China–Australia strategic partnership in the context of China’s grand peripheral diplomacy

Abstract

Alongside its rise, China has intensified its relations with countries on its periphery by adopting a “dual-core” strategy in order to create a “Community of Common Destiny”. In this context, China has upgraded its relationship with Australia from “commercial” to “strategic” levels. China’s “dual-core” strategy and the China–Australia strategic partnership reveal not only China’s desire for intensifying its economic interdependence with countries on its periphery, Australia included, but also China’s strategic intention of creating its own sphere of influence in the form of a “Community of Common Destiny”. China wishes to sustain its economic and social progress by restoring the past glory of “Fuqiang” (wealth and power) as it enhances both its “hard” and “soft” power. The intensified economic interdependence may persuade countries on its periphery to avoid being involved in any attempt by China’s competitors to contain its rise.

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Notes

¹ Some Chinese IR scholars consider “grand peripheries” a political rather than a geographical concept and include countries that may not directly border China, but concern its vital interests. This view holds that Northeast-, Southeast-, South-, Central- and West Asia as well as the South Pacific are part of China’s grand peripheries. For more details, see Zhang and Huang (2007) and Qi (2014).

² The Chinese political leadership has long conceived of the relations between powers as the key to world peace, and been committed to creating with other major powers a type of relations featuring “no confrontation, mutual respect and win–win cooperation”. For more details, see Wang, Yi (2014)

³ Some Chinese IR scholars believe that “the Community of Common Destiny” is a new strategy proposed by Xi Jinping, reflecting China’s concept of its relations with countries on its grand peripheries: to seek common prosperity and security through regional cooperation. For more details see Xi, Jinping (2013b); Zhang, Yunling (2014).

⁴ President Xi Jinping called for intensifying cooperation among member states of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) by adopting a two-core driven strategy, a combination of political and economic objectives, when he attended the BRICS summit held in Australia in November 2014. By that Xi meant that the emerging states should contribute not only to promoting global economic advancement but also to safeguarding world peace and justice by intensifying political and security cooperation. For more details see Ju, Wei and Li (2014), Qi (2014) and Yan (2013).

⁵ In the views of some Chinese IR scholars, the Soviet Union, the once second most powerful country, was ‘sent into the garbage heaps of history’ by the US through half a century’s Cold War. The US did not tolerate the rise of Japan, its docile and obedient ally in political and military terms, and imposed on it the Plaza Accord, which plunged Japan into the ‘lost decades’. For more details, see Jiang, Yong (2010) and Ye (2011, 1).

⁶ The mainstream perceptions of Chinese academics on China’s involvement in the Korean War are radically different from those of the West. Many Chinese scholars characterize China’s involvement in the war as inevitable. They argue that China’s involvement was not merely a logical outcome of the Communist ideology that Mao Zedong upheld, but was more related to China’s geopolitical interests, territorial security and economic rehabilitation from its long-term wars. In their eyes, after the US-headed UN forces crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea and quickly pushed forward towards the Chinese border, Mao Zedong was left with only one option: to roll back the UN forces to the 38th parallel by sending troops to North Korea. For more details, see Qin (2010); Sha (2010).

⁷ It is important to note that Chinese scholars generally attribute the growing momentum of Taiwan’s independence to the changed geopolitical dynamics and “the US factor”. They argue that with the demise of the Soviet Union, China was no longer considered by the US as a strategic force in containing the Soviet expansion. Instead, China’s rapid rise appeared to pose a potential threat to the US’s hegemony. In this context, the Chinese IR scholars emphasize that the US has intensified its efforts in instigating Taiwan’s separation from China in order to contain its rise. For more details see Cao and Cao (2004) .

⁸ To retaliate for Holland’s military sales to Taiwan, China called back its Ambassador and downgraded its diplomatic relations with Holland to the level of Chargé d’affaires in 1981. Likewise, China suspended exchange of ministerial visits with France, closed the French General Consulate in Guangzhou and cancelled all large-scale economic cooperation with France in 1992 as a result of its military sales to Taiwan. For more details, see Office of the Commissioner of the Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMCOPRC) (2003); Qian (2003).

⁹ The Central Party School of the CCP is broadly acknowledged as a key think tank in China, which conceived China’s Peaceful Development (also known as Peaceful Rise) approach, adopted by the Communist leadership as a state strategy.

¹⁰ RCEP includes Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, India, Australia, New Zealand and the ten member states of ASEAN. For more details, see Li, Jiabao (2014)