Can ASEAN offer a useful model? Chairmanship in decision-making by consensus

Abstract

ASEAN has adopted decision-making by consensus. Taking ASEAN as a case study, this article aims to explain how competing positions are reconciled and international agreements reached in organisations that have adopted consensus, a process that risks non-agreement because each participant has veto power, as their sole decision-making rule. ASEAN roundtables with the foreign ministers of its member states have indeed generated some meaningful agreements. I argue that rules and customs associated with ASEAN chairmanship effectively comprise a reconciliation mechanism. The chair is empowered to play an agenda-setting role, and the combination of rotating chairmanship and a limited number of member states means that every state will enjoy the strong power, within a reasonably short period of time. Since each state knows that its turn will come soon, all are willing to allow the others to exert the power of the chair and guide consensus toward agreements that are consistent with the chair’s national interests. This article analyses the impact of a strong ASEAN chair via empirical case studies of decisions reached (or not) under consensus regarding issues where member states had conflicting interests. This analysis of ASEAN decision-making contributes to the ongoing debate on effectiveness of ASEAN and has theoretical implications for the understanding of international organisations that operate under similar institutional settings.

Keywords:

• Agenda setting
• ASEAN
• chair
• consensus rule
• decision-making
• international organisation

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Susumu Yamakage and Taku Yukawa for invaluable comments and useful discussions on the early stages of this work. I am grateful to David Stuligross for carefully proofreading the manuscript. Finally I also thank the anonymous reviewers for constructive comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Concessions are often result of political manipulation. Riker (1986) cites the importance of political manipulation of agendas, arguing that if the agenda is set up differently, there are possibly different outcomes.

2 Tallberg (2003) adapts the term ‘agenda-shaping’ consisting of three forms: agenda setting, agenda structuring and agenda exclusion. Agenda setting involves introducing new issues to the agenda. Agenda structuring refers to emphasizing and/or de-emphasizing issues already on the agenda. Finally, agenda exclusion refers to actively barring issues from the policy agenda.

3 For the importance of constitutive questions in social science, see Wendt (1999).

4 The EU presidency’s function as brokerage is also an informal practice, compared with agenda management and representation (Tallberg, 2006, pp. 57–65).

5 ASEAN member states informally agreed that the issue of arms supply to the CGDK was left to each member state. Singapore showed the intention to supply arms (Straits Times, 11 December 1981; FEER, 25 December 1981: 12–13).

6 According to Haacke (1999, p. 582), ASEAN member states agreed on ‘enhanced interaction.’ However, enhanced interaction was not stated in the AMM joint communiqué; rather, it came from the statement by Thailand’s foreign minister at the 1998 AMM that mentioned ‘enhancing our interactions for the benefit of all’ (Surin, 1998).

7 After the AMM, ASEAN member states released a statement that identified six principles which should guide conflict resolution in the South China Sea. It reaffirmed their commitment to the past relevant agreements including the 2002 DOC, the 2012 Guidelines, full respect for the universally recognized principles of International Law, the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties, and the peaceful resolution of disputes (ASEAN 2012). This statement’s release was the result of intensive lobbying by Indonesia, not Cambodia (Straits Times, 21 July 2012).

8 The ECOWAS adapts the unanimity, consensus, or two-third majority. It suggests that it is desirable to ensure little objections before taking decisions, which is similar to the conditions under consensus rule.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [grant number 15K17015].

Notes on contributors

Sanae Suzuki

Sanae Suzuki is a research fellow of Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Chiba, Japan.