Abstract
The military defeat of Spain at the hands of the United States in July 1898 has always been a reference point in the collective memory of Spaniards. It goes far beyond the actual consequences — military, economic, colonial and political ‐ of a disaster which, to anyone with a modicum of information, always seemed inevitable, given the extraordinary inequality between the opponents and the diplomatic isolation of Spain. In fact, historical writings of recent years agree that, apart from the enormous symbolic significance of the loss of the last colonies of a once‐great empire, the effects of the war, both economic and political, were relatively limited. At the same time, one writer’ has pointed out that, faithful to a tradition common to the European political culture of the time, the date 1898 was used as a rhetorical device to increase awareness of the need for a profound political transformation. French intellectuals had done the same after the defeat at Sedan in 1870. It is as well, therefore, to set out in greater detail the chronological framework of these reflections with which we shall try to develop the idea that the colonial disaster of 1898, far beyond its intrinsic importance, serves to illustrate the disorder from which the Spanish political system was suffering at the end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent attempts to transform it and adapt it to new demands.