Elections and violence

Abstract

No subject attracts political scientists more than elections do. Still, the intimate link with violence has scarcely been noticed. A sparse recent literature exists on how ballots may eliminate bullets in civil war settlements: questions concerning why ballots create occasions for bullets and the relationship between violence‐producing and violence‐reducing propensities of elections are ignored. This article aims to help fill the gap. It treats election as a mode of succession, noting that the succession moment is normally the most dangerous recurring one in all political systems. We compare election with heredity, its chief historical rival, to see how the different character of each shapes violence patterns. Hereditary systems require, but rarely achieve, clarity in establishing claim priorities. Election requirements are ‘fairness’ (competitors ‘bend’ rules) and ‘conciliation’ (divisions are created which must be reconciled). The final section offers a brief taxonomy of typical justifications for initiating and/or resisting election violence.