An existential‐phenomenological counter‐theory of transference

Abstract

The hypothesis of transference has become such a fundamental assumption for many therapeutic practitioners, that it is rarely questioned either in terms of its theoretical value or its function. This paper will critically examine the notion of transference from an existential‐phenomenological perspective and will argue the case for an alternative perspective. Further, it will seek to demonstrate that numerous and significant logical and applied problems arise with regard to the hypothesis of transference—problems which have a major negative impact upon the therapeutic relationship in general and upon the possibility of ‘encounter‘—or ‘meeting‘—between therapist and client. Finally, the paper will seek to show how, in many cases, the adoption of the hypothesis of transference can be seen as a defensive and power‐preserving (or enhancing) activity on the part of the therapist whose benefit to the client is, at best, questionable.

Notes

An amended version of this paper was presented at the British Psychological Society's 2nd Annual Conference of the Division of Counselling Psychology, May 1995. Parts of this paper appear in slightly altered form in the author's recent text Demystifying Therapy (Spinelli, 1994)