![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This article explores the rise of Christianity in urban Nepal through the lens of rural to urban migrants and their experiences. As Christianity continues its exponential growth in the Kathmandu Valley, especially among socially and culturally marginalized groups, the article provides theoretical indicators of what is driving the phenomenon. The article explores the motivations for Christian conversion through a comparative methodology: it compares rural-to-urban migrants who converted to Christianity with those who did not and remained Hindu. Interviews with these two groups (conducted from 2018 to 2021) open a window onto the perceived benefits of Christian conversion. The empirical findings are framed through sociological theories of conversion. Interviews show that Christian conversion in urban Nepal is associated with the development of new forms of sociality that assist newcomers to the city adjust to a larger, more anomic environment. Survey findings are supplemented by reports of Christian worship services from various churches in the Kathmandu Valley. The article ends by exploring possible reactions from mainstream Hinduism in Nepal, arguing that Hinduism in Nepal has not yet evolved in the direction of India’s populist hindutva but that among the professional classes personalistic forms of Hindu belief are flourishing.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 As Wagner (Citation2018) describes it, the 2015 Constitution appears to ban proselytization of religion but is perhaps deliberately ambiguous about interpersonal conversion.
2 Although as Basnet (Citation2016) points out, in rural areas, there is still a high demand for traditional ‘folk Hindu religion’ among janajati populations, so one should be wary in generalizing about large scale transformations in theological practice, especially in rural areas.
3 It would be intriguing to explore whether Christian or Maoist influence has led to more enduring forms of communality in this region.
4 At least among women because for men the wider world of caste discrimination negated the benefits.
5 Due to restrictions on travel caused by the Covid19 pandemic.
6 Mr Manab Tamang.
7 In that Hindu places of worship are not geared toward dissemination of ‘public’ information or contemporary forms of advice/training in the way that Churches are.
8 Poorer congregants are not expected to give 10%, and I heard nothing about potential sanctions for not giving from respondents.
9 It is possible that these reduced expenditures alone account for the impression among skeptical Hindu observers that Christians are doing surprisingly well financially.
10 The only Christian respondents to emphasize personal practice were the two LGBTQ respondents.
11 Interestingly, Liechty makes no reference to religion of any kind in his monograph.
12 See Toffin (Citation2016) for a detailed description of Hindu practices in this ‘self-expression’ mode.
13 Gellner and Letizia (Citation2016, 24) speculate that ritual-based religion may have limits of adaptability to modern conditions, especially when it becomes fossilized in a ‘heritage’ mode.
14 This is the main theme of Kirchheiner (Citation2017).
15 Jindra (Citation2011) argues that scholars often wrongly neglect theological content when studying processes of conversion.
16 Horton (Citation1971, 106) argues that a ‘post-industrial’ mentality typical of professional service sector workers will be inclined toward a more ‘theoretical’ model of the deity, rather than an ‘interventionist’ deity and this is then combined with a ‘personal relationship to God’ model which is more individualistic and ‘indulgent’, presumably because economic security enables a more expressive type of religious experience. Similarly, Roberts (Citation2016, 165) argues that ‘disinterested’ religion with an intellectualized / syncretic deity is seen as ‘rich man’s religion’ by slum dwellers.
17 This claim applies primarily to the hills areas of Nepal and to most of its urban areas, but in the Terai (plains areas bordering India) and among the Nepali diaspora the situation will be different. See, for example, Sijapati (Citation2018) on the Nepali diaspora.
18 Wagner (Citation2018) in one of the few published studies of Nepali Hindutva, focuses on elite-led movements against conversion around the time of debates about the new constitution in 2014 and 15, and does not mention any grassroots instantiations, which may be indicative.
19 This number incudes all festival participation – including ‘national’ festivals such as Dashain and Tihar.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Richard Bownas
Dr R. Bownas studies the political sociology of contemporary Nepal with particular reference to caste, post-conflict social change and religion. He has previously researched and published on social movements in India, and has recently published in Contemporary South Asia (27[2] pp: 179-195) on the socio-economic consequences of the 2015 earthquake in Nepal.