The ASEAN Regional Forum: from dialogue to practical security cooperation?

Abstract

This article examines to what extent the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) has moved beyond dialogue to practical security co-operation. Focusing on terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief as key areas of ARF activities in the past few years, the paper offers four arguments: first, while the ARF primarily remains a forum for regional security dialogues and confidence building, its participants have slowly become prepared to proceed with practical security co-operation, albeit only in limited ways. To the extent that desktop and field exercises take place under ARF auspices, most have been organized in the area of disaster relief. This implies, second, that for the most part ARF participants are still pursuing capacity building and operational security responses outside the Forum. Third, the ARF's cautious embrace of practical co-operation is not the outcome of ASEAN's exercise of diplomatic centrality but the result of initiatives pursued by a small group of ASEAN and some non-ASEAN states. Fourth, at least in the short term, any expectations that participants might organize significantly more demanding practical activities under ARF auspices are premature.

Introduction1

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) was one of the most conspicuous additions to the evolving security architecture in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. However, from the very outset, assessments of the ARF have been shaped by questions over its usefulness and future direction (eg Leifer 1996; Lim 1998; Tan et al 2002). A key issue has been when and how the ARF would move beyond confidence building to preventive diplomacy, the second of the three stages of security co-operation envisaged in the 1995 ARF Concept Paper (for example, Tay and Talib 1997; Desker 2006). In the event, given the very diverse political outlooks of participant states and their different vulnerabilities, even defining preventive diplomacy proved a major challenge (Ball and Acharya 1999). Participants thus only arrived at a consensus position in 2001, which could be considered quite conservative and cautious, in line with the principle that the ARF advances at a pace comfortable to all. Participants' failure to move unequivocally beyond dialogue and confidence building, while nevertheless recognizing the overlap between confidence building and preventive diplomacy, reinforced widespread criticisms of the ARF as a ‘talk shop’. Interestingly, more recent literature has nevertheless been positive about the ARF's contribution to regional security. For instance, Johnston (2008) has highlighted the ARF's apparent early success in socializing China. Other scholars have similarly emphasised its alleged importance as a ‘norm-brewery’ (Katsumata 2006) and the significance of its normative framework for maintaining regional stability and security (Heller 2005). Significantly, it has also been argued that the ARF in fact meets the expectations of participants as regards mutual reassurance (Kawasaki 2006). Those explaining the limited achievements of the ARF and its low-level institutionalization under ASEAN leadership have squarely pointed to the pursuit of regime security by some ARF participants (Khong and Nesadurai 2007), or focused on the effects of domestic coalitions (Solingen 2008). Significantly, irrespective of whether assessments of the ARF are more positive or critical, the research to date generally maintains that the ARF has not been moving forward its cooperative security agenda to extend to concrete and practical security cooperation.

Such cooperation can be understood in at least two ways: either as cooperative activity that is designed to provide a framework for further individual or collective action, or in terms of multilateral activity in preparation for and possibly extending to operational exercises and responses under ARF auspices. While focusing on both, this article is particularly interested in establishing to what extent the ARF has embraced practical cooperation in the second sense outlined above. There are three main reasons for doing so. First, since 9/11 the ARF has increasingly dealt with non-traditional security issues that in the view of most governments have required practical responses. Secondly, the ARF involves many more officials and experts than it did in the past. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the growing role of defence officials, who meet relatively frequently and in many cases are advocates of practical cooperation. Third, participants remain rhetorically committed to the ARF as the ‘main multilateral political and security forum in the region’. For ASEAN countries especially, this raises the question of what the ARF should best do to remain relevant.

The article is divided into five sections. The first provides a brief overview of how the ARF's activities have expanded in recent years. The following three sections then examine to what extent the ARF has addressed in practical terms the three non-traditional or transnational issues that have dominated its agenda since 2001: terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief. The fifth section examines factors influencing practical security cooperation in the ARF.

The article offers four conclusions. First, while ARF activities continue to mainly focus on security dialogue and confidence building, ARF participants as a whole have slowly become more content not only to engage in discussions and exchanges designed to impact on practices, but also to proceed with practical exercises organized multilaterally under the ARF banner. To the extent that such exercises have recently been organized under ARF auspices, these have occurred in the fields of maritime security and, in particular, disaster relief. Second, this implies that operational security responses undertaken by participants are still conducted outside the ARF. Third, this cautious embrace of practical cooperation has coincided with changes in ASEAN's declaratory position on the issue, but for now it seems more the outcome of political initiatives pursued by a minority of ARF states in response to changing circumstances and challenges than the consequence of ASEAN's actual enthusiasm to turn a new leaf. Finally, hopes or expectations that participants will soon organize more demanding practical activities under ARF auspices—involving most or all participants—are likely to be disappointed.

The ARF agenda since 9/11

ARF participants have for years debated about how to advance the Forum's activities with respect to the road-map sketched for the regional arrangement by ASEAN in the 1995 Concept Paper (ASEAN 1995) in terms of a progression from confidence building to preventive diplomacy (PD), to the elaboration of approaches to conflict. Yet the security dialogue of ARF participants has for long also focused on specific regional security issues and those international security concerns that affect the Asia-Pacific, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the progress attained in moving beyond the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, events in the Middle East and the proliferation of weapons (including small arms and weapons of mass destruction).

Since the end of the last millennium, the ARF's agenda and activities have expanded significantly. To illustrate, during the eighth ARF (July 2000–July 2001), for example, activities were limited to the organization of the annual ministerial meeting; discussions at the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF SOM); two Intersessional Support Group meetings on Confidence Building Measures (ISG CBMs); the fourth Meeting of Heads of Defence Colleges and Institutions; three seminars (on civil-military cooperation, CBMs on conventional weapons and approaches to confidence building); two expert group meetings relating to CBMs); one workshop on piracy; and one on humanitarian assistance.

Seven years on, ARF activities had multiplied to include the following: the annual ministerial meeting; the ARF SOM, two meetings of the Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBMs and PD; which replaced the ISG on CBMs); the eleventh ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Universities/Colleges/Institutions; regular ARF Defence Officials' dialogues; inter-sessional meetings on both counter-terrorism and transnational crime (ISM CT-TC) and disaster relief (ISM-DR); a yearly ARF Security Policy Conference; various seminars (focusing on energy security, cyber terrorism, narcotics control and anti-personal landmines); workshops (on CBMs and PD, and the management of small arms and light weapons, or SALW); a training programme and a round table discussion relating to maritime security, an experts meeting on peacekeeping; and a desktop exercise on disaster relief.2 The planned activities for the period until December 2009 reveal a further possible deepening of the ARF focus on maritime security and non-proliferation and disarmament, as participants have also agreed on intersessional meetings in these areas. This development in turn testifies again to the confluence of traditional and new security challenges after the 9/11 attacks.

While the ARF agenda reflects diverse security interests pursued by participants, its widening is of course also the consequence of global and regional circumstances and developments, and calls to respond to these. Partly as a result, ARF activities—workshops, seminars or similar—have concomitantly also dramatically risen in number. In particular, participants have devoted much more attention to non-traditional security issues that tend to be transnational in nature, even as conventional security concerns have remained on the agenda. The counter-terrorism focus of the ARF in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, reinforced by the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) bombings perpetrated in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, is an example in case. Similarly, the acts of armed robbery and piracy committed in Southeast Asian waters earlier this decade had a catalytic effect as regards re-energizing discussions about maritime security. A series of natural disasters, especially the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which brought significant destruction and loss of human life to the region, subsequently raised important issues about the region's disaster relief cooperation. Acknowledging that the ARF dialogue and activities have clearly revolved around many other issues (eg counter-proliferation), it is posited here that after 2001, ARF participants have focused above all on terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief. With regard to all three issues, the question has been how ARF participants might be able to make a contribution to addressing perceived threats and challenges and whether this would involve them going beyond dialogue.

Terrorism

ARF participants responded to the 9/11 attacks by demonstrating political solidarity with the United States, as expressed in the undertaking ‘to use all necessary and available means to pursue, capture and punish those responsible’ for the attacks and ‘to prevent additional attacks’ (ARF 2001a). While not defining terrorism,3 there was, as officials noted in December 2001, ‘general agreement that ARF participants view all acts of terrorism as an attack on humanity and completely unjustifiable regardless of any motivations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomever, and a profound threat to international peace and stability’ (ARF 2001b). Officials also clearly stated their collective commitment to ‘cooperate at the regional level towards joint practical counter-terrorism measures’ (ARF 2001b). In April 2002, participants of the ISG on confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed that ‘terrorism had become an immediate, direct and long term threat to the peace and stability of each and every country in the region and the world at large’ (ARF 2002a). Participants at the ninth ARF in July 2002 released a Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing, in which they politically committed themselves to freezing terrorist assets in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in particular, and to enhancing their international cooperation with respect to information exchanges. They also agreed (ARF 2002b) that ‘further collaboration was needed to support capacity building, in particular to enhance participants’ capability to counter terrorism, especially in areas such as legal assistance, financial measures and practical law enforcement cooperation'. To discuss counter-terrorism cooperation, participants established an Intersessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC), which was initially chaired by the United States and Malaysia. These moves suggested the ARF's collective securitization of terrorism.4 However, the ARF consensus could not hide the divergent state responses to terrorism, and some countries—especially Indonesia—initially seemed to lack the kind of political resolve in the war against terror that the United States demonstrated and sought from others (Abuza 2003, ch. 5).

The Bali bombings of October 2002 reinforced the ARF's commitment to counter-terrorism. In this regard, Australia and Singapore hosted in June 2003 an ARF workshop on managing the consequences of a major terrorist attack. It included an interactive desktop exercise that dealt with a hypothetical attack involving the use of chemical and radiological disbursement devices in densely populated areas. Without explicitly referring to Jemaah Islamiyah, the tenth ARF ministerial meeting termed terrorism a menace to the security of nations and peoples around the world, and again emphasised the importance of regional capacity building (ARF 2003a). Ministers also adopted a key document on cooperative counter-terrorist action that had emerged from ISM CT-TC deliberations. Here (ARF 2003c) possible measures to strengthen border security were organized along four headings (movement of people, goods, document security and general measures). Most of the proposed measures were to be taken nationally (such as strengthening law enforcement and intelligence capabilities) and bilaterally (for example, intelligence sharing and extraditing terrorists). No timetable for or guide to implementation was agreed, however. Interestingly, while they also called for enhanced efforts and commitment to combat terrorism, such efforts were to be taken ‘in a more comprehensive manner on a voluntary basis, taking into account resources and capacity of ARF participants’ (ARF 2003c, my emphasis). While the ARF statement on border security served to provide a framework for cooperative activities in relation to counter-terrorism within the ARF, movement towards significantly closer practical cooperation was not straightforward, not least given different sensitivities to the political effects of both the war against terror and the war against Iraq, domestically and within the region.

Based on further discussions in the ARF ISM CT-TC, ministers next issued a statement on strengthening transport security against international terrorism at the eleventh ARF in July 2004. However, while setting out a range of measures and incorporating numerous pledges regarding concerted and collective action to enhance transport security (ARF 2004b), the language employed was somewhat weaker than that in relation to border security, raising questions both about the level of political commitment to implement the measures identified and existing capacity to do so. A further year on, ministers vowed to enhance practical cooperation through better information sharing, intelligence exchange and the promotion of document integrity and security. However, this followed the admission that significant constraints had been affecting information and intelligence sharing in the context of the ARF, including political will, national sovereignty, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Reflecting existing sensitivities, it was decided that the type of intelligence to be shared among ARF participating countries would focus at the preliminary stage on ‘strategic intelligence’ and only subsequently on ‘tactical intelligence’ (ARF 2005b). That said, it would appear that no comprehensive updated list was always immediately available on national contact points for information exchange and intelligence cooperation (ARF 2006a).

ARF participants have since 2006 focused on terrorism as a long-term challenge. To this purpose, the fourth ISM CT-TC, organized in Beijing in April 2006, discussed terrorist trends and developed recommendations focusing on promoting inter-faith and inter-cultural dialogues; strengthening links with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and focusing more on the overlapping areas between terrorism and transnational crime (such as money laundering and drug trafficking). At the thirteenth ARF in July 2006, foreign ministers followed up and adopted the ARF Statement on Cooperation in Fighting Cyber Attack and Terrorist Misuse of Cyber Space, and the ARF Statement on Promoting a People-Centred Approach to Counter-Terrorism. The fifth ISM CT-TC reinforced the emphasis on ‘soft approaches’ by discussing ideas on how to promote inter-civilization dialogue as an approach to counter-terrorism. As in previous years, these deliberations were subsequently fed into a statement on the topic issued by the Philippines as ARF Chair in August 2007. Possibly fearing that participants might be drifting away from even very limited concrete practical cooperation, the United States submitted to the sixth ISM CT-TC a proposal for an ARF Work Plan for Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime, with a view to building regional capacity in counterterrorism and to focusing the ARF on concrete cooperation. Notably, though the meeting resolved that the future work of the ISM CT-TC should be practical, action oriented and concrete, those participating expressed only ‘support in principle’ (ARF 2008a) for the US proposal. Following further discussion, ministers ultimately agreed to support the idea for the ARF work plan on CT-TC, but instructed their senior officials to work out the details, including a list of lead countries or co-sponsors, as well as specific projects. For their part, ARF foreign ministers also reaffirmed their commitment to countering terrorism with the involvement of civil society, the private sector as well as mass media (ARF 2008b).

By organizing numerous multilateral exchanges to discuss and promote higher standards in guarding against terrorism, the ARF has contributed political impetus to region-wide counter-terrorism efforts. That said, desktop exercises relating specifically to transnational terrorism were not regularized under the ARF banner. Indeed, to put the ARF's counter-terrorism endeavours into perspective, it is also useful to note, without aiming to be comprehensive in scope however, that there have quite a few bilateral, subregional and broader regional frameworks outside the ARF in which its participants have either agreed or pursued decisions, capacity building and even operational responses in relation to counter-terrorism.5

At the broader regional and sub-regional level, counter-terrorism cooperation has of course taken place in fora such as APEC.6. Following many years of deliberations and cooperation in this area, ASEAN signed a Convention on Counter Terrorism Convention in January 2007. This requires six instruments of ratification to enter into force. The convention specifies cooperation in conformity with the domestic laws of the parties involved with respect to a considerable number of areas, including early warning, prevention of terrorism and the development of regional databases. Its Article XIII deals with extraditable offences. Smaller relevant frameworks building on momentum of the ARF include the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism (BRMM-CT), which was led by Australia and Indonesia and convened in February 2004 specifically to translate existing political commitments into practical collaborative actions, albeit outside the ARF framework. Its follow-up was the Sub-Regional Ministerial Conference on Counter-Terrorism (involving Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in March 2007. As regards capacity building, Indonesia in particular has benefited from the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). Other regional centres involved in building up capacity have comprised the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur and the International Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Bangkok, with explicit blessings from ARF participants.

Bilateralism seems to have proved most suitable for the pursuit of practical cooperation. Australia, for example, has concluded Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) on counter-terrorism cooperation with Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and Cambodia. These bilateral counter-terrorism programmes have focused on information exchange and capacity building, not least to further improve border security. Canberra even signed a Status of Forces Agreement with the Philippines in 2007, allowing Australian troops to come for ‘combined training, exercises or other activities mutually approved’, but this agreement had not yet entered into force at the time of writing. The United States clearly also continues to offer very substantial and wide-ranging bilateral assistance in the field of counter-terrorism. For instance, Washington has assisted Indonesia in developing a credible regime against money laundering and terrorism finance. As regards US bilateral terrorism training with the Philippines, activities are now being organized under the auspices of the Security Engagement Board, a security consultative mechanism established in 2006 for bilateral cooperation on non-traditional security concerns.7 As the Balikatan exercises implemented under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty are no longer considered to offer a legitimate framework to combat terrorism insofar as they are supposed to address conventional and external armed threats only, there has been some momentum behind a proposal for a new counter-terrorism framework entitled Kapit Bisig (‘Linked Arms’) consisting of three components: (1) humanitarian and civil affairs; (2) security assistance and training; and (3) operations. As with the Balikatan framework, the US remains barred from undertaking independent combat operations in the Philippines, but bilateral training in the field is unproblematic. Also, Washington has used the State Department's Rewards for Justice Programme to pay for information that led to the killings of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leaders Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Solaiman.

In short, then, while the ARF has conducted a number of activities in relation to counter-terrorism, its record on practical concrete counter-terrorism has to date remained quite limited. Most of the ARF Statements relative to terrorism do not in effect establish very consequential frameworks. To the extent that concrete counter-terrorism measures have been identified in recent years, participants have not been shy at least to implicitly point to unresolved disagreements or a lack of resources and capacity to which there are no clear solutions. Though one desktop exercise relevant to counter-terrorism was undertaken under ARF auspices, actual capacity building fostered within the context of the ARF has thus been much more limited than that offered within other settings or arrangements. Unlike members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ARF participants have certainly not engaged in collective practical counter-terrorism activities such as live military exercises (de Haas 2007). To be fair, the latter should also not have been the expectation given the ARF's status as a regionally specific vehicle of cooperative security.

Maritime security

The ARF's early focus on maritime security was much boosted as a consequence of increasing apprehension among some participants about possible maritime terrorism after 9/11, particularly given recurrent piracy incidents in the Malacca Strait (Johnson and Valencia 2005). Finding consensual positions on matters of maritime security has not always been straightforward for ARF participants given different positions regarding maritime-based threats that in part reflect differences in perspective between coastal and maritime states (Mak 2006a; 2006b). However, they nevertheless managed to adopt an ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security, which was released at the tenth ARF ministerial meeting in June 2003. Significantly, the statement identifies maritime security as ‘an indispensable and fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the ARF region’ (ARF 2003b). ARF participants have also viewed maritime security as multidimensional, encompassing maritime terrorism, piracy, maritime transnational crime involving arms smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal immigration via maritime routes and maritime pollution.

The 2003 statement contained several further political commitments. For instance, participants agreed that it was necessary to ‘step up broad-based regional cooperative efforts’ among all institutions concerned (including naval units, coastal patrol and law enforcement agencies). Also, participant countries would ‘endeavour’ to achieve effective implementation of relevant international instruments such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988). The latter convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute persons alleged to have committed acts such as seizing ships by force or perpetrating acts of violence against persons on board ships. As it stands, several ASEAN countries—including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand—have yet to accede to SUA 1988. Tellingly, ARF participants only encouraged bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation on the basis of respecting territorial integrity, sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction and in accordance with principles of voluntary participation and agreement—in areas such as personnel contact, information exchanges and exercises; and providing technical assistance and capacity building (ARF 2003b). Participants also agreed that neither the statement nor any act carried out in pursuit to it ‘should prejudice the position of ARF countries with regard to any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over territory’ (ARF 2003b), thus highlighting in effect the unresolved competing maritime claims such as exist for the northern part of the Malacca Strait.

In 2004, ARF participants highlighted the critical importance of sea transport infrastructure and services. In March, officials again emphasized (ARF 2004a) the ‘need to give serious attention to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to develop a multilateral framework for achieving cooperation in the region’. However, no mention of maritime security was made in the ARF Chairman's statement released at the subsequent ministerial meeting in Jakarta in July 2004, reflecting profound disagreements on the issue which had come to a head over the testimony given by the Commander of US Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Thomas Fargo, to the US House of Representatives in relation to an American-led Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) that was said to serve the operationalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the US State Department's Malacca Strait Initiative.8 Admiral Fargo had justified the initiative with respect to the need to gain an awareness of the maritime domain and to fight threats using the maritime space. According to Fargo, PACOM was ‘looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting Special Operations Forces on high-speed vessels, putting, potentially, marines on high-speed vessels so that we can use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective interdiction…’ (Fargo 2004). While Singapore had voiced support for RMSI, Malaysia and Indonesia were critical of the initiative.

Nonetheless, at an ARF workshop in September 2004, co-chaired by Malaysia, Indonesia and the United States, participants reached ‘general agreement and understanding’ that ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships, criminal activity such as smuggling and the potential for terrorist attacks pose a threat to maritime security’ (ARF 2004c). They also stressed the urgent need to develop an accurate and timely information system and to apply a cooperative approach in the form of bilateral, trilateral or multilateral arrangements. One such arrangement already existed by then: Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had started implementing coordinated naval patrols (Operation MALSINDO) in July 2004.

In the event, ARF countries agreed to enhance their maritime security cooperation by focusing on four areas: cooperative frameworks; common understandings of threats; information exchange, mechanisms, policies and procedures; and national capacities (ARF 2004c). However, this intent to cooperate was formulated against the backdrop of their recognition of obstacles to maritime security cooperation, such as ‘lack of political will, a lack of trust between countries, the difficulties in exchanging classified information, and a lack of resources in terms of information and data’ (ARF 2004c). These obstacles remained but some headway in relation to developing a framework for maritime security was nevertheless made in another ARF workshop, co-hosted by Singapore and the US in March 2005.

Denoted a CBM in its own right, the workshop sought to develop concrete ‘solution sets’. It combined an operational demonstration by Singapore in relation to container screening and inter-agency counter measures against ‘small boat threats’ as well as ‘larger rogue vessels’ (ARF 2005a) with efforts to flesh out a practical agenda within and outside the ARF. In terms of multilateral cooperation, the meeting brought about agreement that the role of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) might be one possible catalyst for maritime cooperation, in areas of situational awareness, information sharing, personnel training, capacity building and technical cooperation. As regards operational solutions, there was no consensus that existing cooperation among some participants should extend to joint (rather than coordinated) patrols and include pursuit arrangements. At the same time, several participants supported the expansion of maritime-related activities by the Five Powers Defence Arrangements and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

Singapore used the workshop to brief on the role of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAPP), which was regarded as controversial in Malaysia and Indonesia. Proposed originally in 2001 by then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the ReCAPP initiative aims, among other things, to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships on the basis of information sharing, capacity building and operational cooperation.9 ReCAPP also allows for contracting parties to extradite persons who have committed armed robbery against ships as well as for capacity building in the form of joint exercises. Against this backdrop of at times controversial maritime cooperation, participants also formulated proposals for maritime cooperation within the ARF.

One such proposal focused on achieving consensus on three key principles to guide future maritime security dialogue and cooperation. First, the primary responsibility for the safety and security of key waterways such as the Malacca and Singapore Straits would lie with littoral states. Second, there would also be a role for other stakeholders, though this was not specified. Third, participants would proceed to develop maritime security cooperation on the basis of consultation and in accordance with international law (ARF 2005a). These principles were in essence affirmed as guiding principles at the Fourth Asian Security Summit or Shangri-La Dialogue, and also absorbed into the August 2005 Batam Statement by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005). Reflecting the continued commitment to this consensus, recent statements by the ARF Chairs have also reaffirmed that maritime security would be addressed within a cooperative framework respecting the rights of littoral states and legitimate concerns of user states in accordance with international law.

A second idea, put forward by Singapore, focused on organizing an ARF maritime security exercise as an operational CBM in 2006 (ARF 2005a). Though the initiation of ARF maritime security exercises had first been suggested in the 2003 ARF Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security and despite ‘general agreement and understanding’ regarding the usefulness of bilateral and/or multilateral initiatives in relation to training (ARF 2005a), participants organized two ARF maritime capacity building workshops in 2005 but remained reluctant to pursue the proposal for an operational exercise at sea. As was noted the following year (ARF 2006a): ‘It was agreed that future collaborative maritime activities especially those concerning joint maritime exercises will be carefully studied and consulted between and among concerned countries, with the view of achieving consensus’. Significantly, Singapore's determined push for an ARF Maritime Security Capacity Building Exercise still met reservations even when the original proposal was trimmed to a shore exercise. The exercise ultimately obtained the go-ahead, however, ‘using a fictitious scenario and a fictitious map with an exercise area that falls within international waters which will not infringe on the territorial sovereignty of any country’ (ARF 2006b). Representatives of twenty-one ARF participants then gathered in Singapore in January 2007 to conduct professional exchanges as well as tabletop and simulation exercises (Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) 2007). By the time of writing, this kind of shore exercise has not been repeated.

ARF participants have undertaken further capacity-building measures and even operational responses, but such cooperation has not been organized under ARF auspices. Singapore and Indonesia, for instance, established a cooperative system to generate real-time surveillance of the Singapore Strait, and all three littoral countries also launched the so-called ‘Eyes in the Sky’ (EiS) initiative in September 2005 to attain better maritime domain awareness over the Strait of Malacca. As part of the Malacca Straits Security Initiative, the EiS involved the establishment of a Combined Maritime Patrol Team and an EiS Operations Centre in each of the three states. The security situation in the Sulu-Celebes tri-border region, where Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines meet and which has widely been considered to constitute one of the world's major ungoverned territories fuelling transnational challenges,10 has also prompted bilateral maritime cooperation. Indonesia and the Philippines have conducted coordinated patrols (‘Corpat Philindo’), while Malaysia and the Philippines launched a similar arrangement known as Ops Phimal in June 2007. That said, while the former takes place only four times a year, the latter is organized even only twice (Storey 2007).

The lack of funds and capabilities faced by most Southeast Asian states has also prompted some of the major regional players to offer bilateral training and to enhance existing capabilities. An important role in this regard has been played by Japan, which has been concerned about piracy since the mid-1990s (Bradford 2004). With a primary focus on the Strait of Malacca, Tokyo has relied on its sophisticated Coast Guard to foster cooperation with civilian maritime counterparts in Southeast Asia (Suda 2006; Sato 2007). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has funded training seminars organized by the Japanese Coast Guard. Japan has also made available patrol boats to both Indonesia and the Philippines, making this the first time that the Japanese government ‘ever used official development assistance to transfer weapons’ (Samuels 2007, 80).

The United States Pacific Command too has worked very closely with Indonesia and the Philippines with regard to maritime security. It has provided both training and equipment, including radar and patrol craft, as well as assistance designed to increase cooperation among the littoral states. Training has included maritime interdiction operations involving, for instance, US naval vessels, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) patrol ships and members of Indonesia's Naval Special Warfare Unit (KOPASKA) (US Embassy Jakarta 2006a). Addressing the use of the Sulawesi Sea by regional networks, the two countries have also conducted bilateral exercises that included maritime interdiction operations, involving Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) and, on the Indonesian side, members of Indonesia's Marine Corps Special Warfare Unit, DEN JAKA (US Embassy Jakarta 2006b). To allow Indonesia to promote maritime security and thwart transnational crime, Washington has furthermore provided Jakarta with financial assistance to build a new training centre at the Indonesian Marine Police Training Facility. The US government has also made available thirty patrol boats for Marine Police as part of its strategy to build the capacity of partners (Gates 2008).

Moreover, to address insecurity in the Sulu Sea tri-border region, Washington has helped establish ‘Coast Watch South’—a high-tech surveillance system involving radar and patrols. According to Mark Valencia (2008), this involves P-3 Orion surveillance planes, unmanned aerial vehicles, spy satellites, fast patrol boats and helicopters. The US has also set up a maritime interdiction co-ordination centre in Zamboanga. Bilateral maritime exercises with Manila often focus on interdiction. Japanese and US efforts at strengthening the maritime capacity of littoral states have been reinforced by Australian assistance. Canberra has, for instance, offered the Philippines twenty-eight high-speed boats for Coast Watch South (Storey 2007).

In addition, Australia organizes maritime exercises (such as Kakadu IX in 2008) to improve maritime interoperability with the regional states of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Observers from the Philippines and Indonesia also attend. In addition, not only are a number of ASEAN countries participating in CARAT—which stands for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training—but some (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) also participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, which also now focuses on operational exercises against the new security challenges.11 Members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand) have also undertaken such operational exercises since 2004.

While most maritime security cooperation takes place outside the Forum, a stock taking of ARF activities and issues relating to maritime security was co-organized by Indonesia and China in August 2007. Driven in part by legal-political debates about permissible uses of a country's Exclusive Economic Zone (see Djalal, Yankov and Bergin 2005) as well as concerns about illegal fishing, Indonesia used the opportunity to call for the creation of an ISM on Maritime Security. The establishment of this ISM was fairly controversial among ARF participants, but it was ultimately agreed in 2008.

Disaster relief

Having provided one of the early settings for possible ARF cooperation, the ISM on Disaster Relief was suspended at the turn of the century amid apparent differences surrounding the involvement of regional militaries in relief operations. There were then also difficult questions about whether regional or international disaster relief should even require the consent of the affected country, but ARF participants dismissed these with reference to the principle of sovereignty. As the co-chairs of the third ISM-DR (ARF 1999) formulated it, ‘National and multilateral military capabilities should be engaged in disaster relief operations according to the concrete circumstances and the regulations in each country, in a transparent manner, but only upon the request of the country suffering damage’. This reaffirmed the respect for sovereignty made explicit in the 1994 Oslo Guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets in disaster relief, which also emphasized the core principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

The ISM DR was reconvened in 2005 in response to the devastation and immense human losses resulting from the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 as well as the international relief effort that this natural catastrophe prompted. Among other issues, the relief operations had for instance highlighted the reliance on bilateral efforts and raised questions about the use of foreign military assets.12 Indeed, a total of thirty-five countries had provided military or civil defence aid to countries affected by the tsunami, making for significant coordination challenges. In Indonesia's case, the tsunami had brought TNI Commander General Endriartono Sutarto to initially approach his counterparts in Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States to request external assistance. However, Jakarta later insisted that foreign military assets would have to be withdrawn within ninety days. The objective in reconstituting the ARF ISM DR was thus to work towards effective mechanisms to achieve substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and in social, economic and environmental assets as well as to respond jointly to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation. The focus on disaster relief has remained very relevant. Since the 2004 tsunami, Southeast Asia has seen more minor natural catastrophes, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia,13 where foreign militaries have again been deployed, and significant devastation of the Ayeyawaddy Delta by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

At the twelfth ARF in July 2005, foreign ministers welcomed the idea of stand-by arrangements for disaster relief, albeit under the auspices of the United Nations, including rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in the medium and long term (ARF 2005c). They also looked forward to the expeditious establishment of regional mechanisms on disaster reduction, such as the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. Notably, in this agreement, ASEAN countries had emphasized the need to respect scrupulously the principle of sovereignty and had accorded the affected state primary responsibility when responding to disasters (ASEAN 2005b). They had also made a rhetorical commitment to developing and implementing operational measures, including the establishment of monitoring, assessment and early warning systems as well as standby arrangements for disaster relief and emergency response. Significantly, as regards possible standby arrangements, the ASEAN countries were clear that they would make assets available on a voluntary basis only. The development of standard operating procedures for regional cooperation and national action was also mooted. In addition, an ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance was to be established to facilitate cooperation among parties.

To advance the ARF's role—which ASEAN governments wanted to be consistent with their own multilateral framework—in disaster relief, the Head of the ARF Unit in November 2005 emphasized the basic need to exchange information on disaster management and to set up an ARF database of assets and capabilities. He also stressed the importance of continuing with regional capacity building, and to advance civil-military cooperation. To promote ARF cooperation in disaster relief, and to coordinate the implementation of relevant recommendations of various ARF meetings, a number of so-called ‘shepherds’ then stepped forward, initially comprising Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the United States (ARF 2005d). China and the European Union (EU) subsequently also assumed such a role.

The Yogyakarta and Central Java tectonic earthquake in May 2006 occurred too early for the ARF's position on disaster relief to have significantly moved forward. Accordingly, the practical response again essentially relied on bilateral assistance. The US Pacific Command, for instance, deployed a military medical unit. However, against the backdrop of the rescue and assistance activities in response to the earthquake, ARF participants released the ARF Statement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response. This suggested that ARF participants would endeavour to enhance cooperation that supports and complements existing regional and international disaster management and emergency response mechanisms in four areas: risk identification; disaster prevention and preparedness; emergency response and disaster relief; and capacity building (ARF 2006c). The document also stated that participants would work towards the development of an ARF regional standby arrangement for immediate humanitarian assistance, including standard operating procedures (SOPs).

The continued promotion of disaster relief cooperation by ARF participants has had three thrusts.14 First, China called for an ARF disaster relief modality that would introduce a framework consisting of appropriate norms, rules and procedures as well as a regional database of relief resources. This initiative led to the ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation, adopted at the fourteenth ARF ministerial meeting (ARF 2007a). Secondly, Indonesia has promoted the creation of an ARF Standby Arrangement (SA) for immediate humanitarian assistance. Responding to some concerns regarding the nature of the commitments associated with the SA, Indonesia has underscored that in its view commitments to the SA would be non-binding and that contributions would be voluntary. The third initiative has seen Australia in particular propose SOPs for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) in order to provide a speedy and efficient response to natural disasters, including the use of military assets. Canberra has insisted that while civilian agencies might enjoy overarching responsibility in disaster relief efforts, the military often has the best capacity to respond swiftly to immediate disaster relief needs. The idea that the ARF could fill a niche role in promoting civil-military cooperation has attracted some support among the ARF constituency. That said, Indonesia has noted the importance of the respect for sovereignty in the promotion of civil-military and inter-agency coordination among disaster relief stakeholders. One of Indonesia's specific concerns has apparently focused on the weapons systems carried by foreign military assets during relief operations. Against this backdrop, Indonesia and Australia organized the first ARF Disaster Relief desktop exercise at the Naval Command and Staff College in Jakarta on 1–2 May 2008 in order to validate draft HADR SOPs. This represented an important step towards enhancing concrete cooperation in this area. The scenario for the exercise was a natural disaster in a fictitious country that suffers volcanic eruption, an earthquake and a tsunami and needs external assistance. The primary objectives of the exercise were to improve civil and military coordination in disaster relief and to promote understanding and cooperation among ARF participants in situations in which a coordinated multinational response would be required. The event was judged a success although Mongolia and Myanmar did not participate (ARF 2008b).

Cyclone Nargis occurred merely hours after the Indonesian-Australian exercise finished. Within days, Myanmar's obstruction of easy access for international relief workers to cyclone-devastated areas in the Ayeyawaddy Delta raised the question whether the international community should intervene by invoking the responsibility to protect (Haacke 2009; also see Selth 2008). Senior officials of ARF participants thereupon stressed the ‘importance of speeding up the arrangements to receive and deploy aid, material and relief personnel to the stricken areas’ (cited in Kyodo 2008). In the event, Myanmar's authorities resisted external pressure to admit foreign military assets to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the delta, but they agreed to ASEAN's push to facilitate disaster relief involving the wider international community.

Myanmar's problematic response to Cyclone Nargis raised in pronounced fashion for ARF participants how to deepen their cooperation regarding disaster relief. At the fifteenth ARF in Singapore, ministers called for greater civil-military coordination for major, multinational disaster responses through training, information sharing and multinational exercises. They also ‘recognised that military assets and personnel, in full support and not in place of civilian responses, have played an increasingly important role in regional disaster responses’ (ARF 2008b). The foreign ministers moreover requested their senior officials to develop operational procedures in the form of ARF Strategic Guidance for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. These are to be less specific than SOPs, complement the existing General Guidelines on Disaster Relief Cooperation, and may include a focus on a possible ARF Standby Arrangement. Ministers also asked the Co-chairs of the ISM on DR to draw up a disaster relief work-plan aimed at coordinating ARF-wide or sub-regional training for disaster preparedness, and to explore the feasibility of an ARF humanitarian assistance military and civil defence assets template that would be bilateral and voluntary, though it would function only as one possible tool (ARF 2008b).

Significantly, ARF ministers also agreed that several basic principles should continue to apply:

1.	the affected country has the primary responsibility to respond to the humanitarian needs following natural disasters;
2.	where needed, the affected country should facilitate humanitarian assistance from other countries and international organizations to achieve the overall objective of coordinated, timely and effective disaster management and relief;
3.	external assistance should be based on a request from the affected country; and
4.	disaster relief efforts should be undertaken under the latter's overall coordination (ARF 2008b).

These principles indicate that among ARF participants there remain considerable reservations about possible disaster relief roles assumed by other regional states.

Plans originally put forward by the Philippines and the United States to conduct an operational exercise under ARF auspices were realised in May 2009. The first ARF live disaster relief exercise, termed Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR), was civilian-led but also involved foreign militaries. It featured a hypothetical powerful typhoon and involved a tabletop exercise, a maritime search and rescue demonstration by the Philippine Navy, Philippine Coastguard and the Japanese Coast Guard, as well as the provision of medical assistance and engineering and construction work. Activities on the ground, which would appear to have involved personnel from the Philippines, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the United States, seem to have dovetailed the focus of Balikatan 2009, a bilateral exercise organized by Manila and Washington. Most ARF participants are said to have sent to VDR only observers, however, including the vast majority of the ASEAN countries.15

Moving towards more practical cooperation: advocates and constraints

As regards dealing with the transnational challenges addressed in this article, ARF participants have clearly engaged in limited forms of practical cooperation under the Forum's auspices. Apart from establishing some parameters and reference points for such cooperation, participants have also organized a small number of desktop exercises in relation to terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief. The recent field exercise in the Philippines means that ARF participants have now taken practical cooperation furthest in the area of disaster relief. This development represents considerable progression for the ARF. After all, practical cooperation was not really envisaged when the ARF was founded as a vehicle for advancing cooperative security modelled on the experience of ASEAN; it is an experience that is generally associated with regional political-security dialogue, confidence building and norm shaping. This raises the question as to whether practical cooperation within the ARF will not only continue, but also expand and deepen.

There are perhaps two reasons to be optimistic in this regard. First, the ARF's collective rhetorical commitment to concrete and practical cooperation is now explicit, albeit more recent than some of the desktop exercises that have been organized. In the 2008 Singapore Declaration participants vow ‘to undertake concrete and practical cooperation to address issues of common interests, with the view to build capacity, develop expertise and enhance coordination in areas that can contribute to the region's collective security objectives’ (ARF 2008c). Also, some ARF participants are discussing whether practical cooperation in relation to non-traditional security issues could be a step to moving unambiguously from confidence building to preventive diplomacy. At face value, this seems to bode well as regards the ARF's future orientation. However, it may still take time truly to bridge the longstanding divide on the issue of practical cooperation that has existed between a group of activist states and the silent majority of ASEAN countries. The ARF's more ambitious—albeit still limited—practical cooperation is effectively the result of initiatives that have been pursued by only a few participants, which are keen to increase the Forum's overall relevance. As the submissions to the ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO) demonstrate, a number of non-ASEAN countries have consistently been calling for the ARF to embrace concrete and practical activities. In 2005, for instance, while acknowledging that the ARF dialogues had yielded recommendations for practical measures, Australia posited the need for an ‘agreed ARF work plan’ in order to take the ARF beyond recommendations (ARF ASO 2005: 15). Canada favoured practical measures in relation to non-proliferation and suggested that the ARF should consider practical ways to collaborate in terms of training for and participation in peace support operations (ARF ASO 2005: 21). In 2007, Canberra indicated that Australia would ‘continue to work for the evolution of the ARF from the region's principal forum for security dialogue and cooperation into a body with the institutional and operational capacity to respond effectively and meaningfully to regional security developments’ (ARF ASO 2007: 1). Similarly, the United States in 2007 called on the ARF to ‘continue to strengthen its institutional capacity to form and implement appropriate solutions’ to non-traditional security threats (ARF ASO 2007: 116). Japan has also been keen for the ARF to commit to concrete cooperative actions (Yuzawa 2007).

In contrast, as a grouping, ASEAN has been considerably more reluctant to even represent the ARF as a site for dialogue and cooperation. In 2002, ASEAN foreign ministers still regarded the ARF only ‘as the key forum for political and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region’ (ASEAN 2002). The joint communiqué of the thirty-sixth ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting then re-cast the ARF as ‘a unique and indispensable forum for political and security dialogue and cooperation’ (ASEAN 2003), but it took a further two years until all ASEAN ministers explicitly ‘recognized the need to forge concrete cooperation among ARF countries in building capacity and capabilities in order to better cope with challenges’ (ASEAN 2005a, my emphasis). Also, ASEAN ministers only in 2007 ‘encouraged the forging of more concrete and practical cooperation among ARF countries in building capacity and capabilities in order to better cope with numerous challenges, including in counter-terrorism, disaster relief, maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and energy security, among others’ (ASEAN 2007, my emphasis).

This language obfuscated serious divisions among ASEAN countries in relation to practical cooperation under the ARF banner. After all, as this article makes clear, among ASEAN states, it is only Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia that have played a role in organizing ARF desktop and field exercises. Indeed, other ASEAN countries have mostly remained cautious about and at times opposed to practical cooperation that has been proposed. This is not necessarily a surprise, as ASEAN states have diverse security interests and they have not least for that reason held different views about how best to foster regional security and what shape regional order should take. Notably, Singapore and the Philippines, given their particularly close security relations with the United States and Australia, have understandably been keen to respond constructively to longstanding demands that the ARF move beyond dialogue and allow the non-ASEAN countries a greater role in the management of regional security. For various reasons, this enthusiasm has not been fully shared within ASEAN though, even if many members recognize the need to alleviate pressure in this regard.

Notably, the establishment of the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC, formerly ASEAN Security Community or ASC), strongly promoted by Indonesia, was designed to allow the Association to become more relevant as a limited security organization and to help address the numerous diplomatic challenges to its position as the ARF's primary driving force. In the event, however, the initial ideas even as regards dealing with new security challenges proved too ambitious to carry full consensus. The compromise that is the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) has thus been the source of some disappointment (Sukma 2010), not least because it continues to inhibit ASEAN from assuming a more pro-active security role. The ratification of the ASEAN Charter in 2008 has not fundamentally changed this state of affairs. There are thus real questions about whether all ASEAN states will want to follow up the ARF's declared commitment to practical cooperation even in its circumscribed form.

Within this broader context, there are at least two specific reasons why some participants may be cautious about and may even resist proposals for more and deeper practical security cooperation under ARF auspices. First, several ARF participants at most have limited capacity and resources. Clearly, a lack of capacity and restricted capabilities may prevent the participation in or organization of multilateral activity. It is no coincidence that:

1.	the only counter-terrorism desktop exercise under ARF auspices was organized in Australia;
2.	the only maritime security shore exercise organized to date took place in Singapore; and
3.	the only field exercise in relation to disaster relief was hosted by the Philippines, involving above all US forces already present because of Balikatan 2009. Indeed, while the attendance at the maritime security shore exercise was quite respectable, ARF countries actually participating in VDR were few in number.

This suggests that for some participants repeat exercises and a stronger record of cooperation under ARF auspices probably depend on prior capacity building, including training, and material assistance. For others this state of affairs implies considerable limitations on security cooperation among participants. Not surprisingly, rather than to pursue practical security cooperation within the ARF, many participants therefore feel more disposed to take advantage of capacity building in bilateral as well as various mini-and multilateral contexts outside the Forum. Even if the region will benefit from that, there will remain ARF participants that continue to lack the capacity to take part meaningfully in practical multilateral cooperation for some time.

Second, multilateral cooperative activity in the ARF has suffered from a lack of trust among participants, many of which are concerned about the possible disregard or erosion of the basic principles of inter-state conduct such as sovereignty and non-interference. As this article showed as regards counter-terrorism cooperation, for example, ARF participants have hesitated to share information and intelligence in a multilateral setting. The ARF's response to maritime challenges also pointed to the need to take into account the particular sovereignty concerns of two of the major coastal states: Malaysia and Indonesia. Indeed, the basic normative framework that ARF participants have agreed as underpinning maritime security cooperation revolves around paying due regard to sovereignty. The debate about what role the ARF might play in relation to disaster relief has been similarly shaped in so far as some participants maintain that sovereignty is seen by some as imposing unambiguous limitations on what those willing to assist are able to do—even at the invitation of affected countries. The use of foreign militaries and their assets on their territory has been especially problematic for some ARF participants, not least because different militaries still operate on the basis of very different SOPs (for example as regards weapons systems carried during relief operations). Consequently, countries such as Indonesia have noted the importance of the respect for sovereignty in the promotion of civil-military and inter-agency coordination among disaster relief stakeholders. There is no reason to believe that further efforts devoted to concrete and practical security cooperation will not remain circumscribed by a wider wariness within the ARF concerning the legal, political and potential security ramifications of relevant collective decisions.

Conclusions

This article has examined the extent to which the ARF has moved towards becoming a forum for practical security cooperation. To this end, it focused on how the ARF has approached cooperation in three key areas: terrorism, maritime security and disaster relief. It argued that in relation to combating terrorism the ARF has formulated a number of reference points and core ideas for concerted action. However, ARF participants have found difficult even limited practical counter-terrorism cooperation within the Forum's multilateral setting, leaving participants to focus primarily on other settings in order to organize cooperation in relation to practical counter-terrorism measures. As regards maritime security, ARF discussions have yielded basic agreement on a normative framework to guide cooperation within the Forum and other institutional contexts. Singapore's tenacity in organizing a maritime security shore exercise in 2007 in some ways signified a major step forward in promoting practical cooperation among ARF participants, but given the initial opposition to an ARF maritime security exercise doubts must remain about the possibility to run further iterations. And again, capacity building and surveillance activities to improve maritime security have really been pursued outside the ARF. The Indian Ocean tsunami led to sustained efforts within the ARF to promote practical cooperation in disaster relief. While this might also attest to the greater import increasingly given to human security by ARF participants, efforts to push the ARF's role in disaster relief have exposed sensitivities on a range of issues, especially as regards respect for sovereignty and security concerns about having foreign troops providing assistance in affected states. Given that the organization of desktop and field exercises has hitherto depended on the initiatives and political will of the ARF's more activist participants, it seems reasonable to assume that these still limited forms of practical cooperation will continue as long as the activist states are happy to continue to promote them. However, in view of the constraints identified in this article, one may also be forgiven for remaining sceptical in the short to medium term about whether the ARF will be able to maintain, let alone build on, its current record of limited practical cooperation.

Notes

¹ I am very grateful to Paul D Williams, Mark Beeson and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (Project Grant RES 223-25-0072).

² See ASEAN Regional Forum (undated) for an overview of ARF Track I activities.

³ On new and old terrorism in Southeast Asia, see Tan (2007).

⁴ On collective securitization and a comparison of regional arrangements, see Haacke and Williams (2008).

⁵ Relevant national efforts continue, including the passing of legislation and operations by security forces. The former include Cambodia's 2007 Counterterrorism Law and the Philippines' 2007 Human Security Act. The latter include Manila's military and law enforcement efforts to eliminate safe havens in the Sulu Archipelago and Jakarta's raid of suspected JI strongholds on Poso.

⁶ For an analysis of APEC's developing security role, see Ravenhill 2007.

⁷ Joint training is in accordance with the 1999 RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement.

⁸ Following clarifications made by Admiral Fargo in May 2004, the RMSI was further developed as a cooperative undertaking (USPACOM 2004).

⁹ The ReCAAP Agreement was finalised in November 2004 and entered into force in September 2006. Indonesia and Malaysia have preferred not to sign and ratify the agreement, indicating instead their apparent preparedness to cooperate with the Singapore-based ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, which is an independent international organization. The ReCAPP Contracting Parties in early 2009 are Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, PRC, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam.

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion, see Greenwood (2006) and in particular Rabasa (2007).

¹¹ WPNS had 19 members in 2007. Singapore hosted both the inaugural and the second WPNS multilateral sea exercise. The first involved ships from eight WPNS navies (Australia, Canada, France, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand).

¹² For an extended discussion, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] (2008).

¹³ In February 2006, a landslide devastated part of Leyte, Philippines, killing more than 1,100. In Indonesia close to 6,000 were killed in an earthquake in May 2006 that left many more affected.

¹⁴ Disaster relief has of course also been addressed outside the ARF. In 2006, for instance, the Oslo Guidelines were updated. It has also featured, for instance, at the Tokyo Defense Forum (Japan Ministry of Defence 2006).

¹⁵ ASEAN has since 2005 organized ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercises (ARDEX): in Selangor, Malaysia (ARDEX-05); along Tonle Baasac River in Cambodia in September 2006 (ARDEX-06); in Singapore in October 2007 (ARDEX-07); and in Thailand in August 2008 (ARDEX-08). Scenarios for these simulations have included a flood disaster, a multi-story apartment collapse, and a typhoon disaster. These simulation exercises form part of ASEAN's endeavours to prepare for the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER).