Why is there no Northeast Asian security architecture? – Assessing the strategic impediments to a stable East Asia

Abstract

Exploring the ‘organization gap’ that exists in Northeast Asia, this article seeks to explain why there is no such minimal, Deutschian security community and discerns four impediments: played up islands disputes as a symptom of deep resentment shaped by histories of war and animosity; the rise of a fervent form of nationalism related to collective memories and projected at ‘the other;’ the American alliance system and China-US strategic distrust and rivalry; and the nuclear weapons pursuit of North Korea. Contrasting the fatalist logic of the dominant neorealist paradigm, the article goes into the deeper underlying and interconnected obstacles that sustain opposing blocs in Northeast Asia in a spiral of mistrust and arming. Arriving at the ‘Concert,’ or ‘Community’ proposed by White and Kissinger means that the structural, power aspect as well as the domestic socio-historic dynamics particular to Northeast Asia should be examined first. In doing so, the article puts forth conditions under which a process of ‘desecuritisation’ can lead to a viable community in Northeast Asia.

Keywords:

• Northeast Asia
• security community
• security dilemma
• desecuritisation
• territorial disputes
• nationalism
• US-China relations

Disclosure statement

There is no potential conflict of interest

Notes

1 For this first phase of scholarly propositions, from roughly 1991-1994, see Rozman, (1998, p. 4ff).

2 For an in depth take on the different theoretical and empirical approaches considered, among which the historical institutionalist approach drawing on the Six Party Talks see the contributions to a special 2008 issue of Asian Perspective, 32(4), 1–183.

3 The proposal called for a freeze of the North Korean nuclear and missile program in exchange for a halting of military exercises by the US and the Republic of Korea. See Wang (2017).

4 For a similar definition see Tow and Taylor (2010, p. 96).

5 For the three logics of insecurity see Booth and Wheeler, (2008, p. 10ff).

6 See ‘fundamental principles’ at Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘About ASEAN’, http://asean.org/asean/about-asean

7 Although their de facto alliance was not formalized into a defense treaty until 1961, China remained economically and militarily engaged in North Korea after the war, stationing significant numbers of troops and assisting with rebuilding the country. See Scobell (2004, pp. 1–2).

8 No longer under the tributary protection of the in 1895 defeated Qing Dynasty, Korea became a contested strategic space between Russia and Japan.

9 The Qing Dynasty’s concessions in the unequal Treaty of Tianjin of 1858 for example, were the result of British naval action amidst Taiping, Muslim and Nian rebellions.

10 For a discussion on US-led alliances as a bridge to a new, multilateral security architecture see cf. Park, (2011, pp. 144–146).

Additional information

Funding

Beijing Outstanding Young Scientist Program (BJJWZYJH01201910001007).

Notes on contributors

Dong Wang

Dong Wang is an Associate Professor at the School of International Studies and Executive Director of the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding, Peking University.

Friso M. S. Stevens

Friso M. S. Stevens is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University, and a Lecturer in Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam.