Japan’s strategic contrast: continuing influence despite relative power decline in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Since 2008 the Japanese government has become more responsive to the exercise of Chinese economic, diplomatic and military power in Southeast Asia, suggesting an intensifying rivalry. The Japanese government has thrown off any reticence about self-promotion by more forcefully positioning Japan as a sensitive and sustainable strategic partner for Southeast Asian nations in a strategic contrast with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Rather than trying to contain China, Tokyo is seeking to mediate how China turns its material resources into influence. Despite an increasing asymmetry in material resources between China and Japan, this article argues that Japan maintains a surprising ability to influence the preferences of Southeast Asian nations and responses to exercises of PRC power, which in turn has allowed Japan to influence China’s regional strategy.

Keywords:

• Japan
• Southeast Asia
• rivalry
• ASEAN
• strategic competition

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Corey Wallace is the Einstein Foundation Visiting Fellow Postdoctoral Fellow at the Graduate School of East Asian Studies, Freie Universität, Berlin. Corey Wallace received his PhD in International Relations from the University of Auckland in 2015. Corey formerly worked in New Zealand at the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology from 2007 to 2010 as a policy adviser in the innovation system policy team.

Notes

1 In 2018, Sri Lanka was forced to transfer a controlling equity of the loss-making Hambanota Port to a Chinese SOE and grant a 99-year lease in exchange for debt relief from the PRC.

2 An ISEAS (2019, p. 12) ASEAN elite survey found that 70% of respondents thought ASEAN governments should be cautious about the BRI and the potential for debt problems following the Sri Lanka and Malaysia controversies, with only 8.4% confident that BRI benefits will outweigh the negative aspects.

3 The latter resulted in the setup of urea fertilizer plants in various ASEAN nations. Urea is an important ingredient for fertilizers used in larger scale agricultural production but also has various applications as part of chemical and other industrial processes.

4 Data for Figure 1 taken from ASEAN Attitudes towards Japan Surveys conducted by or on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (1983–2018). These surveys generally averaged 300–400 respondents per country.

5 Indonesia and the Philippines also tapped into the Samurai bond market to refinance debt owed to PRC entities, which tend to charge higher interest rates. Concessional loans from the PRC to Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand range between 2 and 4.5% while Japanese concessional loans seldom exceed one percent.

6 Figure 2 shows the aggregated comparison of three options emphasising Japan having its own self-defense capability versus the two options suggesting neutrality or reliance on the US without any military power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2008).

7 The projects in Yokohama, Toyota, Keihanna and Kitakyushu brought together major vendors of smart grid technologies and electronics (such as Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi), renewable energy providers, real estate developers, local governments and universities.

8 The results for Tables 2 and 3 were recalculated for purposes of comparison by author for the seven largest ASEAN economies (Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines).