Beyond free will: The embodied emergence of conscious agency

ABSTRACT

Is it possible to reconcile the concept of conscious agency with the view that humans are biological creatures subject to material causality? The problem of conscious agency is complicated by the tendency to attribute autonomous powers of control to conscious processes. In this paper, we offer an embodied process model of conscious agency. We begin with the concept of embodied emergence – the idea that psychological processes are higher-order biological processes, albeit ones that exhibit emergent properties. Although consciousness, experience, and representation are emergent properties of higher-order biological organisms, the capacity for hierarchical regulation is a property of all living systems. Thus, while the capacity for consciousness transforms the process of hierarchical regulation, consciousness is not an autonomous center of control. Instead, consciousness functions as a system for coordinating novel representations of the most pressing demands placed on the organism at any given time. While it does not regulate action directly, consciousness orients and activates preconscious control systems that mediate the construction of genuinely novel action. Far from being an epiphenomenon, consciousness plays a central albeit non-autonomous role in psychological functioning.

KEYWORDS:

• Consciousness
• free will
• agency
• emergence
• embodiment

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. As described by Boogerd et al. (2005), consider the functioning of a cell (A) containing an embedded modular system (e.g., an organelle). Such a nested system is composed of the organelle (A₂) and the remainder of the cell in which it is embedded (A₁). Given measures of enzymatic metabolism (e.g., the concentration enzyme metabolites) in both A₁ and A₂, it is possible to measure metabolic output of both A₁ and A₂ as they function in isolation (in test tubes) and as they operate in interaction with each other as part of the larger system itself (A). In studies of cell metabolism using E. coli, Boogerd et al. (2005) have shown that the metabolic functioning of the cells as a whole (A) is often a nonlinear function of the behavior of their components in isolation (A₁, A₂). Boogerd et al. (2005) take the finding that cellular subsystems can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors in isolation than as parts of a larger system as evidence for the irreducibility of the systemic properties of the cell as a whole (see Theurer, 2014, for an alternative perspective).

2. To illustrate the concept of hierarchical integration, consider the process by which relational concepts (e.g., cause/effect, reciprocity, temporality, and part/whole) are formed over the course of psychological development (Mascolo & Fischer, 2015; Piaget, 1985; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). Beginning around two years of age, children gain the capacity able to hold in mind single concrete thoughts – symbolic representations that are the equivalent of simple declarative sentences (e.g., “Jack fell down,” “He hit me,” “Eating candy is fun”). It is not until about three and a half years of age that children gain the capacity to integrate two or more such concrete thoughts into a seamless, relational structure – what Fischer (Mascolo & Fischer, 2015) calls “representational mappings.” In so doing, children cannot only hold in mind two or more concrete ideas simultaneously; they can also represent the concrete relationship between the ideas represented. In so doing, they can represent relationships such as cause and effect (e.g., “Jack fell because Jill pushed him”), reciprocity (e.g., “He hit me so I hit him back”), time (e.g., “We went to the store, and then I got candy”), and so forth. Relational concepts thus emerge as higher-order integrations of lower-order meanings. The meanings represented in higher-order structures extend beyond those contained in their elements, whether those elements are considered alone or in combination. The reciprocity communicated in the statement “You hit me, so I hit you back” goes beyond that communicated by the combination of “You hit me” and “I hit you.” Thus, a novel higher-order structure is the emergent equivalent of the integration of lower-order elements. There is not (a) the original elements, (b) their integration, and then also (c) a novel higher-order structure that exists somehow separate from the lower-order elements. While the novel higher-order structure is fully dependent upon the lower-order elements that compose it, it neither exists separate from those elements nor is it reducible to those elements.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Michael F. Mascolo

Michael F. Mascolo is Professor of Psychology and Academic Director of the Compass Program at Merrimack College.

Eeva Kallio

Eeva Kallio is Adjunct Professor and Research Associate at University of Jyväskylä and the University of Tempere, Finland.