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SYMPOSIUM ON MONETARY POLICY

‘Independence’ of Central Banks and the Political Economy of Monetary Policy

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Pages 565-580 | Received 22 Mar 2022, Accepted 04 Mar 2023, Published online: 27 Apr 2023
 

ABSTRACT

The notion of an ‘independent’ central bank has dominated monetary policy debates for the past three decades. The arguments for the political independence of central banks are closely related to the adoption of ‘inflation targeting’. The arguments for an independent central bank are based on the ‘credibility’ of the ‘conservative’ central bank in comparison to government decision making. The independence of a central bank has been a matter of independence from government but not independence from the grip of the ‘new consensus in macroeconomics’ nor from the interests of the banking and financial sector. That independence has also supported a lack of co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policies, diminishing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies. In addition, there remain doubts about the effectiveness of ‘inflation targeting’ on the achievement of low inflation. The policy mandates of central banks have begun to shift towards financial stability and paying attention to issues of inequality and the climate emergency.

JEL CODES:

Acknowledgements

Open Access funding was provided by the Qatar National Library. We would like to use this opportunity to acknowledge and thank the reviewers who reviewed this article and aided in its publication.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 For example, see McCallum (Citation2001) and Meyer (Citation2001) for an introduction, andWoodford (Citation2003) for a very detailed elaboration. See Arestis and Sawyer (Citation2008a, Citation2008b), Sawyer (Citation2009) and Arestis (Citation2009) for critiques of new consensus macroeconomics and monetary policy.

2 See, for example, Heimberger and Kapler (Citation2017), Heimberger (Citation2020) and Sawyer (Citation2019) in Section 8.

3 Axel Weber was governor of the Bundesbank when this paper was published.

4 See Sawyer (Citation2019) for a review of financialization and inequality.

Additional information

Funding

Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.