Utopianism and the Bush foreign policy

Abstract

Amidst a renewed debate over the existence of an American empire, serious questions have emerged about whether the Bush foreign policy can be described as ‘realist’ given the widespread opposition that it encounters from academic realists. This paper is an attempt to shed light on this vexing issue by interpreting the Bush foreign policy through the lens of the broader religious–political tradition of America. Specifically, it argues that the neoconservatives in the Bush administration draw on the utopian strand of this tradition when setting their foreign policy agenda and justifying their decisions to the public. With special reference to Iraq, it discusses how three key utopian themes—the perfection of human life on earth, the possibility of limiting evil through conversion and the prospect of arresting human development—are reflected in the neoconservative agenda. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of how these themes run counter to the tenets of classical realism and of the ethical and political hazards that emerge from an attempt at utopian empire.

Notes

For illustrative examples, see Bacevich (2002), Cox (2003), Fergusson (2003a; 2003b), Hoffman (2003), Ignatieff (2003), Ikenberry (2003), Jervis (2003), Rosen (2003) and Snyder (2003).

For more on American's image problems abroad, see Weisman (2003) and La Franchi (2003).

The term ‘civilized world’ has been used by President Bush frequently in 2003. See Bush (2003a; 2003b).

For a classic critique of American imperial ambition, see Chomsky (1996).

A prominent example of a critic on the right who has made headway in restoring ‘empire’ to today's political vocabulary is Fergusson (2003a). For a critique of empire from the left, see Ignatieff (2003). Others have used euphemisms for empire. For example, see Krauthammer (2003) and O'Brian and Cleese (2002). For an argument against the use of ‘hegemony’, see Fergusson (2003b).

Richard Crockatt notes that isolationism has not been the policy of the American administrations since the beginning of the Cold War but that isolationism was a strong current in American foreign policy discourse (especially in Congress) right up through the Clinton administration. See Crockatt (2003, 13–17).

For evidence of this view, consider the fact that none of the major Democratic presidential candidates has called for an immediate removal of US forces abroad, despite the ongoing guerilla resistance against American occupation in Iraq. Also consider that all of the major candidates call for some variant on what Senator Joe Lieberman has termed ‘muscular multilateralism’ and some—including General Wesley Clark and Senator John Kerry—have made attacking the Bush administration for rejecting allied support in Afghanistan and insulting allies on Iraq a central plank of their campaign platform. Multilateralism has become such an article of faith among Democrats that even Governor Howard Dean, the only major candidate who opposed the Iraq war, has declared that ‘I will not divide the world into us versus them. Rather, I will rally the world around fundamental principles of decency, responsibility, freedom, and mutual respect. Our foreign and military policy must be about the notion of America leading the world, not America against the world.’ For this quote in context, see Dean (2003). For an analysis of the Democratic candidate's foreign policy dilemmas, see Traub (2004).

The only other notable reference to Bush being referred to as a ‘utopian’ is Lewis (2002).

Rice is quoted in Kettman (2000) and Rumsfeld is quoted in Gertz (2001).

Much of the intellectual work behind the neoconservative agenda was done as part of the Project for a New American Century organization. A statement of principles and list of principle members for this project is available at ⟨http://www.newamerican‐century.org/statementofprinciples.htm⟩.

For good analyses of the dangers of alienating allies with American unilaterlism, see Mandelbaum (2002) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2002).

Wolfowitz (2000) drew the analogy between the rising Germany and the rising China. For a critique of this reasoning, see Xiang (2001).

See Legro and Moravcsik (2001). Echoing Butterfield, the authors speculate that the way that the administration deploys the term—implying its opposite is ‘self‐delusion or ‘romanticism’—is an ideal fit for their policy preferences. They also note that realism is attractive to Bush because it seems more closely linked to a preference for military dominance.

For two classic statements of realist principles, see Morgenthau (1993, 4–16) and Carr (2001, 62–120).

The official summation of the Bush doctrine is available in White House (2002). See also Bush (2002).

This is a debatable point. The definition of American internationalism as provided by Kaplan and Kristol (2003) is sufficiently vague to justify virtually anything or to reject virtually anything. Saying that America is exceptional and that it should engage provides relatively few guidelines for actual foreign policy behavior. In this way, it is not directly comparable to either realism or idealism, both of which, however problematic, do provide guidelines for foreign policy behaviour.

For an example, see Kissinger's comments on the links of ‘history, culture and common values’ that linked the US and Europe in his 1973 Year of Europe speech (Kissinger 1982, 131).

Much of the opposition by Reagan and George Bush administration officials to George W. Bush has been relatively quiet, due to party loyalty, but is still noticeable. For examples of quiet opposition, see former Secretary of State James Baker's warnings to Bush on CNN (2002). For former General Brent Scowcroft's more hyperbolic comments, see Borger and Norton‐Taylor (2002). One exception to the cautious opposition is Clyde Prestowitz, a former Reagan administration trade official, who recently published a stinging critique of Bush's policies (Prestowitz 2003).

As Hedley Bull and others have noted, Carr's work (and its sharp division) was a product of its time. Its largely polemical purpose was to address (in Carr's view) the misguided attempts by Britain and France to deal with the rise of Hitler without due consideration of Germany's growing power. For a good critique of Carr, see Bull (2000, 125–38).

Carr 2001, 87. Carr valued ‘utopianism’ because it provided elements of political thought (like a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment, and a ground for action) that could inspire people to creative political thought. Realism, however useful as an analytical technique, was barren of these charms. See Carr (2001, 84–88).

While a full discussion of this work is beyond the scope of this essay, it should be borne in mind that Utopia is an enormously complex and layered work, mixing in political argument (including a critique of the English government), philosophical discussions that occupied his fellow Renaissance humanists and a not insignificant amount of humor. For commentary on Utopia as a text, see Logan and Adams (1989) and Hexter (1950). For commentary on the first book (on political counsel) and for more on More in the context of Renaissance political thought, see Skinner (1978, 216–21).

One interesting aspect of this book is that the Utopians are not by faith Christians (in fact they are closer to Stoics) but they are sympathetic to its values. See More (1989), pp. 95–107.

One of the limitations on the Utopians is that they are forbidden to discuss politics without permission. This is apparently to prevent anyone from plotting in secret to overthrow the government. See More (1989), 49.

While there is no proof that this was indeed the case, the resemblance between More's description of Utopia and a description of America in one of Vespucci's leaders (written in 1503) is striking: ‘The inhabitants of the New World do not have goods of their own but all things are held in common. They live together without a king, without government, and each is his own master … There is a great abundance of hold and by them it is in no respect esteemed or valued … Surely if the terrestrial paradise be in any part of the earth. I esteem that it is not far distant from these parts’ (quoted in Kumar 1987, 70–71).

For more on New Harmony, see Shklar (1998, 182–83). For more on the Shakers and their tradition of equal rights and privileges within their community, see Kumar (1987, 85–87).

For more on Oneida, see Shklar (1998, 185) and Kumar (1987, 90–94).

For more on Fourier and the phalanx concept, see Hertzler (1923, 200–1) and Shklar (1998, 183–84).

Figure quoted in Shklar (1998, 185).

Brinkley is quoted in a PBS (Public Broadcasting Service) American Experience documentary on Carter. For a transcript, see PBS (2000). For Brinkley's biographical treatment of Carter, see Brinkley (1996). For critical analysis of his religious beliefs and how they affected his policies in the White House, see Smith (1986, 13–34). For more on Carter and the Iran crisis, see pp. 180–207. For a critical analysis of his ‘apolitical evangelism’ see Morris (1996, 160–61).

Quoted in CNN 2003a.

Quoted in Roper 2002, 9.

Shklar 1998, 164.

Of particular concern for More was how social institutions could subjugate pride. See More (1989, 109) and Hexter (1950, 75–81).

For a critique of this view, see Hertzler (1923, 302).

Quoted in Lehman (2003), 71–72.

For more on this missionary role, see Roper (2002, 38).

Quoted in Lehman (2003), 72.

For a full statement of his thesis, see Fukuyama (1993).