Issue definition and two‐level negotiations: An application to the American foreign policy process

Abstract

This article builds on the two‐level games and international negotiation literatures and shows how the use of an issue typology can shed light on the nature of the interactions between domestic political forces and international negotiations. This is done by presenting four foreign policy process models illustrating that the decision‐making process varies depending on the type of issue that is involved in a particular situation. The varying structure and nature of the process affects the range of the domestic level win‐set and hinders or aids the achievement of international agreement depending on which model is in play. Although the focus in this article is on the American foreign policy process, the argument is generic to the broader theoretical development of the two‐level games approach because similar, but country‐specific, decision‐making models can be developed for use in the study of non‐American foreign policy. Such generalizations build on recent work focusing on the impact of state structure on the foreign policy process and its outcomes.