Abstract
As China’s power grows, a widespread perception is that China is more willing to respond to nationalist demands and act assertively in international incidents. In reality, China has not supported and accommodated nationalism in all events but has cooled down nationalism in some cases. An important unanswered question is, why does the Chinese government demonstrate selectivity when responding to nationalism and take different foreign policies concerning nationalism in various incidents? This article provides a coherent and testable framework to answer this question and uses five cases to test the congruence and validity of the analytical framework. The core argument is that the primary concern of the Chinese government in dealing with nationalism is its legitimacy. When policymakers perceive severe threats to China’s regime security and stability, they will open a ‘safety valve’ to embrace nationalism, allowing nationalism to unleash its anger under the government’s monitor and escalating disputes to defend national interests and appease nationalism. When there are few threats to the regime, three factors will affect China’s choice: the economic value of the diplomatic relationship, elements of China’s core interests, and the viability of reaching an agreement that sets aside the dispute.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of The Pacific Review for their insightful comments and constructive suggestions for this paper. We are also grateful for the suggestions from Jinhong Li for this research. Both authors contributed equally to this final paper with authors listed alphabetically. Of course, all mistakes and oversights are our own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Chenchao Lian
Chenchao Lian is a DPhil (PhD) candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford. He has research experience in China’s research institutions and think tanks. His research focuses on Chinese politics and foreign policy, territorial & maritime issues, foreign policy analysis, and global governance. He has published in several academic journals and media covering these topics, with his latest research investigating China’s legitimacy-seeking published in Third World Quarterly. Apart from his official email address, he can also be reached at [email protected].
Jianing Wang
Jianing Wang is a postgraduate from the Lau China Institute, part of the School of Global Affairs at King’s College London. His research interests focus on Chinese nationalism, Chinese foreign policy, and East Asian international relations. His master’s thesis research offered a foundation for this paper. He can be reached at [email protected].