Objectives of arts funding agencies often do not map well on to societal benefits

ABSTRACT

The paper addresses in some detail the possible societal benefits of state expenditure on the arts, as opposed to the intrinsic or personal benefits. Three broad categories of societal benefit are posited, namely identity and social cohesion, experimental/innovative work and economic spill-over effects. The goals/objectives of the key funding agencies in Australia, England, Ireland and New Zealand are then examined, with a view to ascertaining to what extent they map on to societal benefits. The goal of equal access for all to the arts in particular is questioned. The paper concludes by addressing the issue of how evidence can, it at all, be provided for the existence of societal benefits from public funding of the arts.

KEYWORDS:

• Public funding
• societal outcomes
• equal access
• funding agencies

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank three anonymous referees for very useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the Editor for very helpful assistance.

Notes

1. See Kellogg Foundation (2004) for a good discussion on the background to this, and for its application in an Irish context to the art sector see Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht (2015).

2. Many studies conflate the personal and public benefits (see, e.g. Arts Council of England, 2014; Behr, Brennan, & Cloonan, 2016; Crossick, 2015; Fleming, 2015 ). These studies also relate to spill-over benefits from the commercial sector, an issue that relates to industrial more than to cultural policy.

3. It probably relates more to industrial policy, where the creative industries are as worthy of state encouragement as other supported industries. Such support may take the form of tax breaks, or start-up grants or assistance with promotion/advertising.

4. Similar arguments are used in relation to the preservation of a national language.

5. The key issue is the freedom from market constraints that state funding provides. This of course as in the past and indeed today can be provided by private patronage, be it through private individuals, foundations or church organisations.

6. As Hazledine (2011) notes,

The high arts also provide the essential platform, albeit with long lags, for pop culture – “No Beatles without Beethoven” would be a good slogan to chant at those who sniff at the “elitist” nature of support for the arts. These spill-overs can flow a long way, and of course there is no reasonable way their value can be compensated at source.

7. A similar case could not be made for funding any consumption activity, such as attending rock music festivals, football matches and so on, even though there might be a more even attendance by socioeconomic grouping at such events. As Hazledine (2011) notes,

Of course the poor lack the means to pay for the arts, but they lack many other things as well, and it is not clear that easier access to culture is at the top of their list of needs. More sausages might be better appreciated than more symphonies. Subsidies can be targeted (means tested), though this can be expensive and demeaning. When they are not targeted, as with free admission to museums, the net effect on the income distribution is actually likely to be regressive, in that the beneficiaries are predominantly higher income groups, who for various reasons are better positioned to take advantage of the subsidy. (p. 69)

8. Things do not stop there of course. How best to achieve the societal objectives through the operation of arts funding agencies then arises, an issue well covered in Hazledine (2011). He notes correctly that few people working in the cultural economics area address this issue of the design and mechanics of arts funding. He proposes a new such mechanism for New Zealand, in the form of a performance-based art funding system based on rewarding market success as the means of delivering the positive externalities (societal benefits) that stem from public engagement with the arts.