The impact of private security companies on Somalia's governance networks

Abstract

The article discusses the use of private security contractors to support coastguard forces in the Somali substate entities of Puntland and Somaliland. Neither of these entities is sufficiently robust to raise and maintain an effective maritime security force without external assistance, hence they have had recourse to the private sector for training, logistical and operational support and high-level consultancy with respect to their coastguards. The article makes some general observations about the international private security industry and Somali politics in order to provide a context for the three case studies. The case studies, each of which covers the engagement of one security contractor in support of a coastguard, assess the roles played by the contractors, making particular reference to sustainability and influence on governance networks. The analysis establishes a matrix of security company typologies and potential roles and then uses this matrix to suggest which types of company might be best employed for which functions. The article has current pertinence, as two of the three case studies concern efforts by substate entities to hire private security to enhance anti-piracy capability.

Notes

¹ Even Jack Straw agrees with this point. He said so in the Green Paper: ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002), 4–5.

² ArmorGroup International, a publicly listed company that provides a wide range of security, mine clearance and other services, was recently bought out by Group 4 Security.

³ Campaigners who oppose the industry, such as ‘War on Want’, use this term. See < www.waronwant.org/Corporate+Mercenaries+13275.twl>, accessed 19 February 2008.

⁴ The terms ‘PMC’ and ‘PSC’ are used by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The reason for using these terms may be to retain their neutrality regarding the ongoing debates surrounding the use of armed contractors in conflict zones. See < www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/pmc-fac-230506>, accessed 19 February 2008.

⁵ This term is in general use to describe the industry for the time being.

⁶ This term is new and may be an attempt by some in the industry to distance their companies from the term ‘PSC’ as a result of the Blackwater incident that occurred on 17 September 2007.

⁷ The company closed its doors to business on 1 January 1999.

⁸ This is a contentious issue, not least because of the difficulty of positioning the lines between defensive, offensive and pre-emptively defensive operations.

⁹ It is acknowledged that in strict legal terms banditry carried out at sea but within a state's territorial waters is not considered to constitute piracy. For the purposes of this article, however, we will use the more common and looser definition that includes acts carried out within a state's territorial waters.

¹⁰ During the period 2004–2006 and at the time of writing, the TFG controlled little territory. During 2007, it controlled large parts of central Somalia.

¹¹ Even though Somaliland is represented in countries around the world, it has not yet been officially recognized as a state in its own right by the member states of the UN collectively or individually. See < www.un.org/members/list.shtml#s>, accessed 21 February 2008.

¹² UNSCR 733, 23 January 1992; text available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres733.html>, accessed 3 November 2008. The arms embargo is still in effect for entities or organizations that are not part of the TFG.

¹³ The information in this section, unless otherwise cited, comes from author interviews with employees and ex-employees of Hart Security, including Lord Richard Westbury, the company's owner. The company has seen the article and cleared it for publication.

¹⁴ The classification of coastguard activities as military support may raise some eyebrows but it has been included here in view of the robust nature of operations required to counter established pirates.

¹⁵ Hart indicated to the authors of this paper that the company's resources were instrumental in obtaining a court decision in Puntland's favour in London. It is not clear that such a court case did in fact take place and it is more likely that the dispute was settled by arbitration, which would have lent some validity to Puntland's claims of sovereign status but would not have carried the authority of a court decision.

¹⁶ Puntland Post, ‘CARMO Express heading for Somalia’, 11 October 2003.

¹⁷ Unless otherwise cited, information in this section comes from various author interviews with Herbert Johan Francke, NCM's operations manager. The text has been cleared for publication by Mr Francke.

¹⁸ Conversations with various representatives of security contractors, their clients and demining organizations, including Control Risk Group, PA Consulting, Danish Demining Group, Proctor & Gamble, Novartis, Global Guard (Rotkreuz), Olive Security and Aegis. These organizations are active in a wide variety of unstable operating areas including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

¹⁹ This is illustrated by the widespread discomfort felt over allegations that EO was given excessive mineral concessions in return for the provision of security and military services in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in Africa.

²⁰ An extreme example of this phenomenon is EO's intervention in Sierra Leone. In this case the company was hired to conduct an operational task and no thought was given to the development of lasting local capacity. It is thus unsurprising that shortly after their departure the stability that they successfully provided collapsed. This need to develop sustainable capacity is a constant thread in the Security System Reform (SSR) policy agenda. See for instance the OECD DAC SSR Guidelines, available at < http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf>, accessed 3 November 2008.