Desire versus judgment subjectivism about welfare: A reassessment

ABSTRACT

Subjectivism about welfare is the claim that something contributes to a person’s welfare if and only if that person has in proper conditions a certain pro attitude toward that thing. Dale Dorsey argues that the pro attitude in question is a judgment that the thing is good for one, a welfare judgment, as opposed to a desire for that thing. Eden Lin and Anthony Kelley provide counterexamples in which subjects allegedly have positive welfare without positive welfare judgments. I argue that such judgments are among the several components of prototypical desires. Given this analysis of the concept of a desire as a cluster concept that includes implicit evaluative judgments, we can reinterpret the authors’ sample cases. In some cases we find conflicts in values that include all the usual components. In atypical cases in which judgments oppose other components of desires, or are absent, the components that determine true prudential values are those that belong or connect to the most central rational desires. These desires can be equated with personal values that, when known to be satisfied, determine positive welfare.

KEYWORDS:

• Welfare subjectivism
• desires
• cluster concept
• welfare judgments

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Some versions hold that it is the combination of the pro-attitude and its object that constitutes personal goods, as opposed to just the object themselves.

2. For further corroboration, see the chapters by N. Frijda; J. Gross; J. Bates, J. Goodnight, and J. Fite; P. Niedenthal; G. Clore and A. Ortony in the same Handbook of Emotions, M. Lewis, J.M. Haviland-Jones, and L.F. Barrett (eds.).

3. For a full defense of my position, see, (Goldman, 2009: Ch. 3).

4. See, for example, (Kraut, 2018).

5. For the relevant arguments, see, (Goldman, 2022).

6. For a full discussion of this issue, see, (Goldman, 2022).

7. I do not include in this equation of deep desires or concerns with values reference to endorsement of or identification with one’s desires, as do some other authors. See, (Raibley, 2013 and Tiberius, 2018). A subject might not recognize some of her values or deep concerns revealed by her behavior, hence might not endorse or identify with them.

8. This paper greatly benefited from comments by two anonymous reviewers for this journal.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Alan H. Goldman

Alan H. Goldman is author of nine books, the latest being Reasons from Within, Philosophy and the Novel, and Life’s Values, all from Oxford University Press.