Anarchy, hierarchy and order

Abstract

How does order emerge from anarchy? While scholars generally agree that international politics is anarchic, there is much dispute about how anarchy orders relationships. This paper challenges prevailing views by attacking the problem of anarchy from behind. We examine how hierarchy creates order and argue that two mechanisms are responsible. The first is the direct actions of a leviathan; the second is an indirect effect, which counterintuitively results from insurmountable handicaps to central authority, that we call the threat of incompetent intervention. We then examine how these two mechanisms affect order as power decentralizes and highlight how bottom–up and top–down processes intersect. Our arguments are tested in difficult cases: highly developed states, where central authority is strongest, and international politics, where central authority is weakest. The arguments have broad implications for all the paradigms, trust in world politics and organizational change.

Notes

² Order is an essentially contested concept; common definitions include a stable set of institutions, a self-sustaining system that channels interactions and social processes in consistent directions, an architecture of relations, and a configuration that guides social processes. These definitions emphasize stability instead of violence reduction. However, the idea that violence is reduced by stability is explicit in the works of Hobbes, Durkheim, Parsons and many others. We therefore believe that our strong definition is appropriate and consistent with existing theory. For other discussions of order, see Bull (1995, 6–8, 93, 308), Kelsen (1989, 31), White (2008), Buzan et al (1993, 70–77), Nys (1912) and Friedrich (1958).

³ On the link between taxes and violence, see Tilly (1993), Mann (1988, 108) and Herbst (2000). On the lack of hierarchy in less dangerous settings, see Llewellyn and Hoebel (1983) and Clastres (1987).

⁴ This idea descends from Hume (1987, 32–33), cf Tilly (1993, 127; 2005, 35), Scott (1998), Solnick (1998, 3) and Migdal (1988).

⁵ For incommensurability we use Cass Sunstein's (1997, 80) definition: ‘Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.’ Cooperation is a situation in which two agents engage in a joint venture for mutual gains, where the actions of each are necessary but not under the immediate control of the other (Williams 1988, 7).

⁶ The example can be found in Schelling (1980, 196). On the conceptual parallel between court, war and strikes, see, for example, Fearon (1995, 393, note 28), Waltz (1979, 114) and Clausewitz (1984, 358 [6.1]).

⁷ On the signalling literature, see Akerlof (1970), Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Schelling (1978).

⁸ Norms ‘describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’ (Katzenstein 1996, 5; cf Posner 2002, 34).

⁹ See Donald Black (1993) and Eric Posner (2002).

¹⁰ For expanded treatment of domestic examples, see Erikson and Parent (2007).

¹¹ For a fuller discussion of these reasons, see Laurence Ross (1970), Ian MacNeil (1978; 1985), Robert Ellickson (1991, 142–144, 189–191) and Lisa Bernstein (1992; 2001).

¹² On America's role in public goods provision, see Katzenstein (2005), Joffe (1984), Ikenberry (2002) and Asmus (2002). On American power, see Wade (2003), Posen (2003) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2002). On the low death rate among states since the Second World War, see Waltz (1979, 95), Wendt (1999, 323) and Fazal (2004, 319).

¹³ On peacekeeping and intervention, see also Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and Edelstein (2004). On the related topic of failing states, see Fearon and Laitin (2004), Krasner (2004), Fukuyama (2004, 6, 40), Holmes and Sunstein (1999, 19, 71), Herbst (2000, 11–14, 266–267), Rotberg (2004, 3–9) and Walter and Snyder (1999).

¹⁴ On Hobbes's more nuanced view of authority than he is given credit for, see Hobbes (1985, 21.6, 21.18, 22.8, 22.30, 29.6, 42.73). For other views on Hobbes, see also Williamson (1985, 165), Austin (1995, 21, 24, 30, 34, 223), Hart (1961, 23–25), Kelsen (1989, 33) and Ladenson (1990).

¹⁵ Again, it is worth stressing that order as we define it is not justice or progress and may not be positive. Our argument is at a high level of abstraction and should not be taken as an apology for objectionable state behaviours, like lying, internment or torture. We only seek to explain why states in anarchy have historically been less trusting than individuals in hierarchy.

¹⁶ For a discussion of such conditions, see, for example, Edelstein (2004) and Neustadt (1990, 18, 24, 36).