This book is about the meaning of life, which is clearly one of the of the most important – if not the most important – topics one could write about. In Understanding Human Conduct, Sam S. Rakover proposes a unique conceptual framework for the meaning of life – or ‘life-meaning’, as he calls it. Avoiding cosmological questions about the origin of the world (which Rakover denies we can explain), Rakover is primarily interested in how life-meaning relates to human behavior. Aiming to “introduce a life-meaning model, called the consciousness-meaning (CM) model” (×i) so as to “explain individuals’ behavior and the questions they face pertaining to their very existence, and their place in the world and society” (ix), Rakover draws on his extensive background in psychology and philosophy to provide a compelling and satisfying read, one that, refreshingly, avoids over-technical and unnecessary jargon.
From the offset, the reader is made aware that the author’s personal experiences and emotions motivate his account, which is certainly no drawback. Rakover bridges the gap between sterile academic texts and personal informal ones, and this style and tone of writing adds to the engaging nature of the book. Rakover states in Chapter 1 that “a person’s worldview develops not only on the basis of a rationality common to all people or an education based on the rules of logic and the scientific method. A worldview is also an emotional and personal matter” (2), and this thought is expressed in the manner of his writing. He notes “This is not a classic science textbook … [it] is an expression of holistic thinking and cognitive processes based on rationality and emotions” (11). Such an interplay between personal observations and philosophy is not common. So, although much of the model was spawned from the author’s emotional experiences, this by no means entails that it is flimsy, ungrounded in reality, or lacking justification. That the narrative is interspersed with personal anecdotes and hypothetical examples will be very helpful for the layperson, so this book will be accessible not only to those who have a solid background in philosophy and psychology but also to anyone with an interest in the subject matter.
In the remainder of this review, I will briefly summarize each chapter of the text and close with some final comments about the value of this work.
In Chapter 1, Rakover explores the connection between what one believes (their worldview) and what type of life-meaning one can possess. It sets the parameters for, say, the extent of life-meaning a Christian may be able to acquire based on their belief in the God of classical monotheism. To this end, Rakover lays out the relationship between worldview and life-meaning using his own personal story of rejecting classical monotheism. In particular, he details how the Holocaust affected his worldview by convincing him that God cannot exist in light of the horrendous evils that occurred during this event. Rakover’s rejection of theism is not, as he explains, a purely logical process; it is an emotional belief that is “an inalienable part of [his] personal infrastructure” (5). This means that the text comes from a starting point of atheism and the notion that humans are “fundamentally … and essentially evil” (5). Despite what might be called pessimistic views about the world and humanity, Rakover stoutly asserts that life-meaning is still possible for existential pessimists like himself. He gives three reasons for this belief: the CM model allows for meaning even under this view, even evil people can have life-meaning, and evil people can change. The author’s model will not be convincing to those who have differing worldviews, particularly religious worldviews that ground life-meaning in a divine source of goodness. Classical monotheists who ground life-meaning in a relationship with God, for instance, are not likely to wholeheartedly accept that life-meaning is grounded only in phenomena and belief. Yet Rakover certainly offers a compelling account of life-meaning for those who are not beholden to a supernatural grounding of life-meaning.
In Chapter 2, Rakover talks about how despair is a natural consequence of accepting that the world is infinite, independent, and indifferent to human beings (what we might call the ‘triple-I’ worldview) but explains that this should not be the reaction we have to drawing this conclusion. He provides examples of the science that caused him to draw this conclusion about the world (that everything has a beginning, a duration, and an end; the theory of evolution; and that science can offer pretty reasonable explanations for real-world phenomena without the need for postulating God’s existence). After establishing his reasons for accepting the triple-I worldview, Rakover then distinguishes his approach from that of Camus. While Camus sees life as absurd and meaningless (accepting absurdism and nihilism), Rakover stresses that superior animals can inject meaning into their own life by affirming that life isn’t meaningless. At this point in the text, I found myself wishing that Rakover did more to explain how people can turn away from nihilism, hoping for a more prescriptive account of life-meaning in light of these examples of rejecting life-meaning. In subsequent chapters, however, he fleshes out the details and provides guidelines about how one who has lost life-meaning can rediscover it. Specifically, Rakover tells of individuals who journey through the process of possessing life-meaning to losing life-meaning and turning to absurdism to re-acquiring life-meaning (losing a loved one, burning out, and experiencing war are several examples of catalysts for rejecting life-meaning).
In Chapter 3, Rakover lays out the CM model of life-meaning by detailing the differences between the three sorts of life-meaning. The crux of Rakover’s theory is the distinction between two different types of life-meaning: innate and acquired. Innate meaning is “a natural phenomenon that may be assumed to have evolved … a sense of being alive, of life, and how wonderful it is” (×), examples of which are the feeling the experience of being wowed by a glowing sunset or feeling wonder at the taste of a delicious food never before tried. Acquired meaning, which is further separated into two sorts—acquired ordinary and acquired extreme, is accumulated after birth and is described as “a systematic collection of rules of behaviors, norms, values, social-knowledge, and scientific information” (×). Examples of this type of meaning are religious beliefs and ethical values. Acquired ordinary meaning differs from acquired extreme meaning in that the former is easier to possess, but the latter is much more difficult to possess and sustain. Extreme meaning is often a worldview that one holds, something outside the human being that is instilled in them during their lifetime by external factors (e.g., parents, teachers, peers). Crucially, then, Rakover ties life-meaning to consciousness, a faculty held by human beings and some ‘superior’ non-human animals (e.g., monkeys, dogs, cats, and dolphins). This of course indicates that consciousness is a necessary condition for life-meaning. Rakover is quick to explain that he does not aim to “support any given idea, or to refute another” (×ii) by comparing his model of life-meaning to any others. The meaning of life, then, and particularly innate meaning, is analogous to an immune system against trauma and loss.
In Chapter 4, Rakover turns to a discussion of the mechanics of consciousness, admitting that a theory of consciousness that adequately explains the nature of consciousness and its relationship with the brain is lacking as of yet. This fact, he contends, does not undermine the CM model of consciousness. The chapter mostly covers the prominent theories of consciousness that have been proposed over the years, all of which, Rakover asserts, are fundamentally flawed.
The book is littered with allusions to existentialist works, with Rakover providing interesting analyses of characters like Camus’ Meursault and Sisyphus in relation to life-meaning. In Chapter 5 specifically, though, Rakover dedicates much time to connecting the CM model to existentialist philosophy (particularly focusing on the works of Camus and Tolstoy) with the aim of demonstrating that the CM model can provide an explanation of absurdism, suicide, and other human beliefs and behaviors.
In Chapter 6, Rakover discusses the three previously identified concepts (absurdism, suicide, and life-meaning) from a new angle based on the CM model. To do this, he engages in a discussion about the relationship between life-meaning and value. He relates his theory to the concepts of free-will (arguing that free-will is a pre-condition of life-meaning) and relativism and argues that religion cannot effectively form a basis for life-meaning. Rakover in this chapter also offers two real-life cases of when innate meaning can conquer the desire to end one’s own life.
Chapter 7 turns to the application of the CM model to how humans behave. Rakover analyzes the remarkable historical example of Gauguin and the fictional example of Strickland (who was based on Gauguin) from Somerset Maugham’s The Moon and Sixpence. He then turns to an explanation of two relevant models: methodological dualism and multi-explanation framework and how they relate to life-meaning.
Chapter 8, the final chapter, offers a thorough discussion of the essential features of the CM model in order to compare it to other approaches to life-meaning. This section of the book serves as a helpful summary of the CM model as laid out by Rakover in the rest of the text. At one point, for instance, Rakover explains how the CM model differs from the Freudian psychoanalytic approach to life-meaning (the former is more general and highlights consciousness, whereas the latter relies on a very specific configuration of personality). Rakover also uses this chapter to express that the CM model is neither a purely objective approach, nor a purely subjective approach, nor a purely nihilistic approach to life-meaning. Rather, it is a hybrid approach that is a combination of subjective and objective approaches. It is in this section, too, that Rakover lists five non-religious options for anchoring one’s acquired meaning: political ideology, faith in science, the individual and family, an exclusive focus on the self, and dedication of life to one goal. Rakover ends this chapter by expanding on the relationship between the CM model and scientific development.
Although it is not within the scope of Ravkover’s work, it would be interesting to hear the implications for particular applied ethical issues such as animal rights, abortion, and the ethics of AI under the CM model. With regard to animal rights, how should we treat non-superior beings that do not have consciousness? Does this mean that their lives possess no meaning? If not, does this mean that they possess no value? The relationship between axiology and life-meaning is not developed in the work but would surely be a fascinating avenue for further exploration. There is also emerging research indicating that non-superior animals as perhaps more sentient (if sentience can be considered binary) that previously believed. If this is the case, more animals might have life-meaning, under the CM model, than Rakover believes. The account seems to indicate that consciousness is binary: you either have it or you don’t, but not all philosophers accept this claim, particularly when it comes to non-human animals. I would also like to hear Rakover’s thoughts on which metaethical theories are compatible with the CM model. In Chapter 8, Rakover hints that the CM model is subjective, remarking that “a lifeway [the values, norms, and rules by which one lives] is not judged as right/wrong, true/false, but rather according to the effectiveness of the realization of its goals, that is, as good/bad, effective/ineffective” (141). If one is a moral objectivist, then, how does living a morally good life fit in to the CM model of life-meaning? Can the life of an evil person be as meaningful as the life of a good person? Finally, there are some weird implications of the model. If, hypothetically, every superior being in the universe is in non-REM sleep, for example, does that mean there is no meaningful life in existence at that time? These questions indicate that there is good scope for further exploration of Rakover’s model and how it fits with other philosophical viewpoints.
Through insightful engagement with psychological and philosophical ideas, Rakover skillfully demonstrates his optimistic approach to life-meaning. The text does not answer every single question we might have about the model, but it offers a compelling map for life-meaning, covering a huge amount of territory over its eight chapters. At the end of Chapter 1 Rakover sets himself a modest condition for success, musing, “if anyone learns something from reading [this book], I will pat myself on the shoulder and consider it a job well done” (12). As I hope to have shown from this review, Rakover should certainly feel justified in doing both of these things.
Correction Statement
This article was originally published with errors, which have now been corrected in the online version. Please see Correction (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2133711)