Stabilizing Japan–Korea relations: Restraining nationalism, appraising Beijing, reassuring Washington

Abstract

By the time Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and President Park Geun-hye took office, Japan-South Korea relations were already experiencing a downturn over history issues and Lee Myung-bak’s unprecedented presidential visit to the disputed islets of Dokdo/Takeshima. Park’s refusal to hold a bilateral summit became the symbol of strained ties. Then on November 2, 2015 — 980 days after taking office — Park met Abe for bilateral talks in Seoul. On December 28, the two sides declared a rapprochement with an agreement supporting survivors of wartime brothels. Tensions worsened again during President Moon Jae-in’s term (2017–2022), contradicting the narrative that leaders had turned relations around in late 2015. Yet the diplomatic relationship was not on a downward spiral. Japanese and Korean policymakers managed to put a floor under their interactions owing to three stabilizing mechanisms that operated during both the Park and Moon administrations. First, political elites practiced mutual restraint to limit vicious cycles of nationalist recriminations. Second, Tokyo and Seoul carefully calibrated policies toward Beijing while avoiding divergence from each other. Third, reassuring the United States about the cost-effectiveness of its alliances involved trilateral cooperation that also helped stabilize Japan-South Korea relations.

Keywords:

• Korea–Japan relations
• China politics
• US foreign policy
• East Asia diplomacy
• security alliance
• reassurance

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Acknowledgements

The author appreciates many not-for-attribution conversations with policymakers and analysts in Seoul and Tokyo, and thanks Jasmine Sumin Cho, Jeeyoon Chung, Chanmi Kwak, Dahyun Christine Lee, and Yumi Park for excellent research assistance.

Notes

1 Japan offered written apologies and financial compensation via the ‘Asian Women’s Fund’ in the mid-1990s, but this effort was seen by some survivors as insufficiently official in terms of government funding and legal responsibility. Many Koreans have since accused Japanese apologies of being inconsistent or insincere owing to actions by some Japanese politicians that appear to dilute or discredit past apologies (Kim, M., 2014; Kumagai, 2014).

2 However, there are concerns in each country about the state of democracy in the other. For example: on Korean reservations about Abe pushing security legislation through the Diet, see Hankyoreh (2015); and on Japanese criticisms about academic freedom in Korea, especially the prosecution of university professor Park Yuha, see Asahi Shimbun Editorial (2015).

3 Such mutual restraint exhibits progress since the tense days of April 2006, when Japanese survey vessels planned to visit the island and Seoul responded by sending twenty gunboats to the area, requiring urgent diplomatic talks to de-escalate the situation (Weinstein, 2006).

4 The six percent figure is approximate owing to fluctuations in exchange rate; increases for inflation are capped at four percent; see US Department of State (2014).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Leif-Eric Easley

Leif-Eric Easley is Associate Professor of International Studies at Ewha University in Seoul. He teaches international security and political economics. His research includes US-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination on engaging China and North Korea, and the geopolitical implications of political transitions (especially in Myanmar). Dr. Easley was a Northeast Asian History Fellow at Stanford University and a visiting scholar at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. He is involved in US-Asia Track II diplomacy with the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and is an alumnus of leadership programs with the Pacific Forum, the Korea Foundation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research appears in academic journals and volumes (available at http://leifeasley.net), supplemented by commentary in major newspapers. He completed his B.A. in political science with a minor in mathematics at UCLA and received his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard University’s Department of Government.