Abstract
This article provides a framework for public corporate governance combining two main components: traditional corporate governance (via governing bodies) and multi-level governance (via regulation). We provide evidence from the publiclyowned Spanish savings banks (‘cajas’), which have a conflict between their two main goals: operating efficiently and maximizing the reach of their welfare projects. The case may have lessons for policy-makers in the 80+ countries that have some government ownership of banks, and for managers muddling through public corporate governance.
Acknowledgements
This article reports on work undertaken by the authors as part of MICINN Research Award CSO2009/11351, and AGAUR Research Award SGR1483. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the IRSPM Conference in Bern 2010, and the US/EU Dialogue Series: Finding common ground on issues of business & public policy, Georgetown University, March 2011. The authors would like to thank the editor and referees for their helpful comments.