Efficiency, choice and control in social care commissioning

Abstract

Publicly-funded social care providers are under significant pressure as a consequence of an ageing population, a tight financial climate, and demands for greater quality and dignity in care. Personal budgets have been advocated as a potential solution. However, the implications of personal budgets on commissioning and market development are largely unexplored. This article looks at new approaches being adopted by English local authorities to reconcile tensions between the efficiency and personalization agendas, and to counter new transaction costs.

Keywords:

• Commissioning
• efficiency
• personal budgets
• social care
• transaction costs

Acknowledgements

The research projects were funded by the Department of Health. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the funding body. We would like to thank the other members of both project teams and the managers of the provider organizations who made this research possible by sharing their experiences and expectations.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Mark Wilberforce

Mark Wilberforce is a research fellow in the Personal Social Services Research Unit, University of Manchester, UK.

Kate Baxter

Kate Baxter is a research fellow in the Social Policy Research Unit, University of York, UK.

Caroline Glendinning

Caroline Glendinning is Professor of Social Policy, Social Policy Research Unit, University of York, UK.