The problem of agency in feminism: a critical realist approach

Abstract

In a recent paper, members from the London Feminist Salon Collective reflected on the vexed problem of agency in poststructuralist theory and asked, ‘as feminist educational researchers, where do we go from here?’ The issue remains pressing as agency, both individual and collective, is at the heart of the feminist, and indeed, all radical political projects. The attractions of poststructuralist theorizing for many feminists has been its decisive break with logocentrism. However, from the 1980s onwards, feminists were pointing to the problems poststructuralism presented in theorizing the nature of agency. In this paper I will argue that we should adopt a different theoretical starting point. Drawing heavily on the work of Margaret Archer, I will argue that critical realism has much to offer theories of political action. While acknowledging the enormous contribution of feminist scholars working within a poststructuralist paradigm, I will argue that the epistemological and ontological assumptions at the heart of poststructuralist theory render it incapable of providing a framework for what Archer calls the enchantment of being human. This enchantment, and the rich resources of a conceptualization of agency based on the primacy of practice, provides a stronger basis for theorizing feminist research, practice and being.

Notes

1. I have used the term poststructuralism here because this is the term adopted in the debate at the Feminist Salon, however, many writers use the term postmodernism to refer to the same philosophical turn. Postmodernism encompasses a broader set of arguments including ones about cultural forms and also the supposedly inevitable condition of the postmodern world.

2. The history of the women’s movement in other parts of the world has been varied, and activism remains a major characteristic. My loose use of the qualifier in the west is meant to signify recognition of these different histories. I am grateful to Clare Beckett for pointing his out.

3. I have relied heavily on Alex Callinicos’ book Against postmodernism in this section, because although it is now 15‐years‐old it was immensely influential in terms of my thinking and I have not substantially revised my views.

4. The section partially reproduces an argument I have made elsewhere (in Clegg, 2005).

5. Moi uses her own translations arguing that the version that English readers have available is highly misleading at critical points.

6. Moi discusses at length why the sex/gender split is not operative in French in the same way as it is in English and that, therefore, to talk about sex in this way does not imply any form of biological determinism.