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Abstract
This article attempts to answer the question: Is Al Qaeda a new fascist movement? It explores this issue by comparing the situations and ideas which gave birth to fascism and jihadism and the beliefs and behaviours common to both movements. The essay demonstrates a close coherence between the two movements, but concludes that the differences between them are significant enough to proclaim that they are not the same. Indeed, Al Qaeda's jihadism may warrant a new category of analysis. Jihadism's differences from fascism notwithstanding, defeating it will be very difficult.
Notes
Christopher Hitchens, “Against Rationalization,” The Nation, online posting 20 September 2001 (published in 8 October 2001 issue), used the term “fascism with an Islamic face.” See: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011008/hitchens20010924, accessed 31 Jan 2006. The analogy was taken up by the Cato Institute's Brink Lindsey, “The Last Totalitarians,” 28 September 2001, http://www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/lindsey-010928.html, accessed 31 January 2006; and by Paul Berman, “Terror and Liberalism,” The American Prospect 12, no. 18 (22 October 2001), http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/berman-p.html, accessed 28 January 2006. The debate has not died. See for example, Yehuda Mirsky, “From Fascism to Jihadism,” The New Republic Online, http://www.tnr.com/doc. mhtml?I=express&s=mirsky041002, accessed 28 January 2004.
Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 149–151, 161; Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914–1945 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 352–353.
Manus I. Midlarsky, “Nihilism in Political Chaos: Himmler, Bin Laden, and Altruistic Punishment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 187–206, explicitly draws comparisons between the Nazis and the jihadists, but focuses primarily on similar beliefs rather than examining both movements as a whole. Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004), 204, dismisses the notion that Al Qaeda can be considered a fascist movement.
See Aristotle A. Kallis, The Fascism Reader (London: Routledge, 2003) parts One and Two.
Paxton (see note 3 above), 218.
Stanley Payne, “The Ideal Type of Fascism: A ‘Retrodictive Theory,’” in Kallis (see note 4 above), 183–185.
Paxton (see note 3 above), 19, 32–33.
Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies (New York: Penguin, 2004), 10, 16–19, 22–23, 37, 51–52, 72, 76–77, 79–80, 94–95, 112–114.
Paxton (see note 3 above), 33–36, 41–49.
Midlarsky (see note 3 above), 191.
Buruma and Margalit (see note 8 above) 50–52, 56–58.
Quoted in Midlarsky (see note 3 above), 190.
Stanley Payne, ‘Fascism as a ‘Generic’ Concept,” in Kallis (see note 4 above), 83–85.
Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (1995), cited in Paxton (see note 3 above), 15, and 258 n. 67.
Paxton, 15–18, and 258, n. 65.
Buruma and Margalit (see note 8 above), 72.
Roger Griffin, “Fascism: ‘Rebirth’ and Ultra-Nationalism,” in Kallis (see note 4 above), 174–177; Paxton, 20, 40, 142; Noel O'Sullivan, “Five Main Tenets of Fascist Ideology,” in Kallis, 159.
Paxton, 10.
O'Sullivan (see note 17 above), 159–160; Paxton, 9, 16, 17, 78–79, 84–85, 135–136, 137; Payne (see note 2 above), A History of Fascism, 136, 217–128, 285–286; Z. Barbu, “Romania: The ‘Iron Guard,’” and Istvan Deak, “Hungary: Horthy, Gombos and the ‘Arrow Cross,’” in Kallis, 196, 206–207.
Midlarsky (see note 3 above), 192–193; Barbu (see note 19 above), in Kallis, 197; Payne (see note 2 above), A History of Facism, 136.
Barry Cooper, New Political Religions, or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 5–6; Midlarsky, 189; Paxton, 213.
Bassam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 86.
Laqueur, (see note 2 above), 153.
Of course, “Liberation Theology” was anything but fascist, drawing as it did upon progressive social mission tendencies in the Latin American Catholic Church.
The Salafist school of thought evolved from a late nineteenth-century reformist movement that attempted to reconcile Islam with modernity to the more conservative, ascetic puritanism of Saudi Wahhabism, which itself derived from Ibn Taymiyyah's (thirteenth century) strict interpretation of Hanbali doctrine. See Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard University Press, 1991), 69, 158–159, 179–181; William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 124–125, 230; Tibi, 90, describes Wahhabism as an “archaic chiliastic variant” of modern Islamic revival. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, “9/11 and the Muslim Transformation,” in Mary L. Dudziak, ed., September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 89–91 argues that by the 1970s Wahhabism and Salafism had become identical.
Cleveland (see note 25 above), 226–228, 436–438, 443–445, 447. See also: Ibrahim A. Karawan, The Islamist Impasse. Adelphi Paper 314 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 15–16; The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: Norton, 2004), 52–54; Eleanor Abdella Doumato, “Manning the Barricades: Islam According to Saudi Arabia's School Texts,” Middle East Journal 57, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 243–246.
Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002): 48–60; Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and the Middle East Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 150; John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27; Robert D. Lee, Overcoming Tradition and Modernity: The Search for Islamic Authenticity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 3, 7, 9–11; Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 40–44; Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2003), 21–22, 28, 35, 48, 52–54; El-Fadl (see note 25 above), 72, 90; Karawan (see note 26 above), 34–36.
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” Middle East Journal 4 (Fall 2000): 573–575.
Quote cited in Dilip Hiro, War Without End: The Rise of Islamist Terrorism and Global Response, rev. ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 106–107.
Quote from text, repr. in Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Anti-American Terrorism in the Middle East: A Documentary Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 150.
Hiro (see note 29 above), 75–76; John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 46.
Quote from text in Rubin and Rubin (see note 30 above), 149.
See Bin Laden's Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places (1996), reprinted in Rubin and Rubin, 137–142; Hiro (see note 29 above), 158–163, 171–173.
Sivan (see note 27 above), 3–12, 14, 73–75, 125–126, 188; Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur'an to Bin Laden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 366; Hafez (see note 27 above), Why Muslims Rebel, 6–9; Lee (see note 27 above), 6–7, 16, 87, 100–101; and Tibi (see note 25 above), 6, 28, 46.
Tibi (see note 25 above), 54.
El-Fadl (see note 25 above), 72; Robert S. Leiken, “Europe's Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 122–123, 127–128.
Esposito (see note 27 above), 26. See also Cooper (see note 21 above), 110–111, 115–116.
Richard C. Martin, “Striving in the Path of Allah: A Fundamentalist Interpretation of Jihad in Egypt,” Conflict Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 5, 9–10; Esposito, 26–28, 32. Bonney (see note 34 above), 12, attributes the notion of the personal higher or “Greater” jihad to the Sufi interpreters of Islam. See also: Interpretations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language, trans. Muhamad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, 17th rev. ed. (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 1997), 2:190–192; 4:74, 90–93; 8:1, 15–16, 39, 45–46, 55–57, 65; 9:5, 29, 111, 123; 47:4–8; hadith 3462; and Appendix III “the Call to Jihad,” 960–981; Fred M. Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991) 46–47. M. E. Yapp, “Islam and Islamism,” Middle Eastern Studies, 40, no. 2 (March 2004): 177–179. Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), 13–15, 127–132 notes first that the Qur'an provides conflicting guidance on how to deal with unbelievers by means of jihad, and second that such guidance has been subject to reinterpretation by modernists (moderates) and fundamentalists.
Esposito (see note 27 above), 50.
Sivan (see note 27 above), 70, 85, 94–107; Andrew McGregor, “‘Jihad and the Rifle Alone’: Abdullah ‘Azzam and the Islamist Revolution,” Journal of Conflict Studies 23, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 92–113; Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 43–59; and Bonney (see note 34 above), 121–126, 208, 213. Maududi accepted the notion of the inner, personal jihad as the greater, but Al-Banna did not.
Quoted in Esposito (see note 27 above), 54–55.
Maududi, “War in the Cause of Allah” (1939), quoted in Bonney (see note 34 above), 204.
Esposito, 52–53; Bonney, 200, 202–203, 209–210.
John C. Zimmerman, “Sayyid Qutb's Influence on the 11 September Attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 224–225; Hafez (see note 27 above), 177. See also: Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Atlantic Monthly (September 1990) reprinted in Policy 17, no. 4 (Summer 2001–02): pp. 17–26 at www.cis.org.au/Policy/summer01-02/polsumm01-3.pdf
Quoted in Sivan (see note 27 above), 25.
William E. Shepard, “Sayyid Qutb's Doctine of Jahiliyya,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 35 (2003): 521–545.
Quoted in Tibi (see note 25 above), 28.
Buruma and Margalit (see note 8 above), 6, 11–12.
Ibid, 6–8, 59, 79; Mirsky (see note 1 above), op. cit.
Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (May–June 2005): 43–44; Kepel (see note 40 above), 5.
Buruma and Margalit, 79; and Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 35–37, 94.
Laqueur (see note 2 above), 149–150.
Quoted in Rubin and Rubin (see note 30 above), 137.
Quoted in “Purported Bin Laden Tape Praises Attacks,” 13 November 2002, accessed 21 June 2006, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/12/binladen.statement/index.html.
Tibi, 6; Sivan, 85; El-Fadl, 72–73, 91–92; Vartan Gregorian, Islam: A Mosaic Not a Monolith (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003), 86.
Lee (see note 27 above), 88–89. See also: Bonney, 217.
Shepard, 530–531; Bonney, 217–18, 222. Often without directly saying so, Qutb was referring specifically to the Egypt of his day while articulating a more universal doctrine.
McGregor (see note 40 above), 92–99, which draws on Azzam’s sermons and writings; Esposito, 7.
Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14, 25–26, 32, 132–133, 144–145.
El-Fadl (see note 25 above), 71.
Ibid, 78, 80, 85–86, 89–92. Gerges (see note 59 above), 86, also notes the fusion of Salafi and Wahhabi ideas. The sources of this creed include only the Qur'an, the hadiths, and the Sunnah of the Prophet, his companions, and the “four rightly guided caliphs.” But Salafabism as a creed alone does not seem to explain the “will to power” that gives jihadism its lethal virulence. El-Fadl seems to have missed the melding of Salafabism with Maududi's and Qutb's conception of Islam as a revolutionary ideology.
Quoted in Bonney, 315.
The 9/11 Commission Report, 51; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, 2002): 87–91; Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin Laden's Fatwa,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, no. 4 (October–December 1998): 323–326; Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002), 46–52; “Interview with Usama bin Ladin (December 1998)” in Rubin and Rubin (see note 30 above), 152–154.
Sivan (see note 27 above), 71–72, quoting Abd-al Halim Uways. See also: Bonney, 7, 432 n. 78.
Quoted in McGregor, 103.
Quoted in Ibid.
Quoted in Sivan, 69–70.
Ibid., 127. See also: Kepel (see note 40 above), 59, 192–193; Johannes J. G. Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and the Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 6, 162, 165–166.
Quoted from his lecture, “Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations,” in McGregor, 99, 106–107.
Quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 150.
According to Ayman al-Zawahiri, Qutb believed that Muslim unification was the central issue in the struggle between Islam and its enemies: Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 2 (March–April 2005): 80. See also: Kepel, 44–45; Lee, 104–5; McGregor, 98–105.
Bin Laden's 1996 “Declaration of War,” quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 140–141.
World Islamic Front, “Statement Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” quoted in Ibid., 151.
Quoted in Ibid., 175.
Mark Sedgwick, “Al Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 800, 803–804 suggests that this was the primary goal of 9/11, and that its secondary goal was to provoke the U.S. into actions that would further alienate Muslims and mobilize them to support Al Qaeda. He feels they have played out as intended. See also: “Transcript of Usama Bin Laden Video Tape,” 13 December 2001, author's copy, from CBC.
From al-Ansar, Al Qaeda's online magazine, 27 February 2002, quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 274, 276.
“Top Bin Laden Aide Reportedly Urges Further Attacks,” 7 January 2003, accessed 21 June 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/06/alqaeda.threat/index. html; Bin Laden's “Declaration of War,” in Rubin and Rubin, 142. Gerges, 187–191 says that 9/11 failed to rally the wider jihadist movement and many of its leaders criticized the attacks.
Buruma and Margalit, 105–107; Sivan, 3–11; Bonney, 208; Peters, 11; Salwa Ismail, “Confronting the Other: Identity, Culture, Politics, and Conservative Islamism in Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30 (1998): 204.
Quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 148.
Ibid., 139–140.
Ibid., 178.
From “On the Doctrine of the Muslim Brothers,” quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 28.
Laqueur, 158. Bonney, 221 says that Qutb's vision of Islamic rule was hegemonic.
Quoted in Sivan, 70. See also: Bonney, 205.
Quoted in Gregorian (see note 55 above), 77.
Quoted in his “Declaration of War” in Rubin and Rubin, 137.
El-Fadl, 92.
Rubin and Rubin, 180.
David Zeidan, “The Islamist View of Life as a Perennial Battle,” in Rubin and Rubin, 16; See: in Interpretations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an, 2:75–76, 80, 89, 91, 96, 99, 145; 3: 118; 4:160–61; 98:6, and hadiths 3453–54.
Buruma and Margalit, 27–32, 33–34, 119–120; Tibi, 128; and Bonney, 6; Ismail (see note 78 above), 205. See also: Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 121, 200, 228; Kepel, 111. This is Kepel's description of their views.
Doumato (see note 26 above), 230–247; Arnon Groiss, The West, Christians and Jews in Saudi Arabian Schoolbooks (New York: The American Jewish Committee Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 2003), 17–22; Raphael Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic Martyrology (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 116, 284–285, 289–291, 296–297, 301–302, 316–317; and Rubin and Rubin, 15–18, 150. Khaleel Mohammed, professor of religion at San Diego State University, argues that anti-Semitism “has become an entrenched tenet of Muslim theology,” taught to the great majority of Muslims. See: René Bruemmer, “Muslims Taught anti-Semitism, Scholar Says,” National Post, 16 March 2004. But many Muslim scholars do not concur with this view.
Rubin and Rubin, 156.
Quoted in Sedgwick (see note 75 above), 799.
Quoted in Rubin and Rubin, 178.
Statements of 10 and 13 October 2001, quoted in Ibid., 251, 254–255.
Al-Jazira broadcast of 3 November 2001, quoted in Ibid., 258–260.
Bonney, 366; Sivan, 73–75; quote from Tibi, 28.
Lee, 18–20, 71–74; quote cited in “Purported al-Zarqawi Tape: Democracy a Lie,” http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/24/iraq.zarqawi/index.html, accessed 24 January 2005.
Dexter Filkins, “Insurgents Vowing to Kill Iraqis Who Brave the Polls on Sunday,” New York Times, 26 January 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/01/26/international/middleeast/26iraq.html
McGregor, 94, quoting Albert Hourani's study: Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (1983).
Bonney, 217–218, 222–223; Azzam quote from McGregor, 98.
The Ideology of the Endless Jihad: Wahhabism, Bin Laden and Khattab (unpublished paper, 2004) 21, 22–23, 30–31. The author, a government official, asked that his name be withheld.
Gerges, 34–35.
Kepel, 15–16; Lee, 67–68, 70–71, 108; and Sivan, 85–86; quote cited in Benjamin and Simon (see note 123 below), 57 [emphasis added].
Rubin and Rubin, 178.
Quoted in Gunaratna (see note 63 above), 87–88.
Ibid., 41–42, 88–89. See also: El-Fadl, 70; Bonney, 358.
9/11 Commission Report, 56, 67; Gunaratna, 56; Hiro, 259; Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Free Press, 2002), 63; “Bin Laden's Martyrs for the Cause,” Financial Times, 28 November 2001; Stewart Bell, The Martyr's Oath: The Apprenticeship of a Homegrown Terrorist (Mississauga, Ontario: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 107–108, 110; and Gerges, 34–38, 126–127, 181–183.
Maxwell Taylor, The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence (London: Brassey's, 1991), 37–55, 126, 130, 194–195, 198.
El-Fadl, 71–72; Buruma and Margalit, 95–96. In the hands of fascists and jihadists, nihilism has become a doctrine that rejects and aims to destroy science and rationalism.
Quoted in Buruma and Margalit, 13.
Sivan, 127–128; Lee, 90; Laqueur, 152, 154.
Interpretations of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an 3:169–172; 4:74; 9:20–21, 111; 47: 5–6; Midlarsky (see note 3 above), 192.
Hamas quote in Midlarsky, 202. See also: Stern, 32, 40, 51, 53–54; Daphne Burdman, “Education, Indoctrination and Incitement: Palestinian Children on Their Way to Martyrdom,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 102–105; Israeli (see note 91 above), 13, 73, 109, 117–118. See also Ivan Strenski, “Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim Human Bombers,” Terrorim and Political Violence 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 3, 7–8, 12; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 82, 133–135, 187–193, 233–234; and Bin Laden quote in Rubin and Rubin, 141.
Buruma and Margalit, 68–69 [author's emphasis in the quote].
Bin Laden quoted in Buruma and Margalit, 68.
Quoted in McGregor, 108.
Wiktorowicz (see note 71 above), 87–89; Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” 582–590; Gerges, 130.
On the debate over whether the Al Qaeda/U.S. war constitutes a “clash of civilizations,” see: Benjamin Barber, Jihad Vs. McWorld (New York: Ballantine, 1996): xii, xv-xvi; Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else's Civil War,” in The War on Terror (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 37–57; Anonymous [Scheuer], 25–28; and Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Terrorist Calculus Behind 9/11: A Model for Future Terrorism?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 1 (January–February 2003): 11–13. Celebrations of the 9/11 attacks are cited in Rubin and Rubin, 243–246, 249, 274, 286–288, 291. Al-Zawahiri is quoted in Bonney, 375. Praise for the London bombings is cited in “Statement Claiming London Attacks,” BBC News, 7 July 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4660391.stm, accessed 8 July 2005.
Bonney, 257–260; Gerges, 251–252, 259–260, 268–269; Sheldon Alberts, “Al Qaeda Beheads American,” National Post, 12 May 2004; Michael Ware, “A Chilling Iraqi Terror Tape,” Time, 4 July 2004, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,660926,00.html, accessed 4 July 2004. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Officers put Priority on Extremists,” Washington Post, 9 May 2005; Susan B. Glasser, “‘Martyrs’ in Iraq Mostly Saudis,” Washington Post, 15 May 2005; Edward Wong, “Islamist Web Site Reports Beheading of Second American,” New York Times, 22 September 2004; Eric Schmitt, “U.S. and Allies Capture More Foreign Fighters,” New York Times, 19 June 2005; and John F. Burns, “Rebels Kill Egyptian Diplomat, Adding Pressure on Others in Iraq,” New York Times, 8 July 2005.
The exact numbers of Iraqi civilian casualties is not known with certainty and is the subject of controversy. See: Sabrina Tavernese, “Data Shows Rising Toll of Iraqis From Insurgency,” New York Times, 14 July 2005; “Survey: 25,000 Civilians Killed in Iraq War,” 19 July 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/19/iraq.bodycount/, accessed 19 July 2005; “Purported al-Zarqawi Message Justifies Civilian Deaths,” 18 May 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/18/iraq.main/, accessed 18 May 2005. Al-Zawahiri's critical letter (available at www.odni.gov/letter) could be a forgery: see Henry Schuster, “Bin Laden: Alive or Dead–and How Would we Know?,” 8 December 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/12/08/schuster.column/, accessed 8 December 2005. See also: Midlarsky, 190, 192–193, 199–200.
Sedgwick, 797, argues that the Arab defeat in 1967 was the shock that gave rise to the resurgence of Islam, in Egypt in particular. On the Islamists' efforts and the problems they had in accommodating science and technology and their secular baggage within Islam, see: Esposito, 52–53; and Cooper, 103–104.
Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), 136, 168, 288; Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 281–282; Karen J. Greenberg, ed., Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today's Terrorists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 140, 154–155; Pape, 285 n. 5. These sources make it clear that while the two regimes have worked actively since 9/11 to suppress domestic jihadist movements, broad sectors of their populations donate funds to support jihadist campaigns abroad.
Roger Griffin, “Interregnum or Endgame?: The Radical Right in the Post-Fascist Era,” Journal of Political Ideologies 5, no. 2 (June 2000): 166–168 is exceptional in its recognition of the post-1945 efforts to “internationalize” the residual and later emergent fascist movements.
Buruma and Margalit, 5–6, 8, 39–40, 70, 72, 105–107, 112–115, 143–144. See also: Mirsky, op. cit.; and quote from Sivan, 138.
Payne, History of Fascism, 280–289.
Michael Doran, “The Pragmatic Extremism of al-Qaeda: an Anatomy of Extremism in Middle East Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (2002): 177–178.
Ibid, 178–182.
“Bin Laden truce Rejected,” 20 January 2006, accessed 20 January 2006, at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/programmes/worldtoday/news/story/2006/01/060120_bin_laden_tape.shtml.
Paxton, 204.
International Crisis Group, “Asia Briefing: Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the ‘Ngruki Network” in Indonesia’, 8 August 2002. See also: Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no. 4 (October–December 2000): 271–275; Benjamin and Simon, 208–209; Gunaratna, 144–146, 182–185.
Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda: Trends in Terrorism and Future Potentialities: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 26, no. 6 (November–December 2003): 430–431.
Ibid., 433, 441 n.25; Bonney, 357, 367; Gerges, 12–13, 57–58, 60–67, 134; Gunaratna, 59, 88, 92, 98, and 100–220 passim. See also: Lee, 103–106; CBS News, “Report: Al Qaeda 18,000 strong,” 25 June 2004, accessed 22 June 2006 at: http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2004/05/25/terror/main619467.shtml; Gordon Corera, “Analysis: Al Qaeda Three Years On,” accessed 10 September 2004 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3644990.stm; Stern, 75, 121, 221–231, 259.
Jason Burke, “Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy (May-June 2004): 18, 26; Corera, op. cit.; Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes, 16–17, 222–224; Tony Karon, “Al Qaeda Today: Not Winning, But Not Losing, Either,” Time, 10 September 2003, accessed 26 June 2006 at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,484590,00.html; “Al Qaeda: One Year On,” Jane's Intelligence Digest, 5 September 2002, copy in e-mail, Dr. Martin Rudner to author, 6 September 2002; Stern, 81, 206, 210, 259; Bonney, 7, 14.
The number of jihadist foreign fighters in Iraq is unclear and disputed. For differing views, see: The Washington Times, 30 April 2004; USA Today, 5 July 2004; Defense LINK News, 27 March 2005; and The Washington Post, 9, 15 May 2005.
Gerges, 232–233 notes the failure of the Umma to rally to Al Qaeda after 9/11. See: Daniel McGrory and Zahid Hussein, “New Wave of British Terrorists are Taught at Schools, not in the Mountains,” The Times (London), 14 July 2005; Michael Evan, David Charter, and Stewart Tendler, “7/7 Bombers Acted Alone, Intelligence Report Says,” The Times, 11 May 2006, at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2174999.html, accessed 26 June 2006. See Bonney, 367–368 on jihadist use of the internet. On the concept of “Leaderless Resistance,” see Stern, 150, 181, 275–276.
Benjamin and Simon, 172.
Rubin and Rubin, 285–286, 289, 294–295, 309, 317–318. On 13 May 2005, the Palestinian Authority's official TV station broadcast a virulently anti-Semitic sermon by Sheikh Ibrahim Mudeiris. See: David Brooks, “Bashing Newsweek,” New York Times, 19 May 2005; Chris McGreal, Conal Urquhart, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “The British Suicide Bombers,” Guardian Unlimited, 1 May 2003, at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,,947080,00.html, accessed 29 June 2006. The four anti-Jewish incidents include the assassination of American journalist Daniel Pearl, the attacks on synagogues in Turkey and Tunisia, and the hotel bombing and airliner attack in Kenya.
See for example, Anne Applebaum, “How Evil Works,” The New Republic Online, 29 December 2004, an extended review essay of Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia(2004), at https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?I=20041227&s=applebaum122704, accessed 11 June 2006.
On this conception of counter-insurgency, see: David A. Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 132–133, 174.
Alan Cullison, “Inside Al Qaeda's Hard Drive,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 2004), www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison; and, Combatting Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaida's Organizational Vulnerabilities (14 February 2006), quote from captured documents indicating internal dissent, although many of these pre-date 9/11 and may not reflect the current situation. See also: Gerges, 190–234.
Gerges, 271–276. See also: Thomas L. Friedman, “If it's a Muslim Problem, it Needs a Muslim Solution,” New York Times, 8 July 2005; Colin Freeze, “Leaders Clash Over Who Speaks for Muslims in Canada,” Globe and Mail, 29 July 2005.