Quantum game analysis of green technology R&D cooperation between competing manufacturers under government subsidies

ABSTRACT

Driven by government subsidies, it’s common for manufacturers to cooperate with their rivals in green technology research and development (R&D). However, the existing literature ignores the fact that, before cooperating, they still need to make independent investment decisions, and different cooperation forms have different cooperation closeness. We introduce the quantum game to consider these two factors. Specifically, the classical game model and quantum game model under green R&D subsidy and per-unit green product subsidy are constructed, we explore the optimal decisions, the influence of cooperation closeness on the optimal decisions and the expected profits, and how should the government design subsidies policy. We find that cooperating in a certain level of closeness and making green R&D investments and pricing decisions based on the cooperation closeness is more favourable. In the case of a large gap in green R&D capabilities, it is unwise for the stronger manufacturer to overly cooperate. The government should offer different levels and types of subsidies to the manufacturers according to the degree of competition and the cooperation closeness.

KEYWORDS:

• Quantum game
• Coopetition
• Green technology R&D
• Government subsidy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 According to the data of IEA, in 2019, the energy consumption in the industry is 120,978,863 TJ, which is the most consumed sector; and the CO₂ emissions in the industry is 20,322 Mt, accounting for 60.44% of the total CO₂ emissions. The ‘manufacturers’ mentioned in this article generally refer to producers in the industrial field.

2 https://evergas.net/dan-unity-co2-transport-of-captured-co2/.

3 https://chuneng.bjx.com.cn/news/20180807/918839.shtml.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant number 72001165] and Technology Innovation Leading Program of Shaanxi [Program No. 2022PT-49].

Notes on contributors

Aiping Wu

Aiping Wu is a PhD in management science and engineering from the School of Economics & Management, Xidian University. She comes from Fujian Province, China. Her research interests include innovation management, contract design, and decision analysis.

Hua Li

Hua Li is a professor in the School of Economics & Management, Xidian University. He is the head of Shaanxi Soft Science institute of Information and Digital Economy. His research interests include decision analysis and innovation management.

Danyang Du

Danyang Du is a doctoral student in the School of Economics & Management, Xidian University, majoring in Management Science and Engineering. She comes from Hebei Province, China. Her research interests include innovation management and supply chain management.