The Tragedy of the Commons: Institutions and Fisheries Management at the Local and EU Levels

Abstract

Garrett Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons argument states that resources held in common will inevitably suffer overexploitation and degradation. However, recent contradicting evidence has led theorists to question the soundness of this claim. This paper assesses the accuracy and predictive success of the six essential assumptions of Hardin's approach. The aim of the paper is to compare the functioning of the tragedy of the commons approach at the local and the international levels, in order to demonstrate that the context we choose affects the applicability of the hypothesis in explaining policy outcomes. The paper compares the validity of the tragedy of the commons hypothesis in three marine cases: California fisheries, modern Oregon fisheries and European Union Common Fisheries Policy. We find that at the local level the tragedy of the commons can be mitigated when a co-management of institutions is achieved, while the EU case shows that the tragedy of the commons is a realistic prediction when dealing with international institutions.

Notes

¹An important factor that affects institutional innovation by resource users is the nature of the political system. Long-standing communal property rights without formal recognition have often been insufficient to prevent incursions, as in the case of the demise of informal ethnic management of the California fisheries (McEvoy, 1988, p. 220).

²The idea was that scientists would find a solution to produce a ‘sustainable yield’ and the lawmakers would limit the harvest accordingly. The problem occurred because federal scientists made their calculations with the focus on species at the top of the food chain (i.e. seals); while neglecting other species (i.e. sardines) that are more sensitive to ecological changes. In this case, algebraic rather than a stochastic (probabilistic) calculations were used, which proved problematic later as the ecological environment changed. Added to that, lawmakers who did not want to disturb the industry based on new scientific predictions of a possible futuristic catastrophe maintained a status quo harvest limit, which eventually led to a depletion in sardine stock.