Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations

Abstract

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into a democratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsin administration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE. However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO's enlargement projects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—now rebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longer served, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisation would be ‘doomed to extinction’. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a number of reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russia whose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateral institutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as well as Russia's wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its place and role are fully legitimate.

Notes

⁵⁰ In June 2005, a deal was publicly announced concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from two bases in Georgia by 2008: see the Jamestown Foundation's Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10 June 2005.

⁴⁹ Russian position: MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 4 of 2 December 2003 and MC(12).JOUR/2 Annex 9 of 7 December 2004. Position of NATO member states and other state parties: MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 6 of 2 December 2003. Apart from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty.

⁴⁸ MC(12).JOUR/2 Annex 9 of 7 December 2004. Apart from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan have also ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty.

⁴⁷ Porto Ministerial Council's ‘Statements’ (2002): Chapter 6 and Chapter 9 of Section 5.

⁴⁶ Russia closed and handed over the Vaziani base to Georgia in due time. It also withdrew its military equipment from the Gudauta base in 2001, but did not close the latter, on the pretext of the opposition of the Abkhaz population.

⁴⁵ MC.DEL/61/04 of 7 December 2004.

⁴⁴ PC.DEL/1438/03 of 28 November 2003.

⁴³ PC.DEL/1162/04 of 26 November 2004 and PC.DEL/1193/04 of 6 December 2004.

⁴² SEC.PR/679/03 of 24 November 2003.

⁴¹ Vladimir Socor: ‘How to Discredit Democracy and Federalism’, Wall Street Journal (European edition), 6 June 2003. Text of the Kiev Protocol: CIO.GAL/52/02 of 4 July 2002.

⁴⁰ ODIHR's report: ODIHR.GAL/39/04 of 2 June 2004.

³⁹ ODIHR's report: PC.DEL/304/03 of 28 March 2003.

³⁸ Russia's reaction: PC.DEL/985/01 of 13 December 2001 and PC.DEL/1002/01 of 18 December 2001.

³⁷ Text of the Panel's Report: CIO.GAL/100/05 of 27 June 2005.

³⁶ Moscow Declaration: PC.DEL/630 of 8 July 2004; Astana appeal: SEC.DEL/225 of 16 September 2004.

³⁵ MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 3 of 2 December 2003.

³⁴ Bucharest Action Plan: MC(9).DEC/1 of 4 December 2001); Bishkek Action Plan: SEC.GAL/289/01 of 19 December 2001; Porto Charter: MC(10)JOUR/2, Annex 1 of 7 December 2002.

³³ MC.DEC/12/04 of 7 December 2004.

³² MC.DEC/2/03 of 2 December 2003.

³¹ Draft decision on peacekeeping: PC.DEL/815/03 of 9 July 2003, PC.DEL/815/03/Rev.1 of 21 October 2003 and PC.DEL/815/03/Rev.2 of 12 November 2003. Russian initial proposals: PC.DEL/480/02 of 28 June 2002 and FSC.DEL/449/02 of 17 July 2002.

³⁰ MC(10).DEC/3 of 7 December 2002 and MC.DEC/9/03 of 7 December 2003.

²⁹ MC(9).DEC/3 of 3 December 2001 (§§ 11–13), MC(11).JOUR/2, Annex 1 of 2 December 2003 and MC.DEC/10/04 of 7 December 2004.

²⁸ Proposed draft rules of procedures: MC.DD/18/04 of 26 November 2004. Russian position: PC.DEL/461/04 of 1 June 2004.

²⁷ PC.DEL/986/03 of 4 September 2003.

²⁶ MC(10).DEC/8 of 7 December 2002.

²⁵ MC.DEC/1/03 of 24 October 2003. See also PC.DEC/495 of 5 September 2002 and PC.DEC/562 of 2 October 2003.

²⁴ PC.DEC/485 of 28 June 2002.

²³ MC(9).DEC/3 of 4 December 2001.

²² PC.DEL/457/01 of 22 June 2001 and PC.DEL/480/01 of 28 June 2001.

²¹ PC.DEL/2/01 of 8 January 2001, PC.DEL/457/01 of 22 June 2001 and PC.DEL/480/01 of 28 June 2001.

²⁰ Russian proposals on the EED: PC.DEL/254/01 of 25 April 2001.

¹⁹ In 2002, for instance over 43% of the seconded staff were provided only by the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France (SEC.INF/68/02 of 19 February 2002).

¹⁸ MC.DEL/127/00 of 28 November 2000.

¹⁷ PC.DEL/3/01 of 8 January 2001, PC.DEL/195/01 of 26 March 2001, PC.DEL/322/01 of 22 May 2001 and PC.DEL/431/01 of 19 June 2001.

¹⁶ MC.DEL/148/00 of 28 November 2000.

¹⁵ Istanbul Summit Declaration (1999): Chapter 23.

¹⁴ Final Act of the Conference of the State Parties to the CFE Treaty (1999): Annex 14.

¹³ Istanbul Summit Declaration (1999): Chapter 19.

¹² SEC.DEL/130/99 of 22 April 1999 and SEC.DEL/152/99 of 27 April 1999. Moscow triggered the Vienna Document on CSBMs to inspect Albania and Macedonia, where NATO troops were hosted (FSC.DEL/123/99 of 14 May 1999, FSC.DEL/127/99 of 19 May 1999, FSC.DEL/145/99 and FSC.DEL/146/99 of 2 June 1999, and FSC.DEL/157/99 of 9 June 1999. It also failed to get a meeting to assess the conformity of the intervention with the Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security (FSC.DEL/194/99 of 29 June 1999).

¹¹ SEC.DEL/86/99 and PC.DEL/153/99 of 25 March 1999, PC.DEL/161/99 and PC.DD/10/99 of 26 March 1999.

¹⁰ RC.DEL/206/99 of 29 September 1999.

⁹ Russian proposals: PC.SMC/18/98 of 20 April 1998, PC.SMC/48/98 of 18 June 1998, PC.SMC/108/98 of 14 October 1998, PC.SMC/20/99 of 5 February 1999, PC.DEL/152/99 of 25 March 1999, PC.SMC/67/99 of 4 June 1999 and PC.SMC/121/99 of 7 July 1999 (Long Term Missions); PC.SMC/33/98 of 28 May 1998, PC.SMC/75/98 of 3 September 1998, PC.SMC/78/98 of 4 September 1998, PC.DEL/99/99 of 17 March 1999, PC.SMC/113/99 of 1 July 1999 and PC.SMC/172/99 of 5 November 1999 (institutional overhaul); PC.SMC/42/98 of 4 June 1998 (economic dimension); PC.SMC/45/98 of 12 June 1998, PC.SMC/70/98 of 14 July 1998, PC.SMC/73/98 of 28 August 1998, PC.SMC/104/98 of 2 October 1998, PC.SMC/28/99 of 12 February 1999 and SMC.PC/101/99 of 25 June 1999 (coordinating role of the OSCE); PC.SMC/47/98 of 12 June 1998 (peacekeeping).

⁸ PC.SMC/98/98 of 25 September 1998, PC.DEL/491/98 of 12 November 1998, PC.SMC/13/99 of 29 January 1999, PC.SMC/18/99 of 5 February 1999, PC.SMC/39/99 of 10 March 1999 and PC.SMC/42/99 of 12 March 1999.

⁷ Budapest Decisions 1994: Chapter 7.

⁶ Russian proposals: CSCE/FSC/SC.23 of 28 October 1993, DOC.433 of 30 June 1994, DOC.621/94 of 30 August 1994 and DOC.645/94 of 2 September 1994.

⁵ Mandate of the Advisory and Monitoring Group: PC.DEC/185 of 18 September 1997.

⁴ Subsequently, Russia was to veto any further condemnation of Yugoslavia or just the Bosnian Serbs.

³ On the role of the OSCE in the 1997 elections, see REF.OD/1/97 of 9 January 1997, REF.OD/2/97 of 14 January 1997, PC.JOURNAL No. 97 of 16 January 1997 (Annex 1), and INF/17/97 of 29 January 1997.

² Mandate of the Assistance Group: PC.DEC/35 of 11 April 1995.

¹ Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), Chapter 15.