Putting the nation back into ‘the international’

Abstract

Alex Callinicos and Justin Rosenberg have both drawn on the concept of uneven and combined development to resolve what they see as deficiencies in international relations theory: in the case of the former, the absence of a non-realist explanation for the persistence of the states system; in the case of the latter, the absence of a sociological dimension to geopolitics. However, Callinicos omits any consideration of the ‘combined’ aspect of uneven and combined development, while Rosenberg ascribes characteristics of transhistoricity and internationality to uneven and combined development which it does not possess. Against attempts to either restrict or over-extend use of the concept, I will argue that its theoretical usefulness depends on understanding the limits of its spatial and chronological reach. An alternative, if still partial, explanation for the continued existence of the states system will emphasize the continuing indispensability of nationalism as a means of both containing class conflict within capitalist states and mobilizing support for ‘national capitals’ engaged in geoeconomic and geopolitical competition.

Notes

¹ I am grateful to Alex Anievas and two out of three anonymous reviewers for their comments. Justin Rosenberg, with whom disagreement is always an intellectual stimulus, helped me clarify our respective positions during a discussion in Brighton during May 2007. This paper was written with the support of Economic and Social Research Council Grant RES-063-27-0174.

² The broader question of whether the relationship between capitalism and the states system is determined by historical contingency, twin logics or some other factor is discussed in Davidson (forthcoming a).

³ Callinicos has discussed the ‘combined’ element of U&CD elsewhere. See Callinicos (1999, 199).

⁴ For different examples from those cited here, see Davidson (2006a, 10).

⁵ For the Scottish experience see Davidson (2000, 167–186) and Davidson (2005, 29–36).

⁶ Allinson and Anievas also have concerns with Rosenberg's claims for the transhistorical nature of U&CD, although for different reasons to those expressed here. See Allinson and Anievas (2009, 62–63).

⁷ Nationalism affects all classes, not only capitalists and workers; but for the purposes of this argument I am using a ‘two-class’ model that does not exist anywhere in pure form, nor is ever likely to.

⁸ What counts as ‘national capital’ is a complex matter, as was pointed out by Colin Barker in an important contribution to the debate over the relationship between the state and capital during the 1970s (Barker 1978, 33–37). For the purposes of this article, it includes all capitals, state and private, based in the nation-state of their origin, plus their overseas operations. More controversially, perhaps, I would argue that it should also include all those foreign capitals operating within that nation-state, to the extent that they are subject to its legal and fiscal regime. One consequence of this in the era of neoliberal globalization would of course be that some capitals will increasingly be claimed as ‘national’ by two or more states: their state of origin and those other states upon whose territory they operate.

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Notes on contributors

Neil Davidson

1 1 I am grateful to Alex Anievas and two out of three anonymous reviewers for their comments. Justin Rosenberg, with whom disagreement is always an intellectual stimulus, helped me clarify our respective positions during a discussion in Brighton during May 2007. This paper was written with the support of Economic and Social Research Council Grant RES-063-27-0174.