Constructing Southeast Asian security: the pitfalls of imagining a security community and the temptations of orthodoxy

Abstract

At the ninth summit of the Association of South‐East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in October 2003, the organisation's leaders declared their intention of transforming ASEAN into a security community. In making the case that ASEAN has functioned as a realist security institution since its inception in 1967, this article argues that the theoretical literature underpinning the ASEAN security community idea is characterised by significant conceptual and empirical flaws. First, a number of problems surround the variables—either norms or identity—that are used to explain the emergence of a putative security community among the ASEAN states. Second, critical issues in the ASEAN security community literature include the tautological nature of the arguments and a failure to rule out alternative explanations. Third, from an empirical perspective, the nascent ASEAN security community has arguably never existed.

Notes

Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) at the Ninth ASEAN Summit, October 2003. Available on ASEAN's official website: ⟨http://www.aseansec.org/15160.htm⟩.

The Bali bombings of October 2002 have made terrorism emanating from radical Islam the central issue for Southeast Asia in the early 21st century.

The fact that a concept that was developed to analyse Western European security cooperation in the 1950s has found its way into the post‐Bali world of Southeast Asian security is a tribute to the enterprise of scholars such as Amitav Acharya who have been vigorously advocating the concept to the official ASEAN community. (See ‘Seminar on ASEAN Co‐operation’, New York, 3 June 2003, located on the website of the Indonesian Mission in New York City: ⟨http://www.indonesiamission‐ny.org/issuebaru/Mission/asean/asean.htm⟩.)

Chong and Sebastian highlight some of the problems confronting the attempt to construct a security community in Southeast Asia. They nevertheless conclude that ‘Despite the difficulties anticipated ASEAN members should at least give serious thought to the idea of creating a security community’ (Chong and Sebastian 2003).

The Indonesian government has been the most influential institutional proponent for transforming ASEAN into a security community. In its capacity as Chairman of ASEAN Standing Committee, Jakarta has played an active role in proposing that ASEAN take the necessary steps to transform itself into a security community by 2020.

Zachary Abuza has meticulously chronicled the origins of radical Islamic groups in Southeast Asia during the Cold War era and their proliferation in the post‐Suharto era. See Abuza (2002; 2003); see also Desker (2003).

In September 2003, Bashir was sentenced to four years in prison for subversion. He was found guilty of ‘knowing about an organisation that is trying to topple the (Indonesian) government’ but was acquitted of the most serious charge levelled against him—that of being the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (Murphy 2003).

For a review of the full spectrum of security institutions see Lake (2001).

Following Wolfers, this article defines security as ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’ (Wolfers 1952, 485). While it is incumbent on anyone who uses the term to define it, it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a debate on the concept of ‘security’. For further discussion concerning the concept of security see Baldwin (1997).

In this respect, Tim Huxley's analysis of the tensions inherent in the Singapore–Malaysia relationship casts doubt on the possibility that an ASEAN security community will emerge anytime soon. As Andrew Tan has argued, a similar claim can be made by looking at some of the other bilateral relationships within ASEAN.

See Acharya 2001, 63, 72.

Leifer observes that ‘the ASEAN Way has been a convenient rationalisation for diplomatic torpor, formal or informal. The ASEAN Way, so‐called, has been possible because it has never really been put to the test’ (Leifer 2001, 485).

Mahathir cited ASEAN's credibility as a rationale for threatening to expel Myanmar from ASEAN. ‘We are thinking about ourselves as ASEAN, we are not criticizing Myanmar for doing what is not related to us, but what they have done has affected our credibility. Because of that, we have voiced our views’ (Agence France Presse, 2003a).

Khong traces the development of this sense of ‘we‐ness’ by breaking down ASEAN's history into four periods: before 1967, 1967–76, 1976–89, 1989 to the present.

In addition to the numerous problems highlighted above, constructivist security community advocates have yet to convincingly address the fundamental question of why identity as a variable necessarily facilitates cooperation. In this respect, this analyst is not aware of any attempt being made by ASEAN security community advocates to address the arguments of Jonathan Mercer. Mercer argues that, from the psychological perspective of situational identity theory, claims by some constructivists that inter‐state competition can be transcended are highly questionable. Mercer's arguments also provide a psychological basis for understanding why the ASEAN security community is headed for failure (Mercer 1995).

For Khong, identity is the independent variable. For Acharya, despite the construction of a flow chart, it is unclear where identity fits into his causal argument. See diagram in Acharya (2001, 29).

Acharya differentiates security communities from other forms of multilateral security cooperation (2001, 16–20).

Acharya 2001, 203–8.

In this respect, see Acharya's account of the socialisation process (2001, 34–37). In particular, see pp. 36–37 on the decline of security communities.

Indeed, Acharya notes that, rather than informally settling disputes in a spirit of give and take, ASEAN members have increasingly submitted conflicts between them to international institutions for resolution (Acharya 2001, 205). One might further add that in these cases there has been maximum attention to relative gains.

For an overview of the security community concept and its application to international politics see Adler and Barnett (1998).

What is the contribution of Khmer Rouge ideology to its own dissolution? How did norms favoring genocide win out over other norms that may have been operative in intra‐Khmer‐Rogue politics? How did Khmer Rouge nationalism differ from other varieties of Cambodian nationalism? Were there varieties of Khmer Rogue nationalism?