Zhuangzi’s ethical nihilism

ABSTRACT

Zhuangzi often is portrayed as a kind of ethical relativist. This popular reading has been challenged by Philip Ivanhoe, who argues that Zhuangzi is not a relativist but rather that Zhuangzi articulates a normative theory of benignity. In this paper we argue against Ivanhoe’s interpretation. We further argue that Zhuangzi is an ethical nihilist, who rejects all ethical positions.

KEYWORDS:

• Zhuangzi
• ethical nihilist
• relativist

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Very succinctly, Hansen (1983) believes that it is a mistake to talk about the Dao. According to his interpretation, for Zhuangzi, a dao is a conceptual/linguistic framework imposed upon reality. Since there can be many such frameworks, it makes more sense to talk about daos, or the dao of a particular individual or group. For Hansen, the point of the skillful individual stories is not to express something about the Dao; rather, the point is that the skillful individuals have internalized some dao to the point where it has become second nature. Ivanhoe’s criticism (1996) is that Hansen’s interpretation can offer no explanation for why only skillful people appear as exemplars. Bumbling failures and screw-ups also have internalized conceptual/linguistic frameworks. If the point is merely one about the internalization of some dao or other, stories about them should work just as well.

2. In ‘Clarity and Survival in the Zhuangzi’’ Thomas Radice (2001) argues that, for Zhuangzi, using clarity is a matter of not making distinctions, that the sage ‘acknowledges unity through the light of clarity, he is free of preferences and makes no distinctions’ (p. 35). While there is much that is illuminating and perceptive in Radice’s argument, there is much with which we disagree. Radice, for instance, believes that the sage realizes ‘that a “right” cannot exist without a “wrong”, and a “this” cannot exist without a “that” because each event is involved in a polar relationship with the respective opposite’ (pp. 34–35). We believe that the sage’s realization is much more radical: the sage realizes that neither set of distinctions applies to reality. Radice also suggests that, according to Zhuangzi, ‘[n]o matter how one wishes to carve up reality, prior to the act of carving, reality must be a unified whole. In this sense, all possible “carvings” are equal insofar as there is no change in the reality behind the words’ (p. 35). We would suggest that all carvings are equal only in the sense that all of them fail to make contact with reality.

3. The ignorance of the sage is a recurring motif in the Zhuangzi. To cite a few examples.

Nieh Ch’ueh was questioning Wang Ni. Four times he asked a question and four times Wang Ni said he did not know. Nieh Ch’ueh proceeded to hop around in great glee and went and told Master P’ui-l. P’ui-l said. ‘Are you just finding that out?’ (Watson, 1968, p. 92)

What Nieh Ch’ueh has found out is the ignorance of the sage. A more extended condemnation of knowledge occurs in chapter ten, ‘Rifling Trunks’:

Knowledge enables men to fashion pitfalls, snares, cages, traps and gins, but when this happens the beasts flee in confusion to the swamps. And the flood of rhetoric that enables men to invent wily schemes and poisonous slanders, the glib gabble of ‘hard’ and ‘white’, the foul fustian of ‘same’ and ‘different’ bewilder the understanding of common men. So the world is dulled and darkened by great confusion. The blame lies in the coveting of knowledge. (Watson, 1968, p. 113)

Sagely wisdom also is characterized as ‘the wedge that fashions the cangue’ and one is advised to ‘cast away wisdom’ (Watson, 1968, p. 118).

4. To forestall a possible misunderstanding and concomitant objection, Zhuangzi certainly has what can be called a philosophy of life. A summary statement of that philosophy of life would note that it extols living simply, spontaneously, instinctively, and naturally—in harmony with other things; eschewing wealth, power, fame, position and other artificial or unnatural goods; realizing that change is the nature of the Way and, thus, accepting what fate brings with tranquility and reverence; maintaining one’s freedom and independence; finding pleasure, satisfaction, and fulfillment in mundane daily life. Delineating and explicating all the various aspects in Zhuangzi’s philosophy of life is far beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately, it is not necessary. Our sole purpose in mentioning it is to emphasize that this is not an ethical position. Zhuangzi never suggests that one has a moral duty to so live; that living so is morally right or commendable; that living so is fitting and proper; that individuals who fail to live so are morally deficient; etc. His endorsements of the recommended life style are all pragmatic hypothetical imperatives; essentially they amount to the claim that if one wishes to avoid punishments, flourish, and live out one’s years, one should so live.

For the record, in the abstract of the paper cited above, Radice suggests that ‘the Zhuangzi does not endorse any normative standard on morality’ (Radice, 2001, p. 33). We agree but would argue that Zhuangzi’s position is much more radical than merely not endorsing any normative standard on morality; Zhuangzi rejects all normative moral standards.

5. Since we all belong to multiple groups with vastly different sets of values, customs, beliefs and norms, an obvious and serious problem for relativists is to delineate the relevant group. An even more serious problem is to articulate some foundation or justification for the core principle. The mere fact that standards of right and wrong vary among groups will not suffice; descriptive relativism does not entail normative relativism. Another problem is defending a coherence theory of truth. Although we believe that there are serious (probably insurmountable) challenges to relativism, we are not here concerned to criticize or defend it. We wish only to argue that Zhuangzi could not be a relativist.