External support to local institutions: providing political leverage to weaker groups, or sustaining traditional relations of power?

Abstract

There is a body of literature showing that donor-supported institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are often captured by local elites, but this literature rarely touches upon whether elite capture is contingent on institutions. However, if this is the case, some institutions may provide political leverage for weaker groups, while others may sustain existing or traditional relations of power. The aim of this study of three cases of donor-supported institutions in Burkina Faso is to understand why close relatives of traditional chiefs invest in gaining control over a municipality, while showing only limited interest in gaining control of village groups and the electricity cooperative. The article argues that while local actors are generally attracted by development rents from donor-supported institutions, relatives of traditional chiefs seem to value the symbolic importance of institutions more than economic resources. The study thus enhances our understanding of mechanisms for access to local donor-supported institutions.

Il existe tout un pan de la littérature qui montre que les institutions appuyées par les bailleurs de fonds en Afrique Subsaharienne (ASS) sont accaparées par les élites locales, mais cette littérature se demande rarement si ce comportement dépend ou non des institutions. Si c'est le cas, certaines de ces institutions peuvent cependant permettre à des groupes plus faibles d'exercer une certaine influence politique alors que d'autres maintiennent les rapports de force existants. Le but de cette étude, qui comporte trois études de cas d'institutions appuyées par des bailleurs de fonds au Burkina Faso, est de comprendre pourquoi des parents proches de chefs traditionnels cherchent à prendre le contrôle de la municipalité alors qu'ils ne montrent qu'un intérêt limité pour obtenir le contrôle; des groupements villageois et de la coopérative d'électricité. L'article défend l'idée que bien que les acteurs locaux soient généralement attirés par les rentes de développement liées aux institutions appuyées par les bailleurs de fonds, les parents des chefs traditionnels semblent donner une plus grande importance à la valeur symbolique des institutions qu'aux ressources économiques. L'étude renforce ainsi notre compréhension des mécanismes d'accès aux institutions appuyées par les bailleurs de fonds.

Keywords:

• Local institutions
• decentralization
• local government
• power relations
• external intervention
• rural electrification

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the Danish Council for Development Research which funded the research behind this paper and Risø-DTU, the National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy at the Technical University of Denmark, which made it possible for me to write it up. A special thanks to Peter Kragelund for valuable comments throughout the process, and to the two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this article.

Notes

 1. In a recent essay, Manor (2004) takes some initial steps in this direction by addressing differences between elected councils at lower levels in the political system and user committees responsible for donor-supported infrastructure, such as water, health and education. Manor's main hypothesis is that user committees are ‘damaging’ decentralization efforts in respect of local elected councils. Manor bases his hypothesis on the observation that, while user committees often control important resources and rest on a questionable democratic mandate, elected councils, which are characterized by more transparent and democratic elections, often lack adequate resources.

 2. This understanding of institutions also acknowledges the work of Cleaver (2002), which, through the concept of institutional bricolage, shows that institutions are not built or transferred whole to a new context but rather evolve as a patchwork of bits and pieces of both new and existing institutions.

 3. The three institutions are all different from traditional institutions in a number of respects. Some development practitioners have argued that village groups are close to traditional organizations, such as ‘age groups’, ‘working groups’ or ‘credit groups’, which can be found in Burkina Faso among the Fulani and Mossi. These traditional groups, however, are based on rotating aid principles, instead of common ownership of the means of production, as in the case of village groups. Common ownership was traditionally practised only within the extended family. (For further discussion, see Ouédraogo 1990, pp. 41–43; Hagberg 2001, p. 54; Nygaard 2006, pp. 196–201.)

 4. The terms Fulani (English) and Peul (French) are sometimes used for the entire group of Fulfulde speakers. Here I will employ the Fulfulde terms Fulbe and Rimaïbe to take into account the important socio-political differences between the two ethnic groups. Rimaïbe will be used to indicate non-Fulbe, including caste people and other ethnic groups, who came to the area during colonial times (Irwin 1981, pp. 14, 48). For other ethnic groups I will use the French terms.

 5. Hamallism or the Tijanisme de onze grain refers to brotherhoods established by the followers of Cheik Hamahoullah. (For the former and present-day political role of Hamallism in Burkina Faso, see, for example, Traoré 1983; Diallo 1997; Diawara 1999, p. 105; Thébaud 2002).

 6. The Sankara revolution from 1983 to 1987 was, in spite of its short duration, of paramount importance for social institutions in the area, and the revolution still reverberates in contemporary dynamics. During the revolution, traditional chiefs were substituted by local revolutionary committees, Comités de Défense de la Révolution (CDR), and popular participation at all levels was encouraged by revolutionary rhetoric (see e.g. Speirs 1991; Tallet 1996).

 7. Here the notion of a patron–client relationship refers to ‘a relationship of personal dependency, excluding kinship ties, maintained by reciprocal exchanges of favours, between two persons, the patron and the client, who control unequal resources’ (Medard 1982, p. 164). A patron–client relationship is a dyadic relationship between a patron and a client. In practice, the client may be the patron of another client, and a multitude of patron–client relationships thus come to constitute a patron–client or clientelist network. A broker is one of a group of actors who serve as mediators of favours between patrons and clients (Boissevain 1974, p. 148).

 8. I have taken the concept of development rent, la rente de développement from Olivier de Sardan (1995, p. 160).

 9. The widespread use of the word ‘community’ in terms like community-based organizations (CBOs), community-driven development, community-based forestry and community-based natural resource management implicitly conveys a picture of village organizations representing the whole community (see, e.g., World Bank 2002a, 2002b).

10. The emirate was officially abolished in 1977, but informally the last emir still played an important role in the leadership of the town.

11. The murder of the leading editor of a critical newspaper.

12. This was parallel to what happened in Dori five years earlier, when the former emir was elected mayor.

13. The Danish Government's aid agency.