Engaging the narrative in ontological (in)security theory: insights from feminist IR

Abstract

Ontological security theory (OST) provides a unique account of how state Self-identity is formed and reformed in international relations. OST postulates that state Self-identity is usefully understood by inquiring into the foundation of a state's sense of Self: its autobiographical narrative. We seek to amend this line of argument by further suggesting that the autobiographical narratives of states are ‘gendered’. Feminist theorizing about the relationship between gender and power implies that the dominant autobiographical narrative of state Self-identity is ‘gendered’ masculine. The power of this masculinized autobiographical narrative flows from an ‘internal othering’ process of counter ‘feminine’ autobiographical narratives that exist alongside the masculinized autobiographical narrative. Our goal is to suggest that opportunities do arise for counter ‘feminine’ narratives to challenge the dominant autobiographical narrative due to their interdependence and we explicate two practices by which masculinized narratives can be engaged, challenged and disrupted.

Notes

¹ For a non-OST rendering of this idea, see Ringmar (1996, 66–92).

² Laing used the term ‘ontology’ in his words ‘because it appears to be the best adverbial or adjectival derivative of “being”’ (1969, 40). Catarina Kinnvall defines ontological security as ‘a security of being, a sense of confidence and trust that the world is what it appears to be’ (Kinnvall 2004, 746). See also McSweeney (1999).

³ Mitzen's (2006) work on OST is well-known, but it focuses less upon the autobiographical narrative endemic to ontological security-seeking.

⁴ For a review of this literature, see Hall (2001).

⁵ We assume following feminist literature (Okin 1979; 1989; 1998; Elshtain 1981; Pateman 1988; Kymlicka 2002, 386–398) that the ‘public sphere’ is ‘gendered’ masculine and therefore is the ‘political space’ in which the dominant autobiographical narrative operates.

⁶ See for instance Allison (2007); Ashworth (1999); Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002); Elshtain (1987); Enloe (2000; 2003; 2007); Hutchings (2000); Locher and Prügel (2001); Mohanty (1991); Ong (1994); Peterson (1992a; 1992b; 1992c; 1994); Peterson and Runyan (1993); Peterson and True (1998); Ruddick (2001); Sjoberg (2006); Sylvester (1994); Ticker (1992; 1995; 1996; 1997; 2005); Whitworth (1994); Zalewski (2006)

⁷ See Bailely (1997); Baumgardner and Richards (2000); Buchan (1999); Butler (1988; 1999; 2003); Connell (1987), Daly (1978); De Beauvoir (1989[1952]); Dworkin (1987); Elshtain (1981); Frye (1983); Hartsock (1983); Kymlicka (2002); Mill (1997[1869]); Millet (1970); Okin (1979; 1989; 1998); Pateman (1988); Phillips (1993); Rich (1986); Rosen (2000); Scott (1999); Tong (1989); Weedon (1987); Weeks (1998); Wittig (2003); Young (1990).

⁸ ‘Power’ here is considered to be multifaceted, drawing from material relations (for example within capitalist production), but also can be found in the norms and values of society which are internalized by actors and through their ‘actions’ become reproduced. For some reviews of ‘power’ as a concept see Lukes (2005 [1974]) and for a description of the ‘productive’ aspects of ‘power’ see Foucault (1977, 3–33, 135–169).

⁹ These potentially include: Marxian feminism (Hartsock 1983); Liberal feminism (Okin 1989); as well as post-structural feminism (Weedon 1987) to name a few. Therefore, we need to be careful in ascribing certain ‘concepts’ or ‘arguments’ to feminism as a broad theoretical tradition given its plurality of foci. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a broad agreement within feminist theory about the construction of ‘gender’. The subsequent analysis which links ‘gender’ to ‘power’ might not be generalizable across feminist theory, but is nevertheless included as a way to show how differences in ‘gender’ can result in marginalization and domination.

¹⁰ It should also be noted that feminists have critiqued what it means to be ‘female’ by suggesting that the term itself represents a western conception of ‘woman’, which excludes or marginalizes non-western conceptions of ‘female’. See Mohanty (1991).

¹¹ It is important to note that OST seems to equate moral action with rational action. Therefore, feminists could suggest that this reifies the state and further entrenches ‘masculinized’ conceptions of the state. Yet, this would be problematic for two reasons. First, OST (like feminism) argues that a state's sense of self is constructed. Therefore, there is nothing ‘natural’ to the autobiographical narrative that constitutes a state's sense of self. Secondly, OST's conception of rationality is not necessarily equal to the ‘rational actor model’ where agents are disembodied rational utility-maximizers. Indeed, OST suggests that to be rational also includes being moral: to have an understanding of one's needs as a ‘self’ and to act in ways which meet those existential needs. The ‘self’ here is not abstracted nor is it individuated: instead, it is embedded in a narrative-structure of meaning.

¹² The work of some feminist authors indicates that the subjugated ‘other’ is not necessarily always gendered ‘feminine’ as differences within the social category of ‘masculinity’ can result in the denigration and marginalization of certain forms of ‘masculinity’ as well (Young 2003, 3–4).

¹³ This is an important difference between the mothers groups in Nicaragua, who while protesting the Somoza government, still largely supported the Sandinistas once they were in power, and those mother groups in Argentina and Chile, who mobilized against a military government throughout their protest (see Ruddick 1989).

¹⁴ In this regard, see the exchange between US night-time talk show host David Letterman and his guest, neoconservative cable host Bill O'Reilly, on the 3 January 2006 episode of Late Night with David Letterman, where the topic of Sheehan's protest developed into a debate over the meaning of the Iraq War. Letterman at one time asked O'Reilly: ‘So, why are we there in the first place?’ before concluding: ‘I'm very concerned about people like yourself who don't have nothing but endless sympathy for a woman like Cindy Sheehan, honest to Christ’. The exchange illustrates both the political cover that comes from being a grieving mother, as well as the debate over the meaning of a foreign policy action. Transcript at < http://mediamatters.org/items/200601060009>, accessed 14 May 2009

¹⁵ For instance, Sheehan was asked in late 2006 the following question by one cable news anchor: ‘Why go stand side-by-side by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? Why do that? I mean, it sounds like—would you rather live under Hugo Chavez than George Bush?’ Norah O'Donnell, ‘Hardball’, 5 July 2006, available at < http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13735484/>, accessed 14 May 2009

¹⁶ Polling from the period of Sheehan's protest indicated a large drop in support for the Iraq War, although we must also note that other events which may explain this drop, such as the bungled US response to Hurricane Katrina, occurred during the same time, see < http://pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm>, accessed 14 May 2009

¹⁷ For example, Hutchings (2000, 124–126) indicates that to assume ‘women’ are always ‘for’ peace is a mistake; indeed, the use of violence, while context-dependent, is not ‘ruled out’ a priori, and to assume this is to reinforce a gendered assumption that ‘women’ in general and ‘feminists’ in particular are always committed to non-violence and therefore, by extension are ‘passive’.

¹⁸ Of course, some might argue there is no contradiction here: sometimes violence or force is needed to allow for the ‘freeing’ of oppressed peoples. Yet, it is important note that the use of force (and the chance of killing those who are supposed to be ‘freed’) can be contradictory. Moreover, the assumption that force can be used for freedom presupposes a ‘gendered’ understanding of the means by which certain ends can be attained.

¹⁹ One interesting question becomes the mechanisms of dissent. While not developed here, it might be possible that certain technologies (the internet, instant messaging, texting, blogging) could provide the mechanisms for alternative narratives to develop. As new technologies arise, it will be theoretically important to try to understand how marginalized groups can create alternative sources of information, and try to disrupt the dominant autobiographical narrative.