Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa

Abstract

The disappointing results of international democratisation efforts are often attributed to domestic conditions that make it difficult for democracy to be established or survive. This paper recognises that the process is largely an endogenous one and that significant structural impediments exist. It argues that international actors, though for the most part absent from current theories of democratisation, can nonetheless play a very important role in promoting (or preventing) democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paradoxically, the role of donors in promoting a rapid transition to a multiparty system actually can impede further democratisation. For better results, a better understanding of and commitment to the process are required. Competing economic, commercial and strategic interests, however, prevent donors from making a more positive contribution.

Les résultats décevants des efforts internationaux de démocratisation sont souvent attribués aux conditions domestiques qui rendent l'établissement ou la survie de la démocratie difficile. Cet article reconnaît que le processus est largement endogène et qu'il existe des entraves structurelles significatives. Des acteurs internationaux, bien que pour la plupart absents des théories actuelles de démocratisation, peuvent malgré tout jouer un rôle très important en promouvant (ou en empêchant) la démocratisation en Afrique subsaharienne. Paradoxalement, le rôle des bailleurs de fonds dans la promotion d'une transition rapide au multipartisme peut, dans les faits, venir gêner la démocratisation. Afin d'obtenir de meilleurs résultats, une meilleure compréhension des mécanismes et un plus grand engagement dans le processus sont nécessaires. Toutefois, les intérêts économiques, commerciaux et stratégiques concurrents empêchent les bailleurs de fonds de faire une contribution plus positive.

Notes

Stephen Brown is Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Political Studies, and affiliated with the Program in International Development and Globalization at the University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

 1. Without getting into any long definitional debates, I would like to specify how I use a few key terms in this paper. By transition, I mean the process of moving from an authoritarian to a democratic system. If free and fair elections are held and the winner assumes office, a full transition to democracy has occurred. If the process falls short of that, the transition is partial or stalled, allowing for a multiparty system to be in place without it qualifying as democratic. Political conditionality refers to the strings attached to foreign aid, making it dependent on political liberalisation. Consolidation is a far more nebulous term and can include long-term survival of democracy, its process of deepening and widening, or its transformation into the ‘only game in town’.

 2. One of the earliest and most important studies of transitions to democracy states that, with the exception of military occupation, ‘external actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role’ [O'Donnell et al., 1986: 5]. Others, such as Pridham [1995], Whitehead [1986] and Whitehead [2001], attribute greater weight to exogenous factors.

 3. Three exceptions are Barkan [1997], Hearn and Robinson [2000] and Sørensen [2000].

 4. For instance, Widner [1994] and C. Young [1994].

 5. Jeane Kirkpatrick [1979] rationalised this focus based on the democratic potential of authoritarian regimes, as opposed to the alleged unreformability of totalitarian states.

 6. Scandinavians were also supportive of progressive socialist regimes, such as Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia and the ‘Frontline States’ in Southern Africa.

 7. Not all donors place equal emphasis on the various components of political reform. The US stresses democracy, while most Western European countries and the European Union focus on less specific ‘good governance’. Nordic countries tend to pay more attention to human rights than other donors, while France values its economic, military and cultural ties with former colonies. Japan is least interested in domestic political systems, privileging trade relationships instead. Among multilateral agencies, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), though prohibited from promoting democracy as such, increasingly emphasise good governance; other agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) do not apply policy conditionality.

 8. Transitions occurred in Benin, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa (extracted from Bratton and van de Walle [1996]).

 9. Colonial rule's main purpose was to extract wealth through domination and imperialism. Colonial powers did not intend to give Africans, considered incapable of rational and intelligent deliberation, a say in their own government. Yet, after World War II, Europeans realised they could not maintain indefinite control over their colonies. Most African countries, especially former French and British territories, were hastily granted representative government in the decade leading to independence. Independence movements aimed to seize the state more than to reform it or follow Western political models. For the most part, nationalism was not a liberal movement [Chazan, 1993: 75]. Soon after independence, almost all new governments ‘decayed’ into authoritarianism or were overthrown in military coups under the justification of national unity and/or a development imperative (though few eventually produced either), invariably centralising power and repressing dissent. Laws enacted by the colonial power to control the ‘natives’ were often used to quell opposition in postcolonial states.

10. One of the biggest impediments to sustained democratisation is the ‘winner-take-all mentality’, whereby an elected party acts as if it has a mandate to do as it pleases for its entire term in office. The strong powers of the executive deprive the parliamentary opposition of a political role, the right to question and criticise, and security from harassment, which constitutes a fundamental breach in the philosophy that underpins democracy [Makinda, 1996: 567]. Opposition politicians are sometimes charged with treason or sedition for criticising the government, despite the fact that that is the ‘loyal’ opposition's function in a democratic system. Viewing power as a prize-for-the-taking often leads to other damaging abuses of power, including the siphoning off of state resources. Control over countless patronage appointments at all levels, land allocation and the privatisation of state assets provide political leaders and their close allies with great opportunities for enrichment at public expense. Moreover, since no party can guarantee its hold on power, governments attempt to grab as much as possible while in office. Indeed, a large number of opposition politicians appear to seek personal aggrandisement and to partake in reaping the spoils of power. Their parties often function as their personal vehicles, lack continuity and professionalism. If elected, they do little to promote the deepening of democracy, including by reducing the powers of the executive.

11. In the case of Kenya, for example, the Bush (Senior) administration and the Pentagon wanted to reward the Kenyan government with military and economic assistance for its support of American military and security interests (including the Gulf War, Sudan, Libya and Somalia). Congress was more concerned with the regime's manifest human rights violations, whereas USAID wanted to downplay the unfairness of elections so that its budget would not be cut.

12. The US Congress is especially desirous of rapid, quantifiable results to justify aid to its domestic constituency. Though arguably appropriate for health care services or infrastructure programs, this makes little sense in the field of democracy and governance.

13. For American examples, see Gore [1994: 447], Christopher [1996: 506] and Rice [1998: 20].

14. Crawford [1997: 93–100] also analyzes the conspicuous ‘non-cases’ of Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, where no aid sanctions were imposed, despite persistent human rights violations. Carothers [1999: 5] cites examples where US national interests (such as oil, trade, or regional security and stability) superseded democracy promotion in the 1990s, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, Indonesia under Suharto, Kazakhstan and Saudi Arabia.

15. In the case of the US, Rose [2000/01: 189] argued that ‘enhancing U.S. security’ and ‘promoting prosperity at home’, the two main competing objectives, ‘carried greater weight’ than democracy promotion abroad.

16. Moreover, the results of free and fair elections in developing countries were not always respected by Western liberal democracies. For example, the US supported the overthrow of democratically elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala (1954) and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973).

17. An exception is Casper [2000: 59], who concludes that ‘difficult transitions, while risky, offer the highest payoff for democratization’.

18. See, for example, World Bank [1989: xii, 4, 15, 54–5, 63, 191].

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Stephen Brown

Stephen Brown is Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Political Studies, and affiliated with the Program in International Development and Globalization at the University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.