Introduction: rising states, rising donors and the global aid regime

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Notes

The origins of this special feature are in a research project on the ‘B(R)ICS as Emerging Donors’, that was commissioned by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Gregory Chin and Fahimul Quadir thank the IDRC, especially Rohinton Medhora, Daniele St-Pierre and David Schwartz, and former Vice President Stan Shapson and Associate Vice President David Dewitt for Research and Innovation at York University for funding the authors' workshop at York University, Toronto, Canada on 20–21 November 2009. Our thanks to Susan Henders, the former director, and Alicia Filipowich, the programs coordinator at the York Centre for Asian Research, for supporting this initiative. We thank Manmohan Agarwal, Simone Bohn, Andrew Cooper, Thomas Fues, Pablo Idahosa, Robert Latham, Ernesto Soria Morales, Viviana Patroni, Michele Ruiters and Andrew Schrumm for participating in the workshop as paper presenters or discussants, and Marianne Lau for her assistance at the workshop. Our special thanks to the editors of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, particularly editor-in-chief Nivedita Manchanda, for her strong support and guidance throughout the project, to former editor Oliver Lewis, and the blind peer reviewers on each article.

¹ An exception, for the case of China's impact on developing countries in Africa, is Brautigam (2009).

² In Monterrey, developing countries signed onto assuming responsibility for ‘implementing sound economic policies, tackling corruption, putting in place good governance, investing in their people, and establishing an investment climate to attract private capital’. The UN also noted that the Monterrey Consensus highlighted that certain regions of the world require particular attention, namely the least developed countries in Africa, small island developing states and landlocked developing countries.

³ Notes from Gregory Chin's discussion with Thomas Bernes, the Chair of the Development Committee of the IMFC, during the negotiations for the Monterrey Consensus, Waterloo, Ontario, January 2011.

⁴ Gregory Chin's notes from discussions with officials of the Regional Office for Latin American and the Caribbean of the International Development Research Centre, Montevideo, May 2012.

⁵ Brazil, India and South Africa also initiated an ‘IBSA’ Dialogue Forum in 2004, and in 2006 created an IBSA Trust Fund, where each country has committed to contributing US$1 million per year, to provide project-level development assistance grants to countries of the South. For more information see < http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/index.php?option = com_content&view = article&id = 29&>, accessed 2 October 2012.

⁶ At the G20 Toronto Summit, in June 2010, G20 Leaders agreed to establish the G20 Working Group on Development.

⁷ The Seoul Consensus consists of eight pillars: infrastructure, private investment and job creation, human resources development, trade, financial services, G20 platform for knowledge sharing, resilience and food security, and governance.

⁸ Lawrence MacDonald, ‘Development and the G20 Summit’, Center for Global Development, 25 October 2010, < http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/development-and-the-seoul-g-20-summit.php>, accessed 3 October 2012.

⁹ Some analysts see less contestation between the G7 and the ‘emerging donors’, and view the Seoul Consensus, or the new ‘G20 approach’ to development, as incorporating core elements of the model that was traditionally advanced by bilateral Western donors in the DAC, but reformatted using the more recent experiences of the emerging economies. Other analysts see the beginnings of a paradigm shift.

¹¹ Li 2007.

¹² Li 2007, 3 (emphasis added).

¹⁰ We thank Thomas Fues for highlighting this point.