Norway between NATO, the EU, and the US: A Case Study of Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse

Abstract

This article addresses the post-Cold War security and defence discourse in Norway, focusing on the impact of the transformation of NATO, an increasingly ambitious EU within security matters and the transatlantic tensions in the War on Terror. The article argues that changes or continuity in policy result from the discursive battle between various power constellations, which are forcing conflicting understandings of reality on each other. In this battle, the dominant representation frames NATO's transformation as a precondition for national defence with reference to alliance solidarity, loyalty and interoperability. The alternative representation, on the other hand, has framed NATO's transformation as negative for national defence, claiming that forces trained for global, warlike missions are neither capable nor available for national defence tasks such as containment of Russia's strategic interests in the Barents Sea. The EU has been brought into the security and defence discourse only when new integration steps, such as the European security and defence policy and EU Battle Groups, put the question of how far Norway may participate, to a test. However, developments like the slow withering away of NATO and unilateralist US foreign policy on Iraq are contributing to pushing the Norwegian discourse, and hence policy, closer to Europe.

Notes

¹ This article draws on research I have done with financial support from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.

²The NGO ‘People and Defence’ (⟨www.folkogforsvar.no/left6678⟩) publishes polls twice a year on Norwegian attitudes towards NATO, and more recently also towards the EU, which confirm this picture. In the November 2004 poll 87% responded that ‘European security cooperation’ is important. In Parliament, only the Socialist Left Party is sceptical towards Norwegian NATO membership.

³As of January 2004, Norway had deployed one civilian and six policemen to the EUPM and five personnel to the Concordia operation (Lindstrom 2004, 113, 117; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003/4).

⁴‘Representations’ are ‘socially reproduced facts; … the things filtered through that which comes between us and the world: language, categories etc.’ (Neumann 2001a, 33).

⁵For example, when Neumann and Ulriksen (1995) presented a constructivist reading of the Norwegian security and defence tradition, Holtsmark (1996) called this ‘alarmingly careless in the handling of the empirical and methodological basis of political science and of the discipline of history’ (98), and ‘an extensive use of fashionable and diffuse expressions’ (114). My translation.

⁶This policy is inspired by a model that sees Norwegian security policy's room for manoeuvre as a triangle in which Russia, the US and the EU occupy each of the corners (Neumann 2001b; Neumann and Ulriksen 1995).

⁷According to the leader of the defence committee in Parliament, Norway's participation in Afghanistan awarded Norwegian politicians with access to political arenas in the US which otherwise probably would have been closed. Interview, June 2003.

⁸The vulnerability of this type of forces was confirmed by various sources at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Interviews, 29 April 2004.

⁹The associate membership was not formalised, however, until 1995 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996–97).

¹⁰The majority of Norwegian politicians, diplomats and military representatives never took the WEU seriously as a defence organisation. On several occasions I personally met with and interviewed Norwegian military representatives to NATO and the WEU who either disregarded the WEU in military affairs or who ridiculed the organisation, letting it be known that they considered it a nuisance to have to attend the meetings on behalf of Norway.

¹¹The next paragraphs draw on Græger (2002, 44–55).

¹³The formulation in para. 20 was: ‘[W]e underline, as we did at the Washington Summit, the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in these [ESDP] structures.’

¹⁴The dialogue involves meetings at the level of foreign ministers every six months, preparatory work at the level of political directors and expert discussions in relation to central working groups under the Common Foreign and Security Policy every six months, and, finally, direct contact and coordination with the capitals in non-EU countries, as well as with international organisations like the UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2000–1, 29–30 non-EU)

¹⁵Interview with an official from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 August 2004

¹⁶See European Council 1999; 2000b; 2004c.

¹⁷Allegedly, Bush accepted Bondevik's reference to ethical and Christian values for the lack of support for the war and Bondevik's description of himself and Bush: ‘we are both men of fate’. The exchange of views took place during a conversation on the phone between Bondevik and Bush in March 2003.

¹⁸The Defence Minister and Foreign Minister represent the Conservative Party, while Bondevik represents the Christian Peoples Party.

¹²According to para. 9b of the Communiqué, ‘NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU.’