India and maritime governance in the Indian ocean: the impact of geopolitics on India’s involvement in maritime governance

ABSTRACT

The article argues that geopolitics is a major obstacle to an effective Indian policy on substantive maritime governance. It holds that India’s involvement in maritime governance is predominantly shaped by geopolitics and driven by two geopolitical concerns, Delhi’s drive to counter China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and India’s pursuit of leadership in that region. This emphasis on geopolitics is perfectly reasonable from India’s perspective but comes at the cost of constraining Delhi’s maritime governance policy and reducing India’s ability to address substantive maritime governance issues. Hence, India’s focus on geopolitics undermines substantive maritime governance. The focus on geopolitics negatively impacts substantive maritime governance because it: 1) leads India to oppose China’s involvement in IOR’s maritime governance; 2) creates bureaucratic obstacles to India’s substantive maritime governance; 3) constrains Delhi’s ability to concentrate its substantive maritime governance efforts.

KEYWORDS:

• Maritime governance
• geopolitics
• Indian Ocean
• India
• China

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 These are Australia, Bangladesh, Comoros, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, UAE and Yemen. (IORA Member States 2021)

2 Or twenty-seven, according to other accounts.

3 Please note that some IOR states do not have navies and, hence, their coast guards serve as naval forces.

4 BRICS is an international grouping consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

5 India sought to do so by developing the port of Chabahar, Iran, as a regional transportation and economic hub and by signing naval agreements to use facilities in Oman and in the French territories in IO. See Pant 2018 and Chaudhury 2018.

6 IORA is a good example of this design problem. In most cases the members of the organization can adopt its programs on a voluntary basis, thus undermining its ability to implement its initiatives.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ivan Lidarev

Ivan Lidarev is an Asian security specialist and former advisor at Bulgaria’s National Assembly. He recently obtained his PhD in International Relations and Political Science from King’s College London.

Harsh V. Pant

Harsh V. Pant is a professor of international relations at the Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London, and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.