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Abstract
During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.
Notes
Sabri Sayari and Bruce Hoffman, “Urbanisation and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976–1980,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1994), 162.
For an overview of Turkey's experience with terrorism since the early 1970s, see Andrew Mango, Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone (London: Routledge, 2005). See also C. H. Dodd, “The Containment of Terrorism: Violence in Turkish Politics,” in Noel D. Sullivan, ed., Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), 132–149, and Nur Bilge Criss,“Mercenaries of Ideology: Turkey's Terrorism War,” in Barry Rubin, ed., Terrorism and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 123–150.
For an analysis of the 1968 student movement in Turkey, see Joseph Szyliowicz, A Political Analysis of Student Activism: The Turkish Case (London: Sage Publications, 1972). For the recollections and reflections of the student activists about the 1968 events four decades later, see Nadire Mater, Sokak Güzeldir: 68'de Ne Oldu? [The Street is Beautiful: What Happened in ’68?] (Istanbul: Metis, 2009). The 1968 student protest movement in Turkey and its radicalization has been the topic of a growing number of autobiographical accounts by its participants. See, e.g., Harun Karadeniz, Olayli Yillar ve Genclik [Eventful Years and the Youth] (Istanbul, May Yayinlari, 1975), Cuneyt Akalin, Dusler ve Gercekler: Taniklariyla Dunya'da ve Turkiye'de 68 [Dreams and Realities: Witnesses to 1968 in the World and Turkey] (Istanbul: Sarmal: 1995), Yuksel Bastunc, Su 68 Kusagi [That 68 Generation] (Istanbul: Yilmaz, 1992), Alev Er, Bir Uzun Yuruyustu ’68 [68 Was a Long Walk] (Istanbul: AFA, 1988), and Oral Calislar, ’68 Anilarim [My Recollections of ’68] (Istanbul: Gendas, 2003).
See Metin Toker, Sağda ve Solda Vuruşanlar [Fighters on the left and right] (Ankara: Akis Yayinlari, 1971) for a journalistic account of the student militant groups during the late 1960s.
See Dev-Genc Dosyasi [The Dev-Genc File] (Ankara: Tore-Devlet Yayinlari, 1973).
For a perceptive analysis, see Ahmet Samim, “The Tragedy of the Turkish Left,” New Left Review 126 (March–April 1981), 60–71. See also Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), 29–43, and John Hinde McFadden, Regime Sanction and Political Instability: An Analysis of Turkish Violence (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The George Washington University, 1986), 206–251.
On the ties between the leftist terrorists and military officers, see, e.g., Mater (see note 3 above), 56–57, 132–134, and 278–279. One of the principal activists among the officers was Air Force Lieutenant Saffet Alp who joined the THKP-C and was killed along with 10 other its in a shoot-out with the security forces. Air Force Captain Orhan Savasci, the brother-in-law of the THKP-C's leader, Mahir Cayan, was also a member of the group.
See Robert W. Olson, “Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the March 12 Coup,” Middle Eastern Studies 9, no. 2 (March 1973), 197–206. For a personal account, see Cengiz Candar, “A Turk in Palestinian Resistance,” Journal of Palestine Studies 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000), 68–82.
The Turkish case confirms Crenshaw's observation that “acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organizational survival or requirements of competition with rival groups.” Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis 29, no. 3 (Fall 1985), 473.
For a detailed analysis of these incidents, see Margaret Krahenbuhl, Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971–1972 (Santa Monica, RAND, July 1977). The government's report also contains information about the activities of the two main leftist terrorist groups. See Beyaz Kitap: Türkiye Gercekleri ve Terörizm [The White Book: Turkey's Realities and Terrorism] (Ankara, 1973).
The young radicals had expected support from the peasants for their cause. However, this turned out to be a costly fantasy. The traditional respect for (and fear of) the authorities led the peasants to inform the security forces about the activities of the militant students who had come to a rural area in the Malatya province from Ankara.
25 members of the THKO were tried in a military court in Ankara in 1971. 18 of them received the death penalty but the military appeals court approved only those of Deniz Gezmis, Huseyin Inan, and Yusuf Aslan. Their death sentences were also approved by the Turkish parliament as required by the constitution. The three THKO leaders were put to death in May 1972 by hanging which was the way capital punishment in Turkey was carried out until its abolishment in 2002.
On the 1971 military intervention, see William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 153–214.
For the number of fatalities during 1970–72, see Hurriyet (Istanbul daily), September 11, 1981. For the number of deaths from terrorist incidents during the late 1970s, see Terror ve Teror'le Mucadele Durum Degerlendirmesi [Terrorism and Assessment of the Situation in the Fight Against Terrorism] (Ankara: Basbakanlik Basimevi, 1983), 121.
“Olaylar: Ve Olumler Basladi,” [Events: And Deaths Began] Yanki (Ankara bi-weekly) (December 30, 1974–January 5, 1975), and “Gencler Vurusuyor” [The Young People Are Fighting], Yanki (Feb. 3–9, 1975).
The escalation of political violence received extensive press coverage. See, e.g., “Kanli Kavga: Tedhis Savas Alani Universite” [Bloody Feuds: Terrorism at the Universities] Yanki (Dec. 20–26, 1976), “Anarsi: Soygunlar, Baskinlar, Operasyonlar” [Anarchy: Robberies, Raids, and Operations], Yanki (Aug. 29–Sept. 4, 1977), “Anarsi: Tirmanma Suruyor” [Anarchy: The Escalation Continues], Yanki (Aug. 22–28, 1977), “A big increase in political violence,” Financial Times: Survey on Turkey (Nov. 13, 1978), and “When will the guns fall silent?” Briefing (Ankara bi-weekly), (Sept. 8, 1980).
Rusen Keles and Artun Unsal, Kent ve Siyasal Siddet [The City and Political Violence] (Ankara: SBF Basimevi, 1982), 35.
According to an official government report published in English, 43,140 individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities were arrested following the 1980 military coup. Of these, 13,749 were convicted and received sentences ranging from 1 year to more than 20 years imprisonment. 47 of those convicted received the death sentence. Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey (Ankara: Basari Matbaacilik, n.d.), 72–73.
For information about the various leftist groups based on translations from the Turkish press, see Translations on Western Europe No. 1433: Factions of the Turkish Left (Springfield, VA: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 14 June, 1979), and Ihsan Bal and Sedat Laciner, “The Challenge of Revolutionary Terrorism to Turkish Democracy 1960–80,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 4 (2001), 90–115. The public prosecutor's case in the trials of various leftist terrorist groups after the 1980 coup include detailed descriptions of many incidents that were committed by the leftist militants. See, e.g., “Dev-Yol Iddianamesi” [Indictment against Dev-Yol] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily) (Nov. 27–Oct. 8, 1982).
Teror ve Terorle Mucadelede Durum Degerlendirmesi (see note 14 above), 113.
Ibid., 131.
Samim (see note 6 above), 62–63.
See Translations on Western Europe No. 1433: Factions of the Turkish Left. For extensive information about the various leftist groups and their activities, see also Emin Demirel, Teror (Istanbul: ALFA, 1999), 215–592.
The terrorist actions of the “idealists” were detailed in the public prosecutor's case against the Nationalist Action Party after the 1980 coup. See Cumhuriyet (Istanbul daily), Aug. 21–25, 1981. For the English summary and translation, see West Europe Report No. 1771 Turkey: Proceedings Against the National Action Party (Springfield, VA: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 26 June 1981).
In an interview with the journalist Cuneyt Arcayurek in 1969, the NAP's leader Turkes admitted that his party had helped organize “five or six youth centers where they received training in martial arts and learned about the tactics and goals of the communists.” Hurriyet (January 10, 1969).
On the NAP's origins and development, see Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Turkey, and Landau, “The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey,” Journal of Contemporary History 17 (1982), 587–606.
Mater (see note 3 above), 31–39 and 105–113.
On the origins and growth of the PKK, see Mango (see note 2 above), 31–57.
Ibid., 34.
Marvine Howe, “A Day in Political Life of Turkey: Shootings and Reprisals by Left and Right,” New York Times (Dec. 30, 1979).
On the Alevi-Sunni clashes triggered by the leftist and rightist terrorists, see, e.g., “The Corum tragedy…more polarization less compromise,” Briefing (July 14, 1980).
Mango (see note 2 above), 18. The English language Ankara daily, Turkish Daily News headlined the incident as “Mini Civil War in Kahramanmaras.” Turkish Daily News, December 25, 1978.
See, e.g., Demirel (note 23 above), 295–297.
Marvine Howe, “Turks' War on Terrorism is Bogged Down in Politics,” New York Times (July 30, 1980).
For the JP's outlook on the causes of political violence, see, e.g., the statement by one of the party's leading members and former foreign minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, “Caglayangil: Uluslararasi Gerila Savasinin Ikinci Merhalesindeyiz” [We are in the Second Phase of an International Guerrilla Warfare], Milliyet (Istanbul daily) (October 10, 1978).
On the views of the CHP's leader Bulent Ecevit about the causes of terrorism, see “Siyasi Bunalim” [Political Crisis] in Bulent Ecevit, Turkiye 1965–1975 (Ankara, n.d.), 175–193, and “Ecevit: Rejimde Anlaşamazsak Kargasaliktan Kurtulamayiz” [Ecevit: If We Can't Agree on the (Nature of) Political Regime, We Can't Get out of the Mayhem] Milliyet (October 9, 1978).
The military's explanations about the causes of terrorism were presented in several reports that were published after the 1980 coup. See, e.g., 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: General Secretariat of the National Security Council, July 1982), Turkiye' deki Anarsi ve Terorun Gelismesi, Sonuclari ve Guvenlik Kuvvetleri ile Onlenmesi [The Development of Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey and Its Prevention by the Security Forces] (Ankara, n.d.), and Turkiye'de Anarsi ve Terorun Sebepleri ve Hedefleri [The Causes and Goals of Anarchy and Terrorism in Turkey] (Ankara: 1985).
For a summary of Gen. Evren's views on this topic, see Yanki (Sept. 21, 1981).
Paul B. Henze was the strongest proponent of the view that the Soviet Union was behind the terrorist campaign in Turkey. See Paul B. Henze, Goal: Destabilization, Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability, and Terrorism in NATO South (Marina del Ray, CA: European American Institute for Security Research, 1981), and Henze, The Plot to Kill the Pope (New York: Scribners, 1983). For a similar explanation, see Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 228–246. For the Turkish press reports about the training of the militants by the PLO, see “FKO: Turk Tedhiscilerini Egitiyor” [The PLO is Training Turkish Terrorists], Yanki (August 17–23, 1981), and “Filistin Kamplarinda Turkler” [Turks in the Palestinian Camps] Yanki (July 12–18, 1982).
Mango (see note 2 above), 19–20.
See “Document 8: DEA Report on Bulgarian Involvement in Drug Trafficking” in U. Ra'anan et al., eds., Hydra of Carnage (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 470–475, and Turkiye'deki Anarsi ve Terorun Gelismesi, Sonuclari ve Guvenlik Kuvvetleri ile Onlenmesi, 77–88.
Serif Mardin, “Youth and Violence in Turkey,” Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 19 (1978), 229–254.
George S. Harris, “The Left in Turkey,” Problems of Communism 29 (July-August 1980), 26–37.
Sayari and Hoffman (see note 1 above), and Keles and Unsal (see note 17 above).
For example, Karpat has argued that no other factor “contributed as much to social and political change, and indirectly, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant settlements around the major cities of Turkey.” Kemal Karpat, “Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics, and the Third Military Intervention,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 2 (Summer–Spring 1981), 18.
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981), 379–399.
See David Barchard, “The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s,” in William Hale, ed., Aspects of Modern Turkey (London: Bowker, 1976), 21–38.
Samim (see above note 6), 70–71. See also Igor Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1992). For Belli's own account, see Mihri Belli, Milli Demokratik Devrim [National Democratic Revolution] (Ankara: Sark, 1970).
Samim (see above note 6), 71.
On the support provided by political parties to terrorist organizations, see Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (London: Routledge, 2003), 37–60.
See West Europe Report No. 1771 Turkey: Proceedings Against the National Action Party.
Ilkay Sunar and Sabri Sayari, “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects,” in Guillarmo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 165–186.
See Marvine Howe, “Turks' War on Terrorism is Bogged Down in Politics,” New York Times (July 30, 1980), and “Little Hope for National Reconciliation,” Briefing (July 28, 1980).
“Cagriya Cagriyla Cevap” [Response as Answer to Call] Yanki (Dec. 15–21, 1975), 7.
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 154–174, Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibrium (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 56–58, and Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1978), 68–70.
Mango (see note 2 above), 25.
Figures cited by the Chief of General Staff Basbug in his press conference on September 16, 2008. Radikal (Istanbul daily), Sept. 17, 2008.
The Syrian government has refused to recognize the annexation of Alexandrietta—Turkey's present province of Hatay—by Turkey in 1938 following a plebiscite when France decided to abandon its control of the region. The water dispute concerns the issue of sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq.