The Disengagement Puzzle: An Examination of the Calculus to Exit a Rebellion

ABSTRACT

Why do rebels leave rebellions? Although much scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding why individuals join rebellions, relatively little is known about why they leave. This paper seeks to fill this deficit by exploring the decision-making process that rebels undertake when determining whether to stay or leave. Based on interview data collected from ten active rebels and four former rebels all engaged (or previously engaged) in conflicts in East Africa, we find that the reason why rebels joined the group influences their decision to leave or stay. Rebels who joined due to grievances are far less likely to escape opportunistically, while rebels who joined due to “greed” display a higher sensitivity to the hardships of rebel life and the pull of alternative options. Understanding why a person joins a rebellion helps predict the factors that will drive them to leave.

KEYWORDS:

• Rebel
• rebellion
• disengagement
• terrorism
• civil war
• intrastate conflict
• desertion
• peace building

Notes

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2. Kendra Dupuy, Scott Gates, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Ida Rudolfsen, Siri Aas Rustad, Håvard Strand, and Henrik Urdal, “Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946–2016,” Conflict Trends (Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), February 2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/a7992888-34fc-44e6-8176-2fcb3aada995/pdf.

3. Theodore McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” Comparative Politics 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–50; and Kevin Koehler, Dorothy Ohl, and Holger Albrecht, “From Disaffection to Desertion: How Networks Facilitate Military Insubordination in Civil Conflict,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 4 (2016): 439–57.

4. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1948): 280–315.

5. Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, and John G. Horgan, “Terrorist Transformations: The Link between Terrorist Roles and Terrorist Disengagement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (January 21, 2020): 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1700038; John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Disengagement, De-Radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge: European and American Experiences, ed. Rik Coolsaet, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011).

6. Donatella della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527555.

7. For example, see John Riley, Kristin Pearson, Mary Kate Schneider, and Lindsey Stimeling, “Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups,” African Security 26, no. (March 13, 2017): 1–23; and Mary Kate Schneider and John Riley, Deciding to Disengage: Understanding Armed Insurgent Attrition (San Francisco, CA: International Studies Association, 2018).

8. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

9. Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John G. Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism: Lessons from Psychology, Sociology, and Criminology,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 5 (September 1, 2014): 647–61.

10. For example, see Julie Chernov Hwang, Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Michael Jacobson, “Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining From Al-Qa’iad’s Losses,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1, no. 8 (July 2008); Fernando Reinares, “Exit From Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study on Disengagement and Deradicalization Among Members of ETA,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 5 (November 2011): 780–803, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.613307; William Rosenau, Ralph Espach, Román D. Ortiz, and Natalia Herrera, “Why They Join, Why They Fight, and Why They Leave: Learning From Colombia’s Database of Demobilized Militants,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 2 (April 2014): 277–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2012.700658; and on the question of why rebels do not disengage Mauricio Florez-Morris, “Why Some Colombian Guerrilla Members Stayed in the Movement Until Demobilization: A Micro-Sociological Case Study of Factors That Influenced Members’ Commitment to Three Former Rebel Organizations: M-19, EPL, and CRS,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (March 11, 2010): 216–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546551003590167.

11. Altier, Thoroughgood, and Horgan, “Turning Away from Terrorism,” 648.

12. John Horgan, Mary Beth Altier, Neil Shortland, and Max Taylor, “Walking Away: The Disengagement and De-Radicalization of a Violent Right-Wing Extremist: Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,” Journal Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 9, no. 2 (2017): 7.

13. Mary Beth Altier, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil D. Shortland, and John G. Horgan, “Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts,” Security Studies 26, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 331, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1280307.

14. Altier, Boyle, and Horgan, “Terrorist Transformations.”

15. Altier, Boyle, and Horgan, 14.

16. Peter S. Bearman, “Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War,” Social Forces 70, no. 2 (1991): 321–42.

17. Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II.”

18. Michael Sikora, Fighting for a Living, A Comparative Study of Military Labor 1500–2000 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 226.

19. Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht, “From Disaffection to Desertion.”

20. John Riley, Pearson, Schneider, and Stimeling, “Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups,” African Security (March 13, 2017): 1–23.

21. Koehler, Ohl, and Albrecht, “From Disaffection to Desertion,” 439.

22. Holger Albrecht and Kevin Koehler, “Going on the Run: What Drives Military Desertion in Civil War?,” Security Studies 27, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 181, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1386931.

23. Theodore McLauchlin, “Desertion, Terrain, and Control of the Home Front in Civil Wars,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (2014): 1419–44.

24. Leon Goure, “Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, August 1968), x.

25. Riley, Pearson, Schneider, and Stimeling, “Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups.”

26. Schneider and Riley, “Deciding to Disengage: Understanding Armed Insurgent Attrition.”

27. Only one terrorist in the Altier study was still engaged at the time of analysis.

28. Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 436–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x.

29. For example, see Syed Mansoob Murshed and Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin, “Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict,” Journal of International Development (2009): 87–111; or David Keen, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 88, no. 4 (2012): 757–77.

30. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (June 22, 2004): 564, https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064.

31. Mats Berdal, “Beyond Greed and Grievance: And Not Too Soon … A Review Essay,” Review of International Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 687–98.

32. Anke Hoeffler, “‘Greed’ versus ‘Grievance’: A Useful Conceptual Distinction in the Study of Civil War?” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11, no. 2 (2011): 275.

33. Andy Knight, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview,” African Security 1, no. 1 (2008): 24–52.

34. Our interview structure parallels Horgan’s discussion of best practices in interview-based research on terrorism. See also John Horgan, “Interviewing the Terrorists: Reflections on Fieldwork and Implications for Psychological Research,” Behavioral Sciences for Terrorism and Political Aggression 4, no. 3 (September 2012): 195–211.

35. Amy Ellard-Gray, Nicole K. Jeffrey, Melisa Choubak, and Sara E. Crann, “Finding the Hidden Participant: Solutions for Recruiting Hidden, Hard-to-Reach, and Vulnerable Populations,” International Journal of Qualitative Methods 14, no. 5 (2015): 1–10.

36. Elisabeth Jean Wood, “The Ethical Challenges of Field Research in Conflict Zones,” Qualitative Sociology 29 (2006): 373–386.

37. Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling,” PS: Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 768.

38. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Rwanda: The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda, FDLR),” October 1, 2007, http://www.refworld.org/docid/474e8955c.html.

39. Koen Vlasseneroot, Emery Mudinga, and Kasper Hoffmann, Contesting Authority Armed Rebellion and Military Fragmentation in Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 9.

40. Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Développement, ed., Weapons and the World, Small Arms Survey 2015 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 18.

41. J. Peter Pham, “To Save Congo, Let It Fall Apart,” The New York Times, November 30, 2012, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/opinion/to-save-congo-let-it-fall-apart.html.

42. “Congo Rebels Threaten New Advance,” BBC News, November 21, 2012, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20427682.

43. Susan Heavey and Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Sanctions Rwanda, Others over Child Soldiers,” Reuters, October 3, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-africa-childsoldiers-idUSBRE9920SJ20131003.

44. Human Rights Watch, “‘Special Mission:’ Recruitment of M23 Rebels to Suppress Protests in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Human Rights Watch (blog), December 4, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/04/special-mission/recruitment-m23-rebels-suppress-protests-democratic-republic-congo.

45. Jason Stearns and et al., Mai-Mai Yakutumba Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South Kivu (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2011), 21.

46. Luca Jourdan, “Mayi-Mayi: Young Rebels in Kivu, DRC,” African Development 36, no. 3 & 4 (2011): 89–111.

47. Jason Stearns and et al, Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise (London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 11.

48. Congo Saisa, “Who Are the Raia Mutomboki?” Congo Research Group | Groupe d’Etude Sur Le Congo, Accessed November 3, 2018, http://congoresearchgroup.org/who-are-raia-mutomboki-2/.

49. At the time in which the interviews took place, The SPLM-IO were still actively rebelling.

50. Jason Patinkin, “South Sudan Rebel Groups Clash, at Least Three Dead,” Reuters, October 19, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-security/south-sudan-rebel-groups-clash-at-least-three-dead-idUSKBN1CO279.

51. Goran Tomasevic, “Short on Supplies, South Sudan Rebels Fight On,” Reuters, September 5, 2017, https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/short-on-supplies-south-sudan-rebels-fight-on.

52. Riley, Pearson, Schneider, and Stimeling, “Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups.”

53. Riley, Pearson, Schneider, and Stimeling.

54. Robert’s view of SPLM-IO’s chance of success was somewhat complicated. In the short-term, he recognized that it was unlikely they would capture Juba and displace Salva Kiir. However, he saw the Dinka as a divided enemy (there was good Dinka and bad Dinka) and overtime the Sudanese people would drive out the bad Dinka.

55. After a year of fighting in the bush, Henry became separated from his unit during a government attack. Subsequently, he was turned over to the United Nations and was entered into a DDR program. Henry hated his time at the DDR center and he claimed to have “learned nothing.” Almost immediately, after finishing the program he joined up with a different Mayi-Mayi unit.

56. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), chaps. 8–10.

57. Riley, Pearson, Schneider, and Stimeling, “Escaping the LRA: Examining the Decision to Disengage from Militarized Dissident Groups.”

58. Altier, Boyle, and Horgan, “Terrorist Transformations: The Link between Terrorist Roles and Terrorist Disengagement.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

John Riley

Dr. John Riley is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at USAFA where he teaches and conducts research related to international relations, human rights, and security in fragile states.  Since rejoining the faculty in 2015, he has directed courses in genocides, mass atrocities, and geopolitics.  Dr. Riley received his Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University.

Mary Kate Schneider

Dr. Mary Kate Schneider is Lecturer of Political Science and Director of Global Studies at Loyola University Maryland. Her teaching and research address themes of conflict, security, institutions, identity, nationalism, and post-conflict peace and reconciliation. Dr. Schneider holds a Ph.D. in government and politics from the University of Maryland, College Park.