The Technopolitics of THAAD in East Asia

Abstract

The decision by South Korean authorities to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile battery in 2016 unleashed a storm of protest, both domestically and internationally. Attempts to resolve these debates by showing the ‘truth’ of the THAAD system obscure the considerable investment of time and resources needed to stabilize technological meanings in the face of rival interpretations. This article synthesizes work in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) to present an integrated model of technopolitics explaining how doing politics through ‘things’ consists of interlinked rhetorical, performative, and material stabilization techniques each seeking to make the object simple, nonpolitical, and ultimately invisible or banal. In the case of THAAD, the single battery deployed to South Korea was the tip of a broader US technopolitical project to materially bind together its regional allies and contain North Korea and China. However, opponents inside and outside of the Korean peninsula tried to destabilize this project by employing their own rhetorical, performative, and de-materialization strategies. This resulted in a partial victory for both sides insofar as the broader US missile defense technopolitical project on the peninsula was paused but not defeated.

Keywords:

• Missile defense
• science and technology studies
• South Korea
• technological controversy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 This paper uses the term assemblage to refer to systems of heterogenous human and non-human objects that have been rhetorically and materially stabilized to create a coherent “thing.” For example, a THAAD battery is not a single artifact but consists of a shifting and historical configuration of technologies and personnel, including missiles, launch vehicle, radars, and datalinks. For more on assemblages see DeLanda (2006).

2 Essentially, closure means that there is consensus on the form and function of the technology. For a classic treatment of this concept see Misa (1992, pp. 109–111).

3 The use of the term translation is also a reminder that these pragmatic strategies often entail trade-offs that may cause the technopolitical project to deviate from its original goal. This discursive and material ‘drift’ is outside the scope of this paper but is an important factor for understanding technopolitics.

4 In the 2010 Missile Defense Review, for example, Russia is singled out for possible ‘cooperation’ on TMD whereas only ‘discussions’ are proposed for China (Department of Defense, 2010, pp. vi, 34).

5 The 2022 Missile Defense Review directly alludes to defeating adversary anti-access and area denial networks (Department of Defense, 2022, p. 10).

6 For a detailed examination of authoritative and non-authoritative sources outlining the Chinese position see Swaine (2017).

7 For instance, Choi (2020)’s technical analysis notes how China’s concerns are justified because of the data and sensor linkages between the Korean THAAD battery and the regional US missile defense system.

8 This pressure continues on President Biden (see Heinrichs, 2021).

9 Subsequent technical analysis suggests that THAAD has only limited defensive utility for South Korea, especially because of the North’s low launch trajectories and the ease of creating countermeasures (I. Kim & Park, 2019).

10 For example, media reports in early 2018 suggested that a North Korean Hwasong-12 malfunctioned and hit the city of Tokchon. Likewise, in late 2022 a South Korean ballistic missile, fired in response to a North Korean missile test, malfunctioned and crashed outside the city of Kangwon. The fear of such public embarrassments may have been the reason why the Missile Defense Agency attempted to classify all information related to missile testing in early 2018 before being overruled by Congress (see Korda & Kristensen, 2019, p. 298).