in the areas of nuclear strategy, the Japan-US alliance, and East Asian regional security including ‘Challenges to Extended Deterrence in the Japan-US. Alliance: From Gray Zone to Nuclear Deterrence’, in Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., ‘American, Australian, and Japanese Perspectives on a Changing Security Environment’, CCC PASCC Reports, 2016-02 (February 2016), ‘Redefining Strategic Stability: A Japanese View’, in James L. Schoff and Li Bin, ‘A Precarious Triangle: US-China Strategic Stability and Japan’, (Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, November 7, 2017).